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ABSTRACT
CARING CHOICES:
DECISION MAKING FOR
CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS
BETTY WOLDER LEVIN

Decision making for catastrophically ill newborns has recently
emerged as a social issue.

Advances in biomedical technology and

practice, and changes in other economic, social and political factors
have led to controversy about norms to guide treatment choice.

While

much has been written on how such decisions should be made, there has
been little social science research on how such decisions are actually
made.

The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the way that
clinicians think about treatment decisions for catastrophically ill
newborns.

The focus is on decision making with respect to the

limitation of treatment in those situations in which clinicians feel
that an infant is terminally ill and/or severely impaired.

The aim is

to place the issue in its broad social context, explicate how clinicians
categorize information, examine how clinicians utilize these categories
in making decisions, investigate the process of decision making in the
context of social change, and elucidate some of the ethical and policy
questions.
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A major finding of this research is that treatment of
catastrophically ill newborns is heavily influenced fay the way that
clinicians conceptualize the issues involved in treatment choice.
Rather than a clear cut choice "to treat" or "not to treat," decision
making is a complex process in which clinicians, and sometimes parents,
make decisions about which treatments are appropriate to give at a
particular point in time.

Clinicians conceptualize this as a choice

about "the aggressiveness" of treatment.
clinician decision making.

A model is derived to explain

Clinicians are seen to categorize

characteristics of patient condition along the dimensions of quality of
life, uncertainty, critical condition and social value; treatments are
categorized according to aggressiveness, ordinary/extraordinary means,
withholding and withdrawing treatment and passive/active euthanasia.
Each of these dimensions is culturally determined.

There is variation

in clinician conceptualization of characteristics of patient condition
and treatment, the goals of treatment, and the norms for decision
making.

The primary mode of research for this study was participant
observation in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).

Treatment choices

in routine and problematic cases were observed and clinicians were
interviewed to elicit information on factors relevant to the decision
making process.

In addition, clinicians from other NICUs were

interviewed and meetings and conferences were attended.

Documents in

the clinical, legal, bioethical, social science, and popular literature
were analyzed and a survey on treatment choice for catastrophically ill
newborns was conducted.
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CHAPTER ONE

CARING CHOICES: INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in biomedical technology and practice have
dramatically increased the ability to prolong the lives of critically
ill patients.

Although, in most cases, the use of life saving

technology is seen as clearly beneficial, in some cases its use has been
seen as inappropriate for it leads to suffering on the part of patients
and their families.

Clinicians, bioethicists and others have felt that

traditional medical ethics have been inadequate to deal with the new
technologies.

Yet, daily, clinicians, patients, and families have had

to made choices about the care of the critically ill.

While clinicians, philosophers, theologians and legal scholars
have written much on issues concerning medical ethics and the care of
the critically ill, social scientists have done little research on this
topic (Fox 1984).

As a result, much has been written on how decisions

should be made, but relatively little research has been done on how
decisions are actually made.

Such research is important in at least two

respects. It can contribute toward the development of social theory by
providing a context in which to study the effects of rapid technological
change on cognitive systems and behavior.

Second, by providing an

analysis which critically examines assumptions usually made in
discussions concerning the care of the critically ill, it can contribute
towards a resolution of ethical issues and the development of social
policy.
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Background to the Problem

This dissertation will focus on decisions in neonatology, the
specialty which provides care to critically ill newborns.

Much of the

bioethics literature concerns treatment decisions in neonatology, for
these decisions exemplify the ethical issues which arise from rapid
changes in medical technology and practice.

Recent developments have

enabled neonatologists to save the lives of many previously non-viable
newborns.

While most of these newborns will have no lasting

impairments, others will have severe disabilities.

For still others,

treatment can do no more than prolong the dying process.

Decisions to

limit treatment lead to the death of some babies, and the limitation of
treatment affects the timing of death for others.

While the limitation of treatment has been an issue of concern to
clinicians and bioethicists for over fifteen years, it has only recently
emerged as a salient political and social issue, following the
announcement of the Baby Doe Directives.

These directives, issued first

in the Spring of 1982, and subsequent revisions, represent the first
attempt by the Federal Government to regulate treatment of the
critically ill.

Now, such questions as: "Which Babies Shall Live?" and

"Who Should Decide?" are being widely discussed.
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While much has been written concerning how decisions should be
made in neonatology, there has been little examination of the basis on
which decisions are actually being made.

Most of the literature on the

choice of treatment for the catastrophically ill infants has concerned
ideal norms that the authors have felt should guide behavior, rather
than the behavior norms which are important in guiding actual practice.
(For a review of such work, see the President's Commission Report 1983;
Weir 1984.)

For example, even those articles written by clinicians, based on
series of cases (e.g.

Duff and Campbell 1973), do not analyze the

factors which have affected decision making, but rather are primarily
concerned with recommendations for policy to affect future cases.
Articles by philosophers have done much to explicate and evaluate the
values and principles which underlie various positions (c.f.

Arras

1985), Those by legal scholars present a range of positions concerning
the applicability of laws pertaining to homicide, manslaughter, child
neglect and discrimination against the handicapped (c.f.
1975; Ellis 1982).

Robertson

However, no previous study has examined the way that

perspectives from the bioethical or legal domains have been incorporated
into the process of clinical decision making to affect decisions in
actual cases.

There is an extensive and growing social science literature on
death and dying (Riley 1983; Palgi and Abramovitch 1984), on technology
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in medicine (Fox 1976; Reiser 1978) and on clinical decision making
(Elstein et al. 1982) but relatively few studies have focused on
decisions to limit treatment.

The most comprehensive study, by Diana

Crane (1977), indicates that physicians' norms are changing; they are
moving away from a purely physiological definition of life to one based
on a social definition.

"The treatable patient is one who, if treated,

is capable of resuming his social roles even minimally and temporarily"
(p. 11).

In some cases, in which patients can't resume their social

roles, treatment is withheld.

Although not discussed in much detail in

her book, Crane's data shows that even when some treatments were
withheld, other treatments are provided (Crane 1975).

Christina M.

Mumma and Jeanne Quint Benoliel (1984) found that even when patients had
conditions labeled by their physicians as either grim or terminal, and
had been designated "no code" (they would not be resuscitated if their
hearts stopped), they still received cure oriented treatments.

From research based primarily on participant observation in two
neonatal intensive care units, Renee Anspach (forthcoming) found that
"physicians and nurses, because of their [differential] experience in
the intensive care nursery, differed systematically in their views of
the infant's prognosis."

These differences in views of prognosis affect

their evaluations of future quality of life for the babies, and, in
turn, their attitudes toward life and death decisions.

No other study

has focused on the conceptualization of such treatment decisions.
Recently Guillemin and Holmstrom (1986) have published a study on
neonatal decision making.

It examines the social relations of parents
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and staff in the unit and places the development of neonatal intensive
care within the context of the American medical system.

Medical anthropologists have studied the relationship of
conceptualizations about illness and treatment behavior of healers in
many Non-Western societies and the relationship of those
conceptualizations and behavior to economic, political and social
factors.

Recent work by medical anthropologists and other social

scientists interested in the social construction of medical work have
begun to examine biomedicine as a sociocultural system.

For example,

Gaines and Hahn write:
Concepts, explanations, and prescribed reactions to conditions of
health and illness are constructed in social interactions, both
collaborative and conflictual; that is suffering, welfare, and
responses to them are socially defined. These same conditions
(and reactions to them) are also socially affected in another way:
they are produced or caused by human social interactions which
distribute the members of society and (other) resources in time
and space and by activity. Pathogenic sources and resources for
their amelioration are distributed in the same sociocultural
process.
(Gaines and Hahn 1985:9)

Studies looking at biomedicine both in the clinical and wider societal
context have looked at how clinicians and other members of society use
cultural symbol systems "both as models of and for reality and action as
well as examining how the material and social conditions of society
shape the models (Gaines and Hahn 1985).

As material and social

conditions change, so too does the ideology and practice of medicine"
(Colombotos and Kirchner 1986; Baer 1982).
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A recent concern of some anthropologists has been to develop an
understanding of the cognitive processes used in making decisions in
various contexts.

They have emphasized the limitations of using formal

models of decision making to account for decisions made in natural
settings.

Instead, they have stressed the need to examine the

structuring of decision choices, the organization of knowledge into
meaningful cultural categories, the goals involved, and the contexts in
which the decisions are made.

They find that variation along these

dimensions can be used to account for variations in behavior (Young
1983; Mathews and Nardi 1983).

Background to the Study

The research for this dissertation began in 1977 when I was
invited to work for the "Task Force on Ethical and Value Issues in
Neonatology."

This interdisciplinary task force was composed of

clinicians from the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) of ColumbiaPresbyterian Medical Center and academics from other parts of Columbia
University.

My work involved observing in the NICU and participating on

the task force.

I had very little previous knowledge about bioethics or

experience in clinical settings, none in critical care.

I had come with

a background in anthropology and interests in reproduction, ethnicity
and other subcultural differences, and technological and social change.

From a brief introduction to the bioethical literature and the
popular media, where there had recently been many articles on Karen Ann
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Quinlan, I thought that the ethical problems would involve decisions
about "pulling the plug."
"treatment" —

I pictured this as a choice between giving

using all possible means to promote survival — and "no

treatment" — the cessation of all treatment.

I was perplexed to find

that all treatments were never withheld; rather, for some babies who
were catastrophically ill, some treatments were given which would
increase the babies' chances for survival, while others were withheld.
While I couldn't understand why only some treatments were being given,
the physicians and nurses working in the unit seemed to feel that such
partial treatment decisions were perfectly natural.

When they explained

what they were doing, they sometimes talked about patients, treatments,
and choices in a way that I couldn't comprehend.

I hypothesized that not only, as Crane had found, were norms
changing concerning which patients would be treated, but other norms and
concepts were changing as well.
a different subculture.^

In fact, I felt that I was dealing with

Clinicians seemed to have an elaborate

cognitive system to deal with the complex issues they dealt with daily,
using concepts and norms which were somewhat different from those shared
by most members of the larger society.

Here was a situation in which technology was changing very
rapidly.

Traditional norms were felt to be inadequate guides to

The ideological system used by philosophers, bioethicists, and
others professionals who discussed the ethics of decision making in
neonatology seemed to comprise yet another subculture in which questions
were framed, and concepts were used in a way which seemed to be
different from both those of the clinicians and those shared more widely
by members of the culture.
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behavior.

Yet, clinicians had to make decisions about how to act.

Their behavior was relevant to and, I assumed must be shaped by ideas
about, some of the most critical concerns of our society including life,
death and disability, suffering and mercy, parental and professional
responsibility, the uses of science and technology, and the role of God
and of human action.

Research in the neonatal intensive care unit seemed to provide an
ideal setting in which to study sociocultural change in the wake of
changing technology.

My entree into the NICU also seemed to provide an

excellent opportunity to study the ways that the people who had the most
experience in dealing with deciding about care for catastrophically ill
newborns thought about the factors involved.

Statement of the Problem

The research questions addressed in this dissertation are: How do
clinicians conceptualize choices about limiting care in an NICU? What
factors affect these conceptualizations? More specifically: How
do clinicians choose which treatments to give and which to withhold from
the range of possible treatments, in caring for catastrophically ill
newborns?

How do material and social factors affect the way that

clinicians think about treatment choices?

In this dissertation, the manner in which clinicians structure
decision choices, how they organize information into culturally relevant
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categories and what norms and goals they use to guide treatment behavior
will be explicated.

This cognitive system, used to make treatment

choices for catastrophically ill newborns, will be looked at as it takes
place within the larger sociocultural system.

The dissertation reports on research which has investigated
material and social conditions which may impact on neonatal care, in
general, and those factors that pertain to the development and use of
medical technology in particular.

More generally, this dissertation illuminates issues relevant to
anthropological research on decision making, intracultural variability,
and social change.

It is also intended to provide substantive

information on decision making about the critically ill which may be of
use to clinicians, bioethicists, and others interested in critically
evaluating clinical practice and developing social policy.

Discussion of Terms

Catastrophically 111 Newborns

The dissertation concerns the treatments of catastrophically ill
infants, babies who are ill and whose illness or condition is socially
defined as a catastrophe, (a disaster, calamity or serious unfortunate
occurrence) by his or her family and/or professional caretakers).
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That term is used, as opposed to other terms sometimes used to
refer to such infants, such as anomalous, damaged, deformed, defective
or disabled, because those terms seem to imply that it is the physical
state of the child which defines the problems.

Catastrophically ill

defines a social rather than a physical state, as the term "illness" may
be used to refer to a social entity in contrast to a "disease" which may
be defined as a biological entity (Fabrega 1979).

A child may be defined as "catastrophically ill" because of the
presence of a serious illness, prematurity, and/or present or future
expected impairment.

Not all children with the same physical conditions

will be defined as catastrophically ill.

Catastrophically ill infants

include, but is not limited to, infants who are critically ill.

It also

includes, but is not limited to, those infants for whom caretakers
consider the limitation of treatment.

Treatments

In this dissertation, the term treatment is used broadly to refer
to anything that a clinician does to promote the health of a patient.
It includes such things as therapeutic and diagnostic medical and
surgical procedures, drugs, provision of fluids and nutrition, use of
isolettes or dressings to maintain a sterile environment, and social
interaction intended for the benefit of the patient.
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Clinicians

The term "clinicians," when used without qualification in this
dissertation, refers to the physicians and nurses who work in neonatal
intensive care.

It is used to refer to individuals who share a

knowledge base as a result of socialization in these medical and nursing
specialties - neonatologists and neonatal nurses.

It is also used to

refer to other physicians (e.g. residents, pediatric surgeons) who work
with catastrophically ill newborns).

The clinical model

The focus of this dissertation is the development of a model for
use in elucidating clinicians' conceptualizations of treatment choice.
Clinicians do not appear to use a single conceptual model.

The model

developed here can be used to understand the range of factors felt to be
important by clinicians, their norms and their goals.

It is an analyst's model used to understand the actors' cognitive
system.

It was derived from observation of clinicians' behavior,

including treatment choices and explanations of why those choices were
made.

It includes concepts meaningful in other domains, such as law,

religion, and bioethics, as they are significant to clinicians.
model is comprehensible to clinicians and acknowledged to be a
representation of relevant factors.
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The

Methodology and description of the site

This dissertation is based on data collected by a variety of
methods.

The principle source of data has been participant observation,

mostly in one neonatal intensive care unit.

In addition, a survey of

attitudes about neonatal decision making was conducted, and documents
were examined from the clinical, bioethics, legal and popular
literature.

A more detailed account of aspects of methodology appears

in the appendix.

Description of the Site

Most of the research for this dissertation was conducted in the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical
Center.
complex.

It is one of the most modern looking areas of the hospital
Formerly a small, dark unit on the second floor of the aging

pediatric hospital, the unit was moved into newly renovated quarters on
the top floor in 1974.

In 1983, the other half of the floor was

renovated and the labor and delivery area was moved from another floor
in an adult wing of the hospital to be adjacent to the NICU.

From the large windows surrounding the neonatal unit, one can look
out over much of Northern Manhattan, Harlem and the South Bronx, home to
many of the families of babies who are admitted to the unit.

Other
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babies' families come from other areas of New York City and Northern New
Jersey, Westchester, and Southern Connecticut.

About 55 babies a month

are admitted to the unit, about 60% born in the hospital, 40% from other
hospitals in the City and suburbs.

About half of the infants are

private patients, the other half are "service," usually Medicaid,
patients.^

As is typical of the New York City patient population, most

of the private patients are White, many of the service patients are
Black or Hispanic; some of the service patients are the children of very
young mothers.

The unit is built in two main sections, a nine bed acute care unit
for infants needing maximal care, and a twenty-four bed semi- acute unit
for infants discharged from the acute section and other babies needing
less acute care.

The unit usually runs "over census;" all of the beds

are usually filled, with additional babies sometimes sent down to other
floors where the normal newborn nurseries are located.

On "the floor"

(the term used to refer to the entire unit) there are additional rooms
^
All specific figures and descriptive information refers to the
period of most intense field work, the "ethnographic present" for this
study, 1982. Over the course of the research period, there were some
changes in organization and structure. For example, work patterns of
house staff and nurses changed as did the administrative structure of
the hospital. The number of admissions rose from about 500 per year in
1977 to about 700 per year in 1985). None of these institutional
changes had major significance for the problems addressed by this
research.
During the period of research, there were some significant changes
in the treatments available and their use. After the completion of the
primary data collection period, in the Spring of 1983 the Baby Doe
Regulations were widely publicized; in December of 1983, a Neonatal
Ethics Review Committee was established. Each of these may have had a
significant impact on the way that decisions are conceptualized and/or
made. When the time of data collection is significant, it will be noted
in the text.
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for physicians and nurses offices, a social worker's office, a staff
lounge, research labs, offices for a follow-up study, a parent lounge, a
breast feeding room, and utility rooms.

One room in the labor and

delivery suite, a "transitional nursery" for care of infants immediately
after birth, is also part of the neonatal service.

The acute care unit is a single large room separated by walls and
doors from the rest of the floor.
nurses station.

The room is built around a central

The sickest babies are admitted to this section first.

Almost all babies are in isolettes, plastic walled "incubators" with
port holes on the side through which clinicians can provide care and
their parents can touch them.

Some of the babies can be taken out and

held by nurses or parents for feedings or rocking, but most babies in
this unit are very sick and remain in their isolettes, lying still most
of the time, dressed in only a diaper or nothing at all.

The majority of the babies admitted to the unit are premature
(below 37 weeks), many are very premature, very low birth weight (under
about three pounds), some with less than 25 of the normal 40 weeks
gestation.

There are also a number of babies with cardiac conditions,

with other congenital conditions, and infants who have suffered birth
accidents or for other reasons are seriously or critically ill.

All of the babies are attached to monitors which continually beep
and frequently sound alarms when there are irregularities in a baby's
heart beat or quirks in the machinery.

Most of the babies need
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respiratory support and are attached by tubes to machines, respirators3
(sending bursts of air to the baby's lung) or CPAP (delivering a
continuous flow of positive pressure air to assist breathing).
the babies have IVs, some more than one.

Most of

Many of the infants have

stuffed animals, other toys, pictures of family, or religious objects
that their parents have placed in their isolettes.

Numerous times each day, nurses draw blood by pricking the babies'
heels or doctors draw blood by IV which is checked in a small lab
adjacent to the unit or sent downstairs for more elaborate tests.
Technicians wheel portable X-ray equipment into the unit so that the
conditions of baby's lungs and the placement of tubes can be examined.
Portable ultra-sound equipment is also used frequently to see if the
babies have had bleeding in the brain.

Almost all of a baby's

treatment, including minor surgical procedures, takes place in the unit.
As results of tests come in, they are noted and discussed and
adjustments are made in the care of the babies.

The semi-acute section is more crowded.

While some of the babies

are also very sick and are in isolettes, attached to monitors,
respiratory support and IVs; others are not as sick and are in open
basinettes, dressed in tee shirts and wrapped in blankets.
these babies can be held for feedings.

Most of

Although the babies in the acute

section rarely smile or cry, these healthier infants are more animate.
Some of the babies started in the acute section, others are larger
3
The correct term for such machines is "ventilator", but they are
commonly called "respirators". They will be referred to as respirators
throughout this dissertation.
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premature infants, children of addicted mothers, babies who are stable
awaiting or recovering from surgery, or who have other conditions that
generally are not as critical as those of babies in the more acute
section.

Occasionally, a terminally ill baby might be on the semi-acute

side if it is not felt that more intensive care would be of benefit.

The average baby stays about 19 days.

Premature babies generally

stay until close to their due date (i.e. three months for a baby born at
27 weeks).

Much of the time is spent "growing" on the semi-acute side.

If a baby has serious complications, however, the stay can be much
longer.

In rare cases, babies have lived for years in the NICU and then

have died there.

The mortality rate for the entire floor is about 8%,

or about one death per week.
no significant problems.

The vast majority of babies go home with

The costs of care are approximately $1000.00 a

day.

While the first impression that strikes a visitor is probably the
high technology character of the floor, the atmosphere is not cold or
stark, but bright and busy.
care to each baby.

There are many people involved in providing

Though the unit is busier during the day, many

clinicians are there each night, weekends, and holidays.

The nurses and

the house staff (residents and neonatal fellows) deliver most of the
direct care.

The clinicians working in the NICU care very deeply about the well
being of the babies.

They realize that many of the decisions they make

each day could be crucial in determining a baby's future health and/or
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survival.

The majority of decisions are seen as "medical" or "nursing"

decisions, but the clinicians are keenly aware that many are "ethical
decisions" as well.

Many clinicians are involved at various levels in

making decisions about the care of each baby.

Most routine decisions

are made by the house staff and nurses, attending physicians establish
the standards and either make or sanction the majority of the most
important decisions.

Most doctors and nurses who work in the NICU are

very dedicated to their work; many spend innumerable hours beyond that
officially required, watching over and caring for critically ill babies.

There are about 100 nurses on staff.

A nurse can take care of

only one or two babies at a time in the acute care unit; they can
usually care for three or four on the semi-acute side.

The nurses

monitor the babies condition, do some tests, give medications, feed and
clean the babies, and provide support to the parents.

The nursing

leadership on the floor is comprised of a nursing care coordinator, two
head nurses, assistant head nurses and an educational coordinator.

Nurses make independent nursing care decisions and carry out
doctors' orders concerning medical management.

Many of the neonatal

nurses are highly trained and have worked for many years in neonatal
intensive care.

They often know more about neonatal conditions and

treatment modalities than some doctors, especially the residents, and
frequently know more about the families.

Although they are not licensed

to make medical decisions, their knowledge is usually respected and they
are sometimes very influential in decision making.
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Two second year residents are "on rotation" each month to care for
the babies in the acute unit.

One third year resident and three first

year residents care for the babies on the semi-acute side.

At least one •

resident is present to take care of the babies on each side round-theclock.

They devise the everyday care plans for the babies, in

consultation with more senior physicians.
carry out most medical procedures.

They write the orders and

They also care for sick babies

immediately after birth in the delivery room.

In addition, at all times

at least one of the eight neonatal fellows (doing 2 years post residency
training in neonatology) is working on the floor or helping to transport
sick babies to the unit.

They perform some routine and many of the more

complicated procedures both in the nursery and at delivery.
to teach and supervise the care given by the residents.

They help

Both residents

and fellows talk to parents about the care of their infants.

One or two of the ten attending neonatologists are "on service"
each month.

They may leave the hospital, but an attending is always "on

call"; they frequently return in the middle of the night.

They are the

people primarily responsible for overseeing the clinical care on the
floor.

While the more junior physicians make most of the routine

decisions, except in an emergency situation,, attendings play a major
role in making major decisions.

Although parents may choose another doctor, the attending
physician on service becomes the private doctor for most patients
admitted during the month.

Service patients, as well as private

patients, have an attending physician.

While the care provided by the
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nurses, residents and fellows is the same for private and service
patients, attendings frequently are more closely involved in following
the care of their private patients and frequently spend more time
talking to their parents.

In addition to the neonatologists, physicians from other services
are involved in the care of the infants.

Columbia is relatively unique

among neonatal units in having a full time anesthesiologist who oversees
the respiratory care of the infants.

As in other centers, physicians

from Cardiology, Cardiac Surgery, Pediatric Surgery, Infectious Disease,
Neurology, Neurosurgery and other services, are frequently involved in
the care of infants.

Sometimes babies are the patients of doctors from

other services, then these doctors may make major decisions, more often
they serve as consultants to the neonatologists who are the primary
decision makers.

Neonatologists often serve as consultants to

obstetricians who make decisions before a fetus is born.

Once the baby

is born, typically the obstetricians are not involved in the baby's
care.

A full time social worker is assigned to the unit.

She provides

psychological support to parents and helps them obtain services.
some units social workers are very involved in decision making.

In
At

Columbia, at the time I did field work, the social worker didn't become
involved at all in treatment decisions.

Numerous technicians also are

involved in the infants' care, taking X-rays, doing EKGs, etc.
too, do not play a role in decision making.
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They

Officially, parents have the legal right and responsibility to
make health care decisions for their children.

The ideology of the unit

strongly supports the importance of parental decision making. In actual
practice, however, since the parents typically have little previous
knowledge about their baby's conditions and the options for treatment,
they are very dependent on information from the clinicians; the ways
that clinicians frame treatment decisions are very important in
determining what treatment choices are made.

In general, parents did

not spend more than a few hours a day in the unit, many were there much
less.

Research Strategy

In conducting field work, my primary research strategy was to
observe and record ongoing behavior.

I watched and recorded information

as nurses and physicians delivered direct care to the babies and
conducted diagnostic tests.

I read and recorded information from the

hospital charts, the nurses'Kardex, and other unit records.

I followed

the physicians as they conducted work rounds and sign off rounds, as
they twice daily discussed the care of each baby.

I attended the nurses

"report" where they discussed the care of each baby at the change of
each shift.

I observed daily teaching rounds where the care of a

particular baby or for a particular problem were discussed, weekly
perinatal and social service rounds, and monthly mortality and morbidity
rounds.

I attended special meetings of physicians and nurses called to

discuss the care of infants who presented particular problems.
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I

watched approximately 15 births and observed care in the transitional
nursery immediately after birth for at least twice that number of
babies.

I attended a memorial service.

I observed minor and major

procedures including surgery and cardiac catheterization.

I observed in

the follow up clinic and attended "alumni" days when babies who
"graduated" from the unit returned for a yearly picnic.

I spent a lot

of time in the staff lounge, and in other settings, where informal
conversations about the babies took place.

Early in my research, I decided that I would focus on the behavior
and conceptual system of clinicians.

I decided not to conduct regular

interviews with parents or plan to observe private conversations between
parents and clinicians.

At the suggestion of clinicians, I did conduct

long interviews with three mothers and had shorter conversations with a
few others.

In the course of my observations, I did overhear and

observe numerous conversations with parents and other family members in
the unit.

I conducted extended interviews with some parents I

encountered through personal connections who had infants cared for in
other intensive care units.

When I first started my research, I felt that I know too little to
impose on families who were going through such a traumatic time; later I
realized that many parents would like an opportunity to talk with
someone about their experience.

By then, however, I had decided to

concentrate on understanding the perspective of the clinicians. Working
with parents would have changed the nature of the research.
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Over the course of fieldwork, from 1977 to 1985, I spent
approximately 1300 hours in the unit at Columbia.

Most of time I wore a

white lab coat, the type worn by fellows, attendings and the nursing
leadership as well as research scientists.

Sometimes I would "hang out"

at the nurses station in the acute unit, reading charts, going over to
listen as a group of clinicians would discuss a case.

Other times I

would follow a single clinician as he or she worked.

When I talked to a

new clinician, I would introduce myself as an anthropologist interested
in studying how decisions were made in neonatology.

I wore a name tag

that had my name on it and "Division of Sociomedical Sciences."

At

times, I became a familiar fixture in the NICU, fading into the
background of familiar faces in white coats.

Often, when X followed a

clinician to another location or a new person came into the unit, they
probably assumed I was a doctor, nurse, visitor, student, or one of the
many other types of observers common in the teaching hospital.

Despite my efforts to keep a low profile, and to make it clear
than I was interested in understanding behavior, not judge it, my role
was often misunderstood.
"the ethics lady."

I was sometimes referred to by terms such as

For years, one attending, not really joking,

referred to me as a "spy."

Sometimes as I would walk into the unit,

someone would say "Here's a real case for you" or something else that
would make clear that I represented the gaze of "ethics;" generally,
however, I think that the clinicians ignored my presence and did
basically what they would have done if I wasn't there.

They were very

busy and had important work to do.
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Sometimes I would sit down and have long conversations with a
clinician about a particular case or issue.

Over the years, the

director of the nurseries, two attending physicians, an assistant head
nurse (who now works in another NICU), a clinical nurse specialist, the
educational coordinator, the nursing care coordinator, and a former NICU
nurse/Assistant Professor at the Nursing School became my key
informants.

Their help has been invaluable in exploring the issues in

neonatal decision making in depth.

I was fortunate in that my observations in the unit had started at
the invitation of the task force; in the words of Charles Bosk, I was an
"invited guest" (Bosk 1985).
I asked to observe.

I was never denied access to any situation

I promised that I would not reveal the individual

identities of clinicians or babies I observed.

For years, the staff

tolerated my presence before I revealed my own opinions about the issues
about which I had interrogated them.

I gave the first real feed back on

my observations in 1983, after I had finished the most intensive part of
my field work.

I had assumed I would use a pseudonym for the hospital.

When I showed a paper I had written, to the Director of the unit, in
which I had used vague terms to refer to the hospital, he requested I
identify it in my papers; academic medicine is exactly that - academic
as well as medicine.
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Significance

While the cognitive processes involved in decision making have
been studied extensively in the laboratory by psychologists and others,
there has been relatively little research on the cognitive processes
used by people to inform behavior in natural settings (Mathews and Nardi
1983).

There has been even less research on variation in cognitive

systems in natural settings. Although there have been many studies of
social change, both in the situation of culture contact (e.g. Spicer
1961), and evolutionary change in sociocultural systems (e.g. Steward
1955), there has been little research on relatively small scale
indigenous social and technological changes and variation and change in
cognitive systems.

This research is intended to provide data and

analysis of variation in a natural setting in the use of norms,
categories and goals.

It is also intended to investigate the impact of

material and social changes in the larger context on changes in
conceptual systems.

During the past few decades, issues of biomedical ethics have
emerged from relative obscurity to become a "primary medium through
which fundamental aspects of our social, cultural, and cosmic way of
thinking, feeling, and believing about ourselves, our society, this
planet, and the universe are gradually being altered" (Fox 1980:45).
The current debate about treatment for catastrophically ill newborns
reflects unresolved issues in our culture concerning ethics and values
in regard to the definition of life and personhood, the value of
children, obligations to dependent persons, and the appropriate use of
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technology.

This study provides information on aspects of treatment

choices for the critically ill which have received little attention but
which have crucial individual and societal implications.

It is intended to be of use in trying to resolve the ethical and
value issues concerning the care of the catastrophically ill.

The

current level of biomedical technology creates a situation in which
decisions must be made concerning the prolongation of life and the
timing of death for many critically ill patients.

As the power of the

technology increases, the potential economic and social costs can only
increase.

The implications of the situation have not been fully faced

by many clinicians, nor by society at large.

Information on how such

decisions are made may help to clarify the conscious and unconscious
basis for decision making in clinical practice and can be useful in the
profession and public debate on these issues.

Outline of the Dissertation

The second chapter of this dissertation examines the issue of
treatment choice for adults.

It provides cross cultural and historical

information on the withholding of medical treatment and a review of the
legal, ethical and sociological literature on the issue.

The third chapter examines the development of care for newborns.
It provides a brief cross cultural and historic survey, and examines
factors leading to the development of neonatal intensive care.
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leading to concern about the issue of withholding treatment from
newborns are presented and the legal, ethical and sociological
literature is discussed.

The fourth chapter examines categorization, goals, norms and
decision making.

Theoretical concepts are discussed and examples drawn

from medical and other settings are provided.

The use of these concepts

to examine neonatal decision making is introduced.

In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, the conceptual system
of clinicians is examined in detail.

Clinicians' conceptualization of

characteristics of patient condition, characteristics of treatments, and
goals and norms for care are presented.
controversy are explicated.

General areas of consensus and

Examples drawn from participant observation

and from the survey are discussed.

In the eighth chapter, recent changes in the conceptualization of
decision making and treatment behavior are explored in more depth.

Then

the first published debate on decision making for newborns, variation in
the treatment infants, changes over time in the treatment of infants
with spina bifida and those who are premature are discussed.
Perspectives on the Baby Doe regulations and clinicians interpretations
of the regulations are presented and general trends in changes in
decision making are discussed.
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In the final chapter, the dissertation is summarized and
conclusions are presented.

Theoretical and substantive implications of

the study are presented as part of a discussion of problems for future
research, and of decision making and social policy.
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CHAPTER TWO

UNPLUGGING THE MYTH:
BACKGROUND TO WITHHOLDING TREATMENT

The ethical issues involved in withholding medical treatments from
critically ill patients are often presented as a new problems attributed
to amazing progress in the ability to support life which has occurred
during the past thirty years, or, to declining social values.

The issue

has certainly gained salience, and there are new dilemmas due to new
technological developments.

Questions concerning the aggressiveness of

treatment for critically ill patients, however, have probably been
raised as long as there have been efforts made by humans to prolong
life.

Questions have been debated in the Western medical and

philosophical traditions prior to the recent medical advances.

This chapter will begin with an historical sketch of some of the
issues pertaining to choices about the aggressiveness of treatment for
adults.

Information on laws and current practices will also be

presented.

Participant observation and chart review studies of the care

of the care of the terminally ill and surveys of decision making about
the withholding of treatment will also be reviewed.
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Euthanasia - Cross Cultural and Historical Perspectives

In every culture, healers and or family members make decisions
about how to care for critically ill patients.

Each culture has a range

of available techniques and must decide which are appropriate in a given
situation.

Although systematic cross cultural data on this issue is

scarce (Kunstadter 1980), it seems reasonable to suppose that healers
and family members may consider such factors as the potential risks,
suffering, and resource use (as culturally defined) in making decisions
about how to treat patients (Christine Paddoch, personal communication
1983; Young 1983).

Decision making about withholding treatment can be thought of in
the context of possible acts toward a critically ill patient.

One can

consider four types: l) acts to prolong life, for the benefit of the
patient, 2) acts to end life, for the benefit of the patient, 3) acts to
prolong life, to harm the patient, and A) acts to end life, to harm the
patient.

Those that fall in the second category, those intended to

bring about death for the benefit of the patient, either by acts of
omission or commission, can be thought of as euthanasia, that is, a
"good death."

In many primitive cultures, shamen were seen as functioning both
to heal and also to harm, in some instances, causing death.

In some

situations, healers may have used preparations to hasten and or ease
deaths which could not be prevented.

The fact that the Hippocratic Oath

dictates that physicians shall not do anything to actively bring about
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death, probably means that such requests were made, and that healers in
other contemporary traditions were perhaps engaging in such practices.

According to David Amundson (1974), the Hippocratic Corpus defines
medicine as having three goals: l) Doing away with suffering of the ill,
2) Lessening the violence of their ailments, and 3) Refusing to treat
those who are overmastered by their diseases.

Decisions were often made

not to treat based on the belief that the medical arts could not be of
help, and might even lead to patient suffering or hasten death.
option to treat or not to treat was up to the physician.
based primarily on prognosis.

The

Decisions were

Prolonging the life of an individual who

could not ultimately recover was seen as unethical.

The conceptions of death have been very different in different
cultures and through time in the Western Cultural tradition.

For

example, while in the contemporary Western imagination death is often
seen as a deep violation against the proper order of things, rather than
as part of that natural order, other cultures have a very different
view.

(Carse 1978; Palgi and Abramovitch 1984).

The meaning of efforts

to extend life will vary with beliefs about death as well as with
changes in political, economic and social changes in society.

A distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatments have a
long history.
such as St.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, Catholic theologians,
Alphonsus and Paul Laymann held that "no one is held to

extraordinary and very difficult means to preserve his life, such as the
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amputation of a leg, unless his life be necessary for the common good
(O'Donnell 1956:57).

A traditional role of the physician was often to provide comfort
and assistance to the dying.

In part, this involved recognizing the

point in time at which the patient could be said to be dying so that the
patient could deal with unresolved social or spiritual issues.

From

that point when the patient was defined as dying, the physician was not
to do anything which might be seen as causing suffering.

Host often,

deaths were the result of infectious diseases or accidents, and occurred
rapidly (Aries 1974; Reiser, Dyck and Curran 1977; Gruman 1978).

19th century issues relating to euthanasia

Fry, in his article on the history of euthanasia, traces the
change in the use of the term "euthanasia."

At first it was used for

"spiritual euthanasia" referring to the state of mind at the time of
death.

Between 1870 and 1890 the current connotation emerged; since

then it has been used for the giving or omitting medical treatments to
bring about "a good death" to relieve suffering.

Yet even earlier,

"euthanasia" was sometimes used to refer to decisions to forego
treatment.

There had been debate about the use of "heroic" medicine in

the early 19th century.
C.F.H.

Fry paraphrases a paper published in 1829 by

Marx entitled "De euthanasia medica prolusio," in which the

physician author urged his peers to:
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... accept responsibility for his patient's 'spiritual
euthanasia.' This is to be accomplished by providing physical and
moral comfort and by avoiding the use of heroic medications which
are likely to be worthless.
Yet Marx clearly differentiated this from acts meant to hasten
death, which he felt would not be consonant with the physician's
mission to save life.
(1978:494-5).

In addition to stopping the useless treatment of terminally ill
patients, within the medical profession, earlier technological
developments have also led to situations in which practitioners have had
to deal with questions concerning conflicts between the traditional
medical goals of relieving suffering and preserving life.

Before anesthesia was developed, surgeons had to consider the
ethical issues involved in deciding if the benefits of surgery would
justify the pain.

When anesthesia was first introduced, and its use was

very risky, there were debates about the ethics of risking death for the
relief of pain.

It was resolved by what Pernick refers to as a

"moderate utilitarian measurement to pros and cons, a calculus of
suffering" (1983).

The end of the 19th century through the 1930's saw a

debate on the issue of active euthanasia which was advocated by some
physicians (Reiser, Dyck and Curran 1977).

A majority of physicians

rejected the notion that their role should be to actively end life.

The

debate concerning the ethics of giving pain medication for the purpose
of relieving suffering which, as an unintended but not unforeseen
consequence might shorten the life of the patient, extended past the
middle of the 20th century (Fry 1978; Reiser, Dyck and Curran 1977;
Williams 1957).
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Rise of the Technological Imperative: the Battle Against Death

The debate concerning active measures taken which would cause
death did not involve a significantly different situation in earlier
periods than it does today.

As a result of recent technological

developments, however, questions concerning the cessation of treatments
intended to prolong life do take place in a significantly different
context.

In the past, the power of clinicians to actually prolong the

lives of critically ill patients was very limited.

In this century,

especially since World War II, the power of medicine to significantly
prolong life has increased greatly.

Whereas, in the past the

withholding of life saving treatment made little difference, it can now
have a significant effect on survival.

Although much of the reduction in mortality actually occurred
because of improvements in diet, sanitation and other preventive health
measures, the great reduction in mortality rates from infectious
diseases led to great faith in the power of scientific medicine.

There

was optimism that medicine could conquer disease, and hope that a new
cure to many diseases lay just around the corner.

The aggressive

application of life saving and life prolonging techniques became the
rule, often with the hope that if a patient could be kept alive long
enough, a new cure would be found.
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Indeed, during the post World War II period, the widespread use of
recent medical advances have greatly increased the ability to prolong
the lives of patients, with the use of such low technology interventions
as antibiotics and blood transfusions, as well as, resuscitation and
life support techniques.

A "technological imperative" developed.

Physicians generally accepted the ethic that what ever could be done,
should be done (Silverman 1980; Aries 1974; Carse 1978).
seen as a battle against disease.

Medicine was

Militaristic metaphors were used

frequently (conquer death, win the war against cancer, magic bullets,
etc.)

Death became increasingly defined not as a natural event, but as

was a technological failure.

For example, in 1972, Moser wrote:

To the physician, death is the enemy -- the implacable ultimate
foe — the symbol of failure, ever lurking in the wings, ever
hovering near the critically ill patient. The missed diagnosis,
the resistant microorganism, the hidden malignancy, the
irreversible degenerative lesion — all represent familiar
catacombs. As physicians we accept commitment to the life long
conflict. Every instinct, drive and desire -- every intellectual
and emotional sinew, has been trained to defeat death.
(Moser 1972:43)

Death was seen as a "'medical defeat1 either for the physician
personally or for the 'state of the art1" (Parsons, Fox and Lidz
1972:396; Levine and Scotch 1970:211).

Anecdotal reports suggest that even during this most aggressive
period, in fact, at times, less than the most aggressive means were used
(see Chapter III).

The questions of which therapies were appropriate

have always been culturally determined.

Generally, however, the axiom
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that the physicians' role was to "preserve life" went unchallenged.

At

the structural core of contemporary medical ethics was an absolutizing
of the value of preserving life (Parsons, Lidz and Fox 1972:395).

What

was later perceived as a contradiction between the goals of preservation
of life and relief of suffering was not recognized as an issue.

While the debate continued about active euthanasia, "passive
euthanasia" was not yet seen as a particularly troubling problem.

For

example, based on a series of lectures he delivered at Columbia
University Law School, Glanville Williams wrote about four types of
euthanasia:
1) fatal injection, enabling the patient to commit suicide,
2) administering a fatal dose of a drug intended to relieve pain,
3) aiding suicide, and
4) omitting treatment.

Out of 39 pages of text, only one paragraph addresses the fourth
type:
(4) We come finally to the problem of killing by inaction.
"Mercy killing" by omission to use medical means to prolong life
is probably lawful. Although a physician is normally under a duty
to use reasonable care to conserve his patient's life, he is
probably exempted from that duty if life has become a burden to
the patient. The morality of an omission in these circumstances
is conceded even by Catholics [reference to Joseph V. Sullivan:
Catholic Teaching on the Morality of Euthanasia (Washington, D.C.,
1949 p. 64 J.
(Williams 1957: 326)

Very soon after Williams' lecture series, questions about
"omitting treatment" were to emerge as a major social issue.
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The Crumbling of the Technological Imperative;
Cultural Contradictions and Technological Choice

A number of factors contributed to the emergence of concern about
withholding treatment as a social issue.

It developed, in part, because

of a perceived contradiction between the goal of medical treatment to
save life, and the goals to relieve suffering and to do no harm, seemed
to come into contradiction when patients were saved, only to have a poor
quality of life.
use of technology.

The problem came to be seen as one of inappropriate
The ethics of limitation of treatment began to be

debated in the clinical, legal, and philosophical arenas.

The roots of

this issue lie both in the technological changes and ideological
currents of this period.

Changing Definitions of Death

One often sees the emergence of ethical issues about withholding
treatment attributed to technological developments in the ability to
provide life support.

While not the only factor, it was certainly one

of the most important.

Previous developments of other new treatments

which saved patients with conditions which had been terminal (such as
giving insulin to save a patient in a diabetic coma) has also been
perceived as bringing a patient "back from death" (Parsons, Fox and Lidz
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1972: fn on 399).

The development of techniques of resuscitation,

however, has an unrivaled effect for they led to the transcendence of
the traditional, universally accepted, definition of death.

Since the invention of the stethoscope in the middle of the
nineteenth century, controversies about the determination of death had
been laid to rest.

(Pres.

Comm 1981:14-15) Death was defined as "the

apparent extinction of life, manifested by absence of heart beat and
respiration" (Dorland's Medical Dictionary 1965:387).

The development

of artificial means to support cardiopulmonary function, such as the
respirator, pacemaker and the development of drugs and other forms of
stimulation for cardiac resuscitation, was felt to make such traditional
definitions obsolete.

Efforts were made to develop new definitions.
"clinical death ...

For example,

when the heart or the lungs or both cease to

function" was differentiated from "biological death" which was thought
to occur when irreversible changes in the organism lead to the
disintegration of vital cells and tissues" (Wasmuth and Wasmuth
1969:352).

The feeling developed that, in certain circumstances,

efforts to postpone such biological death should cease and be replaced
with "more fitting and respectful behavior when a patient has become a
dead body" (Pres.

Comm.

1981:24).

According to Wasmuth and Wasmuth,

the question became not "When is the patient dead?" but rather, "When
shall 'treatment' and 'more critical support' be withdrawn?" (p. 352).
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Although not the main impetus, another important factor compelling
the need for a new definition of death, was the development of the
capacity for organ transplantation using cadaver organs (kidneys in the
1950s and hearts in the 1960s).

(Pres.

Comm.

1981:23)

In 1959, several French neurosurgeons coined a phrase, "coma
depasse, translated as "beyond coma" to refer to the condition of some
respirator dependent patients in which there was a permanent loss of
brain function and physiological changes in brain tissue.

Since then,

numerous criteria and guidelines have been developed for defining and
certifying "brain death."

One of the most influential was the "Harvard

Criteria," published in 1968.

(Ad Hoc committee of the Harvard Medical

School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death 1968).

Dialysis and Questions About Chronic Life Support

In addition to seeing resuscitation or life support as detrimental
in those circumstances where life is prolonged after "brain death" had
occurred, the benefit of heroic treatment wasquestioned in other
situations as well.

For example:

As one physician from the Seattle dialysis program reflected
'Doctors now find themselves able from time to time to enter a
grey, limbo-like area where they are able to prolong life without
however, being able to cure the disease or heal the injury ...
the first great anxiety, then, that onefaces in approaching the
question of hemodialysis is whether from the patients pointof
view the whole procedure will turn out to be a blessing or merely
a labored and painful hanging onto life.* [C. E. Norton, 1967]
(Fox and Swazey 1974:203)
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Now the ability to provide chronic treatment for what had been terminal
conditions created a new class of chronically ill patients who were
maintained by what has come to be called "artificial life support."

In part, the perception of a class of treatments as "artificial"
and of questionable benefit may be due to the rapid rate of medical
developments and their invasiveness.

While the first artificial kidney

had been developed in the 1940*s, hemodialysis could only be used on a
short term, intermittent basis.

Later, cannulas (tubes) were implanted

allowing chronic dialysis in 1960.

When the first center opened in

1962, it only functioned on an experimental basis.

This new technology

could only be made available to a few of the potential patients.

A

combination of medical and social criteria were used by centers to judge
the suitability of candidates such as willingness to cooperate in
treatment regimen, medical suitability, and absence of other disabling
disease (Fox and Swazey 1974:230).

Although the procedure of using a

committee with non-clinician members to select patients and the
publicity about decision making was a radical departure from past
practices, the idea of selecting patients who were felt to have the best
chance of benefiting from a new "radical" procedure was usual for
utilizing an experimental procedure.

As more facilities were developed,

and especially after federal support for kidney dialysis was obtained,
selection thresholds were lowered and people who would not have
initially been seen as candidates, were treated.
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Even during the early selection period, however, some patients who
were recommended as appropriate candidates, declined treatment and
others choose to discontinue after a period of dialysis (Fox and Swazey
1974 [1978]:260-65).

Such refusal of treatment forced physicians and

others to confront the fact that some people including some who would
not be terminally ill with treatment, would choose to forego treatment
and die, rather than live with the assistance of chronic treatment.

Public Concern With the Management of Dying

The late 1960s and early 1970s brought a growing public awareness
of the changes which had taken place in the nature of medical treatment
and the social context of dying.
had become a "taboo subject."

Social commentators noted that "death"

Many felt there was a need to reexamine

"death and dying" It became a subject for social inquiry, leading to
such classic works as those by Feifel (1959), Sudnow (1967), Glaser and
Strauss (1965 and 1968), Brim et al. (1970), Kubler-Ross (1969), Aries
(1974), as well as hundreds of articles, lectures, and conferences.
This led some to comment that like "sex," this "taboo subject" had
become focus of widespread attention.

One of the major changes in the social situation surrounding death
was that increasingly, people were dying in hospitals and other
institutions, rather than at home.

While in 1949, slightly less than

half of all deaths occurred in institutions, by 1967, almost three
quarters (73.1%) of all deaths occurred in institutions (Lerner 1970:22-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23).

By the mid 1980's, 80% of deaths occurred in institutions (Malcolm

1986).

There was also growing awareness that the reduction in the rate of
death from infectious disease which led to a longer life span, led to an
increase in survival with chronic conditions.

Lerner wrote that people

"survive today to a much later age, only to succumb in due time to their
degenerative conditions (Lerner 1970:16).

Such conditions were

recognized as the new leading causes of death and were seen to
compromise the quality of life.

With chronic diseases and life supports, terminally ill patients
could be kept alive for long periods of time, although not forever.
This led to concern about the "management of dying" (Levine and Scotch
1970).

The then common practice of concealing prognosis from the dying

patient was challenged and changed (Noyes, et al. 1977).

Dealing with

the dying patient as more than the bearer of a disease, and instead, as
a whole person, was encouraged.

This was done not only for the benefit

of the dying patient who could then be helped to deal with the
anxieties, hopes and fears of the last stage of life, it was also
encouraged for the benefit of the living, who it was felt could learn
about the functioning of the human mind and about the essence of human
existence (Kubler-Ross 1969).

The notion of "death with dignity" became

a positive image of death to contrast with the negative image of death
as always representing a failure.
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The increased role of technology in the care of the dying was seen
as an issue.

At first, it was seen primarily as a medical problem: How

far should the physician go in keeping the patient alive? Such
decisions, however, could not be made on physiological grounds alone.
Either implicitly or explicitly, social definitions of life and social
characteristics of patients were playing an increasingly important role
in decision making about treatment for the critically ill (Crane 1975).

As the psychological, social, and economic implications of the use
of technology were realized, it increasingly was seen as a social
problem.

Issues of the psychological state of the patient who loses

control, implications for the relationship of the patient to his
physicians and family, the increasing costs of care, and questions of
the allocation of resources between categories of patients were all seen
as problematic (Levine and Scotch 1970).

Wider Social Concerns Impacting on
the Use of Life Prolonging Technology

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were other issues of wide
social concern which were to have an impact on the care of the dying.
Three of the most important will be discussed below.

The first was a

concern about the power of professionals versus individuals to make
decisions which affect those individuals' lives.
concern about the use of technology.

The second was a

The third was a concern about

rising costs of health care.
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Concerns about Professional Decision Making

During the 20th century, the "professional expert" had come to
play a central role in many areas of life.

Whereas previously, the

family and religious leaders had played most of the key roles in such
areas as socialization of the young and care of the sick, in the 20th
century, professionals in education and medicine had come to make major
decisions affecting the lives of many more individuals.

Professionals

in industry and the military were making decisions affecting millions.
Up until the 1950s, the benefits of professional expertise generally
went unquestioned.

However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, perhaps

as an outgrowth of the civil rights movement, there was a wide spread
challenging of traditional authorities in such diverse areas as the
anti-war movement, movements for community control of schools, ecology,
increased power for students, laity in the churches, consumers, and
welfare mothers.

The slogan "Power to the People" characterized

movements for social change to give many who had previously been
subjected to professional authority, more autonomy in decision making.

One area where the questioning of traditional authority was to be
focused was "patient's rights."

In the health arena, there was the

beginning of the women's health movement, abortion rights, and the
natural childbirth movement.

Medical research, which had previously

been largely dependent on the discretion of the researcher, became
subject to review both by other researchers and by "outsiders."
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Paternalistic practices which sanctioned the withholding of information
from patients was challenged.

The medicalization of deviance control

and the treatment of the mentally ill was questioned.

The basic

assumption guiding much of the behavior of physicians and patients, that
patients should put their trust in physicians who would
paternalistically make decisions for the good of the patient was
challenged from a number of perspectives (e.g. Szasz 1961; Duff and
Hollingshed 1968; Illich 1976; Barber 1978; Ehrenreich 1978).

There was a call for "demedicalization" for a number of
populations such as the behaviorally or physically deviant, and those
passing through critical life transitions such as birth and death.

In

part, this was tied with a demand for "deinstitutionalization" reflected
such practices as the release of thousands of mental patients, the
mainstreaming of the physically and developmentally disabled, and the
call for home birth and hospice care.

In addition to a change in

locale, it reflected a demand for change in the power relations between
professionals and their clients (as they increasingly came to be
called).

Individual were demanding a role, in some cases the sole

right, to be making decisions affecting their own lives and those of
their family members.

In some circumstances, some professionals welcomed the opportunity
to share decision making about matters about which they felt they had no
unique expertise (Graham 1981:269).

In general, however, professionals

resisted any but token intrusion into what they saw as basically a
technical area.

In some situations, there was an accommodation of
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changes in professional practice (as in the management of childbirth) or
inclusion of clients in the decision making process.

Questions of

professional versus individual or family authority for medical decision
making became a major issue in the management of the care of the
critically ill and general, and the care of critically ill newborns in
particular.

Concerns About the Use of Technology

A second area of societal concern which affected public attitudes
toward the use of medical technology was a growing apprehension about
risks and dangers of many aspects of science and technology.

Whereas in

the preceding decades, science was generally endorsed as the key to
progress, by the late 1960s, and early 1970s, the benefits of technology
were being questioned in a number of areas including the dangers of
nuclear war, pollution to the environment, exhaustion of natural
resources, threats to civil liberties through computer networks,
electronic surveillance, etc.

By that period, there was public concern about a number of aspects
of the use of biomedical technology including the effect on social
values of the development of an effective contraceptive (the pill), side
effects of diagnostic or treatment techniques (such as X- rays), dangers
of pain relief medication or mind altering drugs, and changes in the
nature of the patient practitioner relationship related to the use of
technology (Sidel 1971).
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At first, the issue of use of technology for treating the
critically ill had relatively little salience.

In a 1971 article on

"New Technologies and the Practice of Medicine," in which the issues
outlined above were discussed, Victor Sidel barely mentions the use of
"life support" except to raise the issues involving allocation, cost,
use of scarce resources, and problems involving following unusual
religious dictates (e.g.

Christian Scientists).

During the 1970s,

burdens associated with the use of technology for some critically ill
patients was of increasing societal concern until "artificial life
support" became a paradigmatic issue for illustrating negative effects
of the use of technology.

In Between Science and Human Values, Loren Graham presents a
framework for explicating concern about the use of science and
technology.

It can be used to examine concerns people have had about

the treatment of critically ill patients.

These can be seen to fall in

virtually all of the categories.

I.

Concerns about Technology
A. Concerns about the physical
results of technology

Destructive Technology

B. Concerns about the ethical
results of technology
1. biomedical ethics

Slippery Slope
Technology

C

Economically Exploit
ative Technology

Concerns about the economic
results of technology
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II.

Concerns about Science
A. Concerns about research on
human subjects

Human Subject Research

B. Concerns about distortions in
allocation of resources for
science

Expensive research

C. Concerns about certain kinds
of fundamental knowledge
1. knowledge itself
2. knowledge "inevitably"
leading to technology

Subversive Technology
Inevitable Technology

D. Concerns about accidents in
the research itself

Accidents in Science

E. Concerns about the use of
science to excite racial,
sexual, or class prejudice

Prejudicial Science

F. Concerns about certain
modes of knowing

Ways of Knowing

(1981:219)

According to Graham, the first concern that people have is fear of
"destructive technology" - negative physical results of its use.

An

example of this would be the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of
cancer, or of neurosurgery to treat a brain lesion, where the effects of
treatment may be worse than those of the disease.

A second category is

"slippery slope technology" where it is feared that the use of the
technology may destroy the ethical system.

There is fear that decisions

to cease using sophisticated biomedical technology to prolong life,
would lead down a "slippery slope" to eugenics and active euthanasia.
Critics evoke the specter of Nazi medical experimentation and death
camps as the ultimate depth of the slippery slope.

Changes in

biomedicine, particularly the use of life prolonging technology, leads
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to increased concern of both clinicians and non-clinician with the
ethics of medical practice.

Graham's third area of concern is "economically exploitative
technology."

Enormous costs are involved in the development and use of

some life prolonging technology which will benefit few people.

Some

question whether so much money should be spent on technology for those
in critical condition.

They feel that more money should be spent on

research and technology that will benefit more people.

The fourth area is "human subject research."

Here the goal of

therapy is secondary to the acquisition of information.

In some

situations, patients are not primarily treated for their own benefit
(because the chance of success is too small).

In such cases, the

patient may be treated in hopes that the knowledge gained during
treatment may be used to help others with similar conditions in the
future.

Some people feel it is inappropriate to use dying patients for

such research.

Another area of concern is "expensive research."

They fear that

there will be distortion in the allocation of societal resources which
will prevent allocation of resources for research in other area of
medicine and to meet other human needs.

Graham also discusses "subversive technology," fundamentally new
knowledge that is seen as conflicting with the theories of ruling
authorities.

For example, Galileo's theories, which were seen as
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demoting the place of man from the center of the universe, were felt to
challenge church teaching.

Today, knowledge that human decisions can

lead to prolonging dying or to not sustaining life are sometimes seen as
challenging the world view of some individuals.

They fear rational

decision making about life and death matters that should be determined
by "God" or "Nature."

The seventh issue is fear of "inevitable technology."
that "anything that can be done, will be done."

The fear is

There has been fear on

the part of some that once technologies are developed, people will not
feel that they have the option not to use them.

Eighth is a concern with "accidents in science."

The use of life

prolonging technology does not raise the specter of mass threat to
public safety, such as that feared with the use of atomic energy or
recombinant DNA.

But, there is fear of unintended moral and economic

consequences of "prolonging dying" both for the public at large and for
the individual patients and their families.

"Prejudicial science," which exacerbates racial, ethnic, sexual or
class prejudices are another area.

Some fear that unequal access to

expensive life prolonging technologies will exacerbate the racial and
social class differentials in survival which already exist.

Problems

many also arise between members of different religious groups who have
different definitions of what constitutes the definition of "death" or
what treatment should be given to critically ill patients.

For example,

there is potential for strains between members of some religious groups

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
who don't accept "brain death" definitions of death and others who don't
want to pay for heroic care for brain dead patients.

Finally, Graham discusses fears about scientific developments
changing "ways of knowing."

It is argued that the epistemological basis

of science is so limited that it is unprepared to handle significant
modes of reality and, at worst, is fundamentally alienating to the human
spirit.

Some would claim that clinicians who use life support to

prolong the circulation and respiration of an individual beyond the time
when that individual could be capable of human interaction, has limited
the focus to a physiological, rather than a social or a spiritual
reality, since the first is the only one which science is able to deal
with.

Concern with Rising Costs of Medical Care

Finally, a third theme that had an impact on the conceptualization
of life prolonging technology was concern about the rising costs of
social programs in general, and medical care in particular.
rising prominence as national issues in the 1970s.

Both had

The prosperity of

the 1950s and 60s led to confidence that "the richest nation" in the
world could and should spend resources to provide a decent quality of
life for all citizens, particularly in the area of health; it was seen
as a means to demonstrate the benefits of the "American Way."
Nation's Health 1965)
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(The

By the 1970s, however, as the country entered a period of economic
recession, there was concern about the rapidly rising expenditures for
social welfare, particularly health care.

Significant increases in the

percentage of the GNP devoted to health care were acknowledged [4.5% in
1950; (Rosenberg, lecture notes 1985) 5.3 in 1960, 7.6 in 1970, 9.4 in
1980 and 10.6 in 1984 (U.S Bureau of the Census 1985:96)].
Medicare and Medicaid were escalating rapidly.

The costs of

The focus of concern

switched from questions of access to questions of cost.

The Nixon

administration, using the rhetoric of "crisis," predicted a breakdown in
the medical system within a few years unless changes were made (Starr
1982).

In particular, the proliferation of critical care facilities and
advances in biomedical technology and practice, such as renal dialysis
units and intensive care units, and expensive intervention such as open
heart surgery and transplants, were identified as adding much to the
cost of health care.

In place of concern about problems in trying to

provide "enough" health care to those with medical need, the public
concern switched to a focus on containing the high cost of health care
as a medical problem.

Concern about the rising costs of health care and issues
concerning the use of life support technology have always had an
ambiguous relationship.

On the one hand, many have argued that, at

least at the level of individual patient, choices should never be made
between dollars and lives.

It is said that physicians should be able to
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provide whatever treatments are of benefit to a patient, especially
acute, life saving treatment, without regard to costs.

On the other hand, critics have pointed to the very high cost of a
number of life support technologies.

They feel that there are limited

benefits to "half way technologies," which may support life but are
unable to cure the underlying condition, and
prolong dying.

may in some cases merely

They therefore feel that societal resources might be

better spent for other social needs.

In order to accomplish this, some

have advocated public policy decisions to limit resources for expensive
medical technologies.

The relevance of financial factors in decisions

affecting the care of individuals has been even more controversial.
While some advocate the cessation of certain types of care so as not to
deplete family resources, others felt that such reasons are never
justified.

Along with concerns about the rights of individuals to make
decisions, and about the use of technology, thus concern about the
rising costs of health care and other social programs contributed to
concerns about the treatment of the critically ill.

Rising Concern with Bioethics

Since the early 1970s, in part because of the reasons discussed
above, there has been a proliferation of works dealing with bioethical
concerns.

This has included a multitude of books and articles, the
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founding of Institutes for the study of biomedical issues, numerous
conferences, and the establishment of centers, courses, and ethics
rounds at many medical centers.

The explosion of interest is perhaps

best illustrated by the increase in specialty journals.

Whereas,

previous to 1970, the only journal devoted to articles on medical ethics
was the Linacre Quarterly, published since 1932 by the National
Foundation of Catholic Physicians, since 1970 the following journals
have started publication: The Hastings Center Report (1971), Ethics in
Science and Medicine (1973), Journal of Medical Ethics (1975), Kennedy
Institute Quarterly Report (1975), Man and Medicine (1975), Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy (1976), IRB: Review of Human Subject Research
(1979).

and Journal for Philosophy and Methodology of Medicine (1980).

(Goldstein 1985)

There has also been a flourish of new journals dealing with
Medicine and the Law.

Although there have long been journals on

forensic medicine, only recently have there been journals devoted to
medical jurisprudence.

A precursor in the field was Lex and Sciencia,

started in 1964, which dealt extensively with medical issues.

In the

1970s and 80s, Medicolegal News (1972) (which combined with Nursing Law
and Ethics to become Law, Medicine, and Health Care), The Journal of
Legal Medicine (1973), The American Journal of Legal Medicine (1975),
and The Journal of Health Politics, Policy and the Law (1976), started
publication (Frey 1982).
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Decision Making about Withholding Treatment:
A Brief Review of the Literature Concerning Adults

Since the early 1970s, there has been a plethora of books and
articles dealing with various aspects of decisions to withhold treatment
from the critically ill.

Many have concerned a number of legal cases,

including Quinlan, Saikowitz, Fox, Storars, Conroy and Brophy, which
have been covered extensively in the popular and professional
literature.

The Law and Legal Cases Concerning the Withholding of Treatment

The legality of actions concerning the withholding of treatments
has not been determined by a clear cut set of laws enacted to deal with
the issue.

Rather, understandings of the legal status of various

actions has evolved over time largely as a result of legal decisions in
a number of landmark cases.

In this section, I will briefly review some

of the major cases and statutes.

The principle that competent adults have the right to refuse
treatment had been established long before the 1970s.

For example,

Judge Cardozo stated in 1914:

Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages" [Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 211, N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92
(1914)].
(in the Matter of Clair Conroy 1985:19)
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A number of cases affirmed the right of a competent adult to make
an informed choice to refuse treatment.
of Erickson v.

For example, in the 1962 case

Dilgard, the right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse a

blood transfusion was upheld even though refusing treatment was likely
to lead to death (Beauchamp and Childress 1979:83).

In some cases,

however, the courts have ruled that the right to refuse treatment is
outweighed by other interests, such as the interests of the State in
seeing that care is provided to minor children.

For example, in "the

Georgetown College Case," blood transfusions were required for the
Jehovah's Witness mother of a 7 month old child (Beauchamp and Childress
1979:84).

In general, however, the right of a competent adult to refuse

treatment has been "broadly construed" (Ackerman and Pope 1982:212).

The issues have been more complex in cases concerning incompetent
patients.

As discussed above, since the 1960s, there has been an effort

to allow the withholding of treatments from patients who are "brain
dead."

Although there is still controversy in some quarters about

aspects of ascertaining brain death, and many states, including New
York, do not yet have clear statutes providing a definition of death
based on brain function, the acceptance of withholding treatment from
individuals with no brain function has been widely accepted in clinical
and legal circles.
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Since the early 1960s, a number of cases and proposed statutes
have dealt with withholding treatment from incompetent patients who were
not "brain dead."

Issues in the Case of Karen Ann Quinlan

The best known case, and in many respects the most significant, is
the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman who suffered brain damage
which left her in a chronic and persistent vegetative state.
not meet the criteria for "brain death, yet she had no
recovery of cognitive function.

She did

hope for

Her parents requested that her

respirator be removed; her physician refused, and her parents brought
her case to the Courts in the State of New Jersey.

In the seminal decision in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, the
Court declared that "a right of personal privacy exists ...[that is]
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances" In re Quinlan, quoted in the
Pres.

Comm.

1983:31).^

The Courts concluded that Karen's right should not be denied
simply because she was not herself competent to exert them.

They stated

that her "guardian and family" should be permitted to "render their best

1
Some people question the framing of these issues in terms of
constitutional rights (Pres Comm 1983:31).
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judgment ...

as to whether she would exercise it in these

circumstances" (Annas 1976:30).

In their decision, the judges wrote: "We think that the State's
interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome
the State's interest [in preservation and sanctity of life] (quoted in
Ackerman and Pope:215).

In part, the Courts decision was based on the fact that there was
considered to be no "reasonable possibility" of Karen's emerging from
the coma to a cognitive sapient life.

The court therefore wanted

confirmation of that prognosis by her attending physician.

The Court

also stated that it wanted concurrence in the prognosis by an "ethics
committee."

In discussing the "ethics committee," the Court quoted at length
from a 1975 article by pediatrician Karen Teel in the Baylor Law Review.
In it, she suggested the formation of "ethics committees" to share
responsibility with the physician for life and death decisions, in part
to relieve the physician of legal liability.

She suggested membership

from such professions as medicine, social work, law and theology.

In

seeking confirmation of prognosis, the Court might have more
appropriately suggested review by a "prognosis committee" composed of
medical experts.

However, the Court mandate of the review by an "ethics

committee" in the Quinlan decision, led to widespread discussion of, and
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in some hospitals establishment of a mechanism for multidisciplinary
review of some cases involving ethical issues.

More recently, the

concept of ethics committees was endorsed by the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (1983) and the U.

S.

Congress (Congressional

Record 1984).

One of the most significant aspects of the Quinlan decision was
that it mandated decision making by family and physicians for
incompetent patients with review only by a hospital based committee.
The decision explicitly stated that it would be inappropriate for the
Court to review each decision involving the withholding of a life saving
treatment (Ackerman and Pope 1982:216).

The Quinlan decision had a profound affect on public and
professional discourse and debate about the issue of withholding
treatment from the critically ill.

It served to educate the public

about the issue both by raising the question of whether all possible
technological interventions should be utilized to prolong life and, if
not, who should make such decisions.

It set precedents concerning

criteria which could be used for making decisions to withhold treatment
and it suggested a mechanism for reviewing such decisions.

For some

physicians, and other health care professionals, it provided the first
significant social sanction for discontinuing extraordinary care in some
circumstances when the patient was not brain dead, a practice which was
to be much discussed over the following decade.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

Beyond the initial Court decision, the Quinlan case has served to
educate the public further about issues surrounding decisions to
withdraw treatment.

Although some experts in neurology had suggested

that Karen might live after she was taken off the respirator, most
people expected that if "the plug was pulled," Karen would die.

Her

survival for nine years after removal of the respirator vividly
illustrated the uncertainty of medical prognosis and raised further
questions about the issues in decision making for the critically ill.

The popular image of "withdrawing life support" involves a
literal "pulling the plug" of the respirator or pulling out tubes to
stop all treatment.

In fact, in a clinical setting, many aspects of

care are continued even though certain other more aggressive treatments
may be discontinued or modified (see Chapter VII), In Karen's case, she
was gradually weaned from the respirator, while other forms of
respiratory support was provided.

She was fed through a nasogastric

tube and received excellent nursing care such as frequent repositioning
to prevent bed sores.

While at first surprising, her continued

existence served to educate the public to the fact that withdrawal of
extraordinary life support and death are non synonymous, Within the last
few years, her treatment has been one of the cases frequently examined
in discussions about the provision of more routine care for hopelessly
ill patients (for example, see Capron 1984).
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Other Legal Cases Pertaining to Withholding Treatment

It is important to remember that there is no clear federal basis
for law involving the provision of care to the critically ill.

While

some decisions, such as the Quinlan decision, rests on constitutional
questions, no "right to die" case has been adjudicated by the Supreme
Court.

Therefore, decisions in one case provide no binding legal

precedents for rulings in others jurisdictions.

There have been a

number of other cases dealing with the care of the critically ill adult.
While some decisions have complemented the judicial reasoning of the
Quinlan case, others have not.

Some of the most significant cases

involving adults will be reviewed here; legal cases specifically
involved with the care of newborns will be reviewed below (Chapter III).

Contrary to the decision in the Quinlan case, a number of courts
have rejected delegating decision making authority to family and
physicians without approval by the Courts.

For example, in the case of

Saikewicz in 1977, the Massachusetts Court ruled that Court approval was
necessary before removal of life support from incompetent patients.
Subsequently, in the Case of Earl Spring, in 1980, the Court outlined a
number of factors to be considered before deciding if a case had to be
referred to the courts.

The decision, however, did not provide clear

guidance about which combination of factors would necessitate prior
court approval.

(Ackerman and Pope 1982:).

Despite the Court decisions

which suggest mandatory Court Review, many individuals and
organizations, such as the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association, share the opinion that "existing law allows extraordinary
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life support systems to be disconnected from terminally ill comatose
patients without judicial interventions" (Wallace-Barnhill 1982:60).

It is worth noting that reported cases may be biased in favor of
those decisions for which the Courts felt that judicial review was
necessary.

In other situations, where cases were referred to the legal

system and determinations were made that rulings by the Court were not
necessary, decisions may have only been made at a lower Court level, and
these may be not discussed much in the literature.

Whereas, court decisions have indicated procedures which differ
significantly from the non-involvement of the Courts recommended in the
Quinlan decision, the legality of a decision to remove "extraordinary
treatment" (e.g. the use of a respirator) from a terminally ill,
comatose patient has been affirmed by subsequent Court decisions (e.g.
Eichner, 1980).

There has been variation, however, in decisions about

other, more ordinary, treatments.
example, the N.Y.

In the 1981 Storars case, for

Court of Appeals refused to permit discontinuation of

transfusions for a profoundly retarded man of 52 who was being treated
for bladder cancer (Annas 1981).

In the 1985 Conroy decision, the New

Jersey Supreme Court ruled distinctions between treatments themselves
were not important, and that in some cases it is permissible to withhold
any treatment, including feedings (In the Matter of Claire Conroy 1985).
In the 1985 decision of a probate court in the case of Brophy, the judge
did differentiate between treatments in ruling that most treatment,
including antibiotics could be withheld from this patient in a
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persistent vegetative state, but that tube feedings would have to be
continued (Levin and Powderly 1985).

In addition to differentiations on the basis of treatments, the
courts have also differentiated on the basis of knowledge of the
incompetent patient's wishes, before the patient was incompetent.

For

example, in the case of Father Fox, the Court felt that his prior
expressed view that he would not want his life to be continued with
extraordinary means, was an important factor in deciding that his
respirator support could be discontinued (Annas 1981).

In the Conroy

case, the Court suggested that different standards would be relevant in
decision making about withholding treatment depending on the amount of
knowledge of the wishes of the patient (In re Conroy 1985).

While most

of the legal cases involving the withholding of life saving treatment
have been civil cases, there have been a few cases involving criminal
charges of murder.

It appears that in ALL CASES charges were dropped or

the defendant was acquitted (Pres Comm. 1983).

In the most recent case,

concerning the death of Clarence Herbert in 1982, two physicians were
charged with murder after discontinuing a respirator and intravenous
fluids.

The Courts sanctioned joint decision making by the family and

physicians and consideration of quality of life, as well as the duration
of life, in their decision to acquit (Lo 1984).

In examining the legal basis for decision making regarding the
withholding of life saving treatment, some people believe that the
current laws are appropriate.

For example, the members of the

President's Commission concluded that there is adequate discretion in
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the criminal law to allow for good decision making while the threat of
prosecution provides an appropriate protection against abuse (1983:SA
BS).

On the other hand, others have expressed fears that the current

ambiguity in the law leads physicians to practice defensive medicine and
sustain treatment even when they feel it would be better to stop
according to their medical and ethical judgments (Lo 1984:284).

Some

people have proposed that State legislatures enact legislation:
granting immunity from civil and criminal liability to all persons
who help to effectuate cessation of an extraordinary life support
system sustaining a comatose, terminally ill patient, provided
such decision is made in good faith with the consent of family
members of the patient.
(Wallace-Burnhill, et al. 1982:60)

In

recent years, anumber of state legislatures have adopted laws

dealing with aspects of withholding treatment.
the

The first and best know,

1976 California "natural death act", expressly states that

withholding treatment is not to be construed as homicide or suicide
(Pres.

Comm.

1983:40).

Many states, however, including New York, have

yet to adopt such legislation.

At the present time (1986), the New York

State Governor's Commission On Life and the Law is considering proposals
concerning recommendations for legislation on definition of death, "Do
not resuscitate" (DNR) orders, and decision making about withholding
other treatments.

In sum, although during the past ten years, legal precedents have
supported a number of termination of life support decisions, the legal
status of many treatment choices remain uncertain.
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Some Bioethical Issues Pertaining to the Withholding of Treatments

In the past two decades an enormous literature has developed in
the bioethics and clinical literatures on the subject of withholding
treatment, particularly from terminally ill patients.

It is beyond the

scope of this chapter to present a comprehensive review.

The

President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research did a masterful job at presenting an
overview of the issues in their volume Deciding to Forego LifeSustaining Treatment (1983).

I will briefly discuss some of the

literature concerning differentiations between treatment choices, for
this will be a topic of concern in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.

The

literature on treatment choice for children and newborns will be
discussed in Chapter III.

One of the main ways that distinctions have been made between
treatments is in terms of "ordinary" versus "extraordinary" means.

For

example, in 1973, the American Medical Association issued this
statement:
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong
the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that
biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or
his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician
should be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate
family.
(cited in Kuhse 1981:117)

In differentiating between ordinary and extraordinary means, those who
use the terms, generally are attempting to distinguish those treatments
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that would be obligatory and those that would be optional.

In general,

the distinguishing criteria between obligatory and optional treatments
has been seen to be whether or not the treatments would be of benefit to
the patient.

In addition, the terms ordinary and extraordinary means

are also used to refer to a distinction between treatments that are
simple and those that are complex, and between treatments that are usual
and those which are unusual (Pres.

Comm.

1983:82-87).

Critics have objected to use of the distinction for two main
reasons.

First, there has often been confusion between the various

definitions (Pres.

Comm.

1983:88).

Not all simple or usual treatments

are seen to be of benefit for some patients.

Second, the distinction

between treatments that would be of benefit and those that would not,
begs the question of what is of benefit.

In general, a treatment is

seen as beneficial when it sustains a life that is worth prolonging.
Therefore the distinction depends on the quality of life of the patient,
rather than on the means used to sustain life (Kuhse 1981).

Another distinction that is also made differentiates acts of
omission from acts of commission -- whether the behavior under question
was an action or a failure to act.

One way that this contrast is used

is to differentiate between withholding (not starting) and withdrawing
(stopping) treatment.

Many critics have argued that there is no moral

significance to this distinction, but rather it is the intention of the
action and/or the outcome, rather than whether it involves a action or
conscious decision not to act that is morally significant (Pres.
1983:60-77).
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A distinction is also made between active and passive euthanasia.
This is also sometimes discussed in terms of acts of omission and
commission.

Acts which cause death are referred to as active

euthanasia, positive euthanasia, or mercy killing.

Acts which allow a

natural death to occur are referred to as passive euthanasia or negative
euthanasia.

There is debate about whether the withholding of "ordinary"

means, such as nutrition, would constitute active or passive euthanasia
(Capron 1984) and about whether it would ever be ethical to use a dose
of a lethal drug to cause death directly.

It appears that the

bioethical mainstream and most clinicians now accept the notion of
passive euthanasia; there is much controversy about the status of
withholding nutrition.
ethicists (e.g.

Although supported by a number of prominent

Rachaels 1975; Kuhse 1981), it appears that most

bioethicists see direct killing as

unethical.^

(Pres.

Comm.

1983:60-

88; Veatch 1976; Steinbock 1976).

The Clinical Literature on Withholding Treatment

Clinicians have written numerous articles about when to give or
withhold certain treatments; most have concerned the care of terminally
ill patients and/or cardiac resuscitation (stimulation to the heart if
it stops or is about to stop).

For example in 1976, the Clinical Care

Committee suggested a four category classification system for hopelessly

^
This is differentiated from a decision by a terminally ill
competent patient to choose to take a lethal drug. It appears to be
more acceptable than active euthanasia for an incompetent patient;
whether it should be socially sanctioned is very controversial.
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ill patients in the intensive care unit.

The physician in charge was to

make classifications, to be based on prognosis: A) Maximal therapeutic
effort; B) Maximal therapeutic effort with daily evaluation; C)
Selective limitation of measures (with a detailed care plan and
resuscitation status recorded); D) All therapy can be discontinued
(comfort measures given).

More recently, Wanzer and his associates (1984) issued a statement
about the physician's responsibility toward hopelessly ill patients.
They wrote "the patient's role in decision making is paramount, and a
decrease in aggressive treatment of the hopelessly ill patient is
advisable when such treatment would only prolong a difficult and
uncomfortable process of dying" (p.

955).

They differentiated four

levels of care to be considered and discussed by the clinicians, and the
patient and/or patient's family: (1) emergency resuscitation; (2)
intensive care and advanced life support; (3) general medical care,
including antibiotics, drugs, and surgery, cancer chemotherapy, and
artificial hydration and nutrition; and (4) general nursing care and
efforts to make the patient comfortable, including pain relief and
hydration and nutrition as dictated by the patient's thirst and hunger,
(p.

958)

Numerous articles have also been written on establishing
guidelines for issuing "Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders" (e.
Cranford and Shultz 1982).

g.

Miles,

(Such orders are also frequently referred to

as DNR, no code, or no arrest page.) Many clinicians have stated that
DNR is not synonymous with no treatment, and that clinicians, patients,
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and families should discuss both the DNR order and the appropriate level
of care, and the level of care should be clearly documented in the chart
and communicated to other clinicians.

There are often problems in implementing guidelines (Lo and
Steinbrook 1983).

Resuscitation may be withheld without consulting the

patient or family; older patients, those with functional impairments,
(especially the senile, demented or mentally retarded), those
transferred from a nursing home, and those with chronic- obstructive
pulmonary disease or malignancy, are less likely to be resuscitated (Lee
and Cassel 1984; Farber, Bowman Major and Green 1984).

Physicians who

are taking care of another physician's patient, sometimes misinterpret
the intention of the orders (Uhlmann, Cassel and McDonald 1984).

In

addition, decisions are sometimes made to do a "slow code," that is
delay an attempt to resuscitate and/or do it in a slow or inefficient
manner for patients who have a poor prognosis but have not been
officially classified as "no code."

(Basson, Dantzker, and Benjamin

1981).

Recently there have been a few studies in which series of actual
cases have been reviewed to investigate the factors involved in
decisions not to resuscitate.

Younger and his associates found that 14%

of the patients admitted to one medical ICU were designated DNR, 9%
survived hospitalization.

Severity of illness, age and prior health

were associated with DNR designation while race and socioeconomic
factors were not (1985).

Levy, Lambe and Shear also found that age,

sex, ethnicity and pay status were not associated, while residence in a
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nursing home, and not being alert and oriented on admission were
associated with DNR orders (1984).

Such factors as patients having

cancer, dementia, incontinence, being non-ambulatory, divorced,separated
and unemployed were all more likely to be associated with DNR orders.
(Ulmann, McDonald and Inui 1984).

Centers differ in how long patients have been the the ICU before
DNR orders are issued (Zimmerman et al. 1984).

Lo and his associates

found that 4% of all patients admitted to medical services at three
teaching hospitals were designated DNR.

In most cases consultations

with patients and/or their families took place.

Sometimes, however,

when patients or families did not agree, "limited DNR" orders were
issued (1985).

At another center, in many cases, there was no

documentation of discussions with families; this was attributed to fear
of litigation (Ireland and Puri 1984) although the clinicians wish to
avoid confronting the issue directly with the family may also have been
a factor.

There have been even fewer studies to document the withholding of
other life saving treatments beside resuscitation.

There are some

reports that discuss examples of the withholding of more ordinary
treatments, such as blood transfusions (e.g.

Lo and Jonsen).

As far as

I know, there is only one systematic study that reports the association
of non-physiological factors with the withholding of less aggressive
treatments.

In that study, Brown and Thompson report that decisions not

to give active treatments (e.g.

antibiotics) to residents of nine

extended-care facilities showed a significant relation to diagnosis,
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mental status, mobility, pain, narcotics prescribed, size of the
facility, relation of the physician to the patient and medical-record
statements documenting the patient's deterioration or plans for non
treatment in general.

59% of the patients, who were not actively

treated, died.

Surveys and Sociological Studies of Decisions to Withhold Life Saving
Treatments

Although there has been much written by social scientists on
aspects of care of the critically ill (e.g.

Glaser and Strauss 1965;

1968; Sudnow 1967; Bluebond-Langer 1978), on the use of high technology
in medicine (e.g.

Fox 1976; Reiser 1978), and on social factors

affecting medical care (e.g.

Gaines and Hahn, 1985; Wright and Treacher

1982; Atkinson and Heath 1981) social scientists have done few in depth,
observational studies on decision making about the aggressiveness of
treatment.

Studies on decision making about the care of newborns

(Anspach forthcoming; Guillemin and Holmstrom 1986), the only in depth
observational studies I know of (beside this study), will be reviewed in
Chapter III).

In an address entitled "Reflections and Opportunities in the
Sociology of Medicine," Renee Fox (1985) lamented the fact that, unlike
the 1950s and 1960s, there have been few recent ethnographic studies of
hospitalized patients or of physicians or nurses working in hospital
settings.

She also noted the limited participation of social scientists
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in the field of bioethics.

She quoted from her own recent article with

Judith Swazey (1984), comparing "medical morality" in China and
"Bioethics" in the United States, and called for more social science
research on issues in bioethics.

Beside the work of Fox and Swazey,

there has been little work by social scientists which has looked at the
field of bioethics in its broad societal context.

Numerous surveys have been conducted to investigate clinicians
attitudes and behavior regarding the withholding of treatment from
critically ill patients using survey research methodology.

As early as

1961, Levinsohn, who conducted a survey at a medical convention, found
that 61% of the physicians present believed that euthanasia was being
practiced by members of the profession.

Another survey, conducted in

1968, found that 72% physicians polled would not perform dialysis on all
patients with chronic uremia.

Williams (1969) found that among "leaders

of medicine" 87% favored negative euthanasia, and 80% had practiced it,
while 15% favored "institution of therapy that is hoped will promote
death sooner than otherwise."

One of the most quoted surveys was conducted by Travis, Noyes,
and Brightwell (1974).

Their 1971 survey of Iowa physicians indicated

that nearly half of the respondents frequently omitted life-prolonging
procedures or medications in the care of terminally ill patients but
most objected to a change in social attitudes which would permit
physicians to hasten death.

A follow-up survey (Noyes et al 1977)

revealed that support for the omission of life- prolonging treatments
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was increasing; opposition to the use of death hastening measures
remained strong.

More recent surveys of clinician attitudes found that clinicians
distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary treatments (Carey and
Posavac 1978; Micetich, Steinecker and Thomasma 1983) and there is
variation in beliefs about prognosis, information felt to be important
as well as in treatment recommendations (Pearlman, Inui and Carter
1982).

Farber and his associates found patient's social as well as

physiological factors to be important in decisions about cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (1984; 1985).

In making decisions to withhold treatment,

some physicians state that they would override the wishes of patient,
family, hospital or community (Blum 1982).

A survey in dtarsing Life found that 97% of nurse respondents
favored "withholding all life-sustaining treatment for dying patients
who don't want it" and 61% had "seen a slow code."

Youngjer, Jackson and

Allen found that professional role (physician or nurse) was more
important than gender or religion for attitudes about the decision
making process, but, in general, there was more variation among
physicians and nurses than between professional groups (1979).

In studying attitudes of non-clinicians, Jorgenson and Neubecker,
who conducted a national survey of attitudes found a general favorable
attitude toward euthanasia.

64% of respondents approved of "termination

of life" for a patient with an "incurable disease."

Pro-euthanasia

attitudes were found to be associated with being white and being male,
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while strong religiousity and living in a rural environment was
associated with anti-euthanasia attitudes (1981).

A Gallup Poll,

conducted shortly after the Conroy decision in 1985, found 81%
supporting a "right to die," 13% were opposed (New York Times 3/17/85).

The most comprehensive study of physicians decision making is the
study by Crane, The Sanctity of Social Life: Physicians Treatment of
Critically 111 Patients (1975).

In her study, based primarily on a

survey of physicians, Crane elucidated criteria used by physicians in
making treatment decisions.

She found that physicians no longer used a

purely physiological definition of life.
social definition.

Instead, physicians used a

First the physician attempted to decide if the

patient is "salvageable."

Second, the physician considers the patient's

future quality of life - the extent of physical or mental damage.
Together, the salvageability of the patient and the degree of
irreversible damage indicates the capacity to resume social roles.
Crane found that a norm is evolving to guide treatment decisions based
on the capacity to resume social roles and to interact meaningfully with
others.

In general, Crane found there was most agreement to treat
salvageable patients with physical impairment and not to treat
unsalvageable patients with severe mental impairments.

There was more

controversy surrounding treatment decisions about unsalvageable patients
with physical damage and salvageable patients with severe brain damage
(Crane 1975; 1975a).
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Crane also reviews the general issues involved in decision making
about the critically ill and terminal patients and explores
institutional and background factors associated with variations in
physician attitudes.

Crane's study was based on a survey composed primarily of
hypothetical vignettes and questions about whether the respondent would
be likely to perform a number of tests and treatments.

Among others,

there are items which asked physicians "how actively" they would treat a
patient with a particular condition.

The marginal responses to the

questionnaires indicated that in many situations, physicians would
provide some treatments while withholding others (personal communication
1981 - see Chapter III) In some of the analysis, Crane distinguished
types of treatments (e.g.

"comfort therapy", "diagnostic" or "minor

treatment", "heroic treatment", and "resuscitation".

She notes:

A continuum ranging from comfort therapy to diagnostic procedures
to emergency surgery to resuscitation can be discerned with
physicians being least likely to withdraw the first and most
likely to refuse to perform the last."
(1975:70)

In most of the analysis, responses concerning a number of treatments
were combined into a "scale of activism," which was then used to examine
variations associated with characteristics of patients and respondents.
Differences between characteristics of treatments was not a main focus
of Crane's study.

Crane also did not seek respondents' attitudes

concerning the social prognosis for the patients in the vignettes;
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rather, the categorizations about the capacity of patient's to resume
social roles were made by the analyst.

Finally, Benoliel conducted a retrospective chart review study of
the care of patients in three teaching hospitals on the day of death.
She compared data collected for 2,879 patients who died in 1966 and 1971
and concluded that "shifting medical norms were shown by increases in
heavy recovery and life support treatments.

Influence of technology was

shown by increases in critical care wards and increases in work effort
activity for all types of dying" (n.d.:v, also see 1977).

Further analysis was conducted on data from the charts of 184
adults who died in one urban teaching hospital.

A "work effort index"

was devised using points for medical consultations, surgical procedures,
medications, medical treatments in identified categories, and cardio
pulmonary resuscitation.

The analysis showed that "the medical

treatment orientation was overwhelmingly toward the cure end of the
care/cure continuum, despite the fact that the majority of patients had
been designated no code (non-use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation) and
had conditions labeled by their physicians as either grim prognosis or
terminal" (Mumma and Benoliel 1984).
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CHAPTER THREE

TREATING BABIES:
BACKGROUND TO CARE FOR
CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS

As with questions about the aggressiveness of treatment for
patients in general, questions about the aggressiveness of treatment for
infants has a long history.

Many of the issues have always been similar

to the issues raised for adults.

In addition, however, because of the

unique feature of being newborn and the degree of dependence on adults
some issues arise in the care of infants which are different from those
raised in the care of older patients.

As with adults, the dramatic

recent advances in technological medical capacity has led to a new focus
on questions about the aggressiveness of medical treatment.

Perhaps

because of the complexity of related ethical issues and because of the
perceived relationship to the abortion issue, questions related to
treatment for newborns have been debated and politicized even more
extensively than similar decisions for older patients.
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Cross Cultural and Historic Perspectives on
Infanticide and Non-treatment Decisions

Some people see non-treatment of newborns in the NICU as the modern day
version of infanticide, the intentional killing of infants.*-

For

example, Robert Weir starts his book, Selective Nontreatment of
Handicapped Newborns, with a chapter on infanticide.

It begins:

The contemporary practice of selective nontreatment of
handicapped newborns is, in many aspects, a continuation of
historical practices of infanticide. The settings and
circumstances vary from historical patterns, but infant deaths
brought about in neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) often
provide parallels to acts of infanticide in earlier times and
places.
(1984:3)

A number of other recent books on non-treatment of newborns have either
approached the issues primarily as the same as those of infanticide, or,
at least included a chapter drawing links to practices of infanticide in
other cultures and/or the history of Western Civilization (Kohl 1978;
Horan and Delahoyde 1982; Tooley 1983; Kuhse and Singer 1985; Lyons
1985).

In some cases, there are parallels with infanticide as it was
practiced at other times and in other places.

What characterizes

infanticide generally is that it entails killing of newborns who are not

*•
Infanticide can also refer to death caused by neglect or less
support than the family might be able to provide, and less than family
members know should be provided (Scrimshaw 1982).
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seen as an acceptable addition to the social group.

The infant's lack

of acceptability may be due to one or more of a number of factors.
These factors may be identified as attributes pertaining to the infant such as gender or appearance, to the birth - such as twins (Williamson
1978) or breech (Sargent 1982), to the social situation of the mother such as illegitimacy (Cohen n.d.; Langer 1974) or age (Tsing 1986), or
to the social group - such as captive populations (e.g.

first born sons

of Jewish children in Egypt at the time of Moses) or population control
(Scrimshaw 1982; Hausfater and Hrdy 1984).

In most cases, infanticide

takes place at a point of time earlier than that when the child is
recognized as a member of the social group (Morgan 1983).

The theme of

rejecting the baby as a potential member of the social group is the
dominant theme in some decisions to withhold treatment from infants with
impairments in the NICU.

In most cases of non-treatment, however, there is no question that
the family wants to accept the baby as a new member into the social
group.

The child is considered to be a member of the family.

Decisions

about care involve other issues, more similar to those involved in
making treatment choices for critically ill older people.

These are

fundamentally different from infanticide decisions for they are focused
on the presumed value of treatment for the benefit of the patient, not
for the benefit of others.

As will be discussed below, some decisions

involve elements of both themes.
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Many authors have claimed that infanticide of newborns with
disabilities was the norm in "primitive societies."

For example,

Williamson concludes:

Infanticide may be widespread in a society or happen only
occasionally, but it has very few, if any, exceptions with one
class of infants, that is, deformed infants. The reasons for
eugenic infanticide seem obvious; unwillingness or inability to
assume the burden of caring for such an infant, whose future at
best would be unsure. The same is true of infants who are clearly
"different," as, for instance, those with unusual skin color, too
light or too dark."
(1978:64-65)

Such statements reflect our ethnocentric assumptions about disability.
As Scheer and Groce state in their paper on "Impairment as a human
constant:11
...the category 'the disabled' is a cultural artifact which varies
cross-culturally ...
As ethnographers of the disabled, we have observed that
given the cultural latitude to do so, the vast majority of
individuals with impairments can contribute and function in a much
wider variety of ways than would be expected by American social
norms. It is our position that the cultural expectations and
social arrangements which accompany the category 'disability'
circumscribe the life of each disabled individual to a greater
extent than an individual's particular physical or mental
impairment. Furthermore, we suggest that throughout human
history, culture has defined what does and does not constitute a
handicap or impairment and that these definitions have changed
from one society to the next, from one historic period to another,
and of course vary to a degree within subcultures and
socioeconomic classes.
(1985:1)

They cite a study by Weiss, who used the HRAF (Human Relations Area
File) to review the 47 groups where disabled individuals were mentioned.
Of these, 13 groups practiced infanticide of disabled infants.
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Eight of

the 13 practiced infanticide on other newborns as well.

They conclude,

"It is our impression that societies in which disabled infants are put
to death and those where they are not exist in equal proportion" (Scheer
and Groce 1985).

The fact that groups that practice infanticide have

members with congenital impairments that would have been obvious at
birth, proves the fact that the "deformed" were not always killed
(Jessica Scheer, personal communication, 1986).

All cultures develop customs to care for pregnant women, and for
mothers and infants at the time of birth.

These include means to care

for infants born not breathing, sick or premature (Jordan 1978; Kay
1982).

Mothers, other family members, and/or other birth attendants

assessed the physical condition of infants and made judgments about how
to care for infants.

In general, decisions were made to care for

infants in such as way as to maximize chances for survival, but in some
situations, the assessment led to decisions not to try to promote
survival or even to take actions which might bring about death.

For example, Soranus, an ancient Greek physician who wrote a text,
Gynecology, describes how a midwife may recognize an infant "worth
rearing:"

...the infant which is suited by nature for rearing will be
distinguished by the fact that its mother has spent the period of
pregnancy in good health, for conditions which require medical
care, especially those of the body, also harm the fetus and
enfeeble the foundations of its life. Second, by the fact that it
has been born at the due time, best at the end of nine months, and
if it so happens, later; but also after only seven months.
Furthermore by the fact that when put on the earth it immediately
cries with proper vigor; for one that lives some length of time
without crying, or cries but weakly, is suspected of behaving so
on account of some unfavorable condition. Also by the fact that
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it is perfect in all its parts, members and senses; that its
ducts, namely of the ears, nose, pharynx, urethra, anus are free
from obstruction; that the natural functions of every <member> are
neither sluggish nor weak; that the joints bend and stretch; that
it has due size and shape and is properly sensitive in every
respect. This we may recognize from pressing the fingers against
the surface of the body, for it is natural to suffer pain from
everything that pricks or squeezes. And by conditions contrary to
those mentioned, the infant is not worth rearing.
(1956 ed.: 79-80)

Cohen, in her paper on the treatment on impaired newborn in
American history, documents how, as the medical profession developed,
physicians gained the authority to determine whether anomalous infants
were monsters who should be killed or infants who were entitled to the
same careful treatment as other infants (n.d).

Until the recent developments leading to the practice of giving
birth and special care to infants with problems in hospitals, most birth
attendants and physicians would have encountered relatively few

infants

with congenital impairments in the course of their life's work.

Rather

than a well defined class to be treated in a culturally prescribed
manner, physicians and family would make decisions about the care of
each child.

Development of Medical Treatment Capabilities for Newborns

Until recently, in the United States, there was relatively little
that could be done for babies who were born more than a few weeks
premature or for those who were born with severe abnormalities.
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Most

82

babies were born at home, and sick infants were generally cared for
and/or died at home into the beginning of this century.

There was a

high child mortality rate both immediately following birth and later in
the first years of life.

For example, in 1885, for every 1000 live

births, 273 infants died (Pawluch 1983).

Most were the result of high

rates of infectious disease reflecting both the undeveloped state of the
medical sciences (including lack of preventative methods such as
immunizations), and poor nutrition and sanitary conditions.

Deaths of

premature infants were seen as part of high reproductive wastage
(MacMullen and Bruckner 1986).

While the rate of newborns who were born

critically ill because of prematurity [rate of prematurity estimated at
16 - 20% in 1900 (Kretchmer 1964)] or congenital impairments was
probably high, in general, it was not seen as a separately identified
social problem.

The Beginnings of the Development of Modern Technology to Care for
Critically 111 Newborns

As recounted by W.

A.

Silverman (1979), the beginnings of modern

attempts to improve the survival of prematurely born infants can be
traced to France, following the great loss of life resulting from both
military action during and famine following the Seige of Paris in the
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71).

In 1878, Dr.

E.

R.

Tarnier, a leading

Paris obstetrician observed a warming chamber for the rearing of poultry
devised by Odile Martin of the Paris Zoo.

At his request, Mr.
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Martin

built an incubator which was the first warm air incubator.

It was used

at the Paris Maternity Hospital in 1880.

A former pupil of Tarnier, Pierre Budin, wrote about the care of
premature infants in 1888.

Influenced by Madame Henry, a midwife, Budin

established a special department for "weaklings" in 1893, which became
the first center in the world to specialize in the care of premature
infants.

In 1900, Budin established basic protocols for the care of the

prematurely born.

This included instructions 1) to maintain an

appropriate, warm environment by use of an incubator, 2) to provide
human milk feedings (if the baby was unable to suckle, milk was
expressed in a trickle into the mouth), fed by spoon into the mouth or
nose, or introduced directly into the stomach by intermittent gavage, 3)
to take precautions against infection by use of such techniques such as
isolation, sterilization and cold storage of milk.

Over time, other

nurseries adopted these techniques.

While incubators and other aspects of special care may have slowly
spread in medical circles, the early use of incubators for the care of
premature babies became best known through their exhibition
Martin A.

Couney.

by Dr.

He exhibited first at the Berlin Exposition of 1896,

and later at Earl court in the United Kingdom in 1897.

He was probably

the first to use incubators to care for premature infants in America
when he brought his exhibit to Omaha, Nebraska in 1898 and Buffalo in
1901.

He was unhappy that his exhibit was placed in the amusement

section in Omaha, but was pleased when it was placed in the scientific
section in Buffalo and received serious attention from such journals as
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the Scientific American.

Following the show, the Children's Hospital of

Buffalo purchased incubators by the same manufacturer.

Couney

immigrated to America, settled on Coney Island, and exhibited premature
infants there each summer for almost forty years.

He was respected by

New York obstetricians, who sent their babies to Coney Island for
skilled care.

In 1937, he was honored by the New York Medical Society.

Silverman writes that the reasons that no one else established a center
to care for infants commercially was the great expense of such care $15.00 a day.

Couney charged admission for spectators, and did not

charge parents for the care of their infants.

Julius H.

Hess, who later became the leading American expert on

the subject of prematurity, paid tribute to Couney when he wrote his
text, Premature and Congenitally Diseased Infants.

(Silverman 1979).

Hess organized the U.S. first hospital-based specialized premature
infant center at Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago in 1920.

After

Couney exhibited in Chicago in 1933-34, he donated his equipment to Hess
and gave his ambulance to the City of Chicago, which became the first
U.S.

metropolitan infant transport vehicle (Silverman 1979).

Couney returned to New York and exhibited premature babies at the
World's Fair in 1939.

Vital Statistics from the babies cared for at the

Fair were published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
in 1940.

Arnold Gesell, a contemporary authority on infant behavior,

studied the infants at the Fair.
was a financial disaster.

(Silverman 1979).

The show, however,

After the fair, Couney returned to Coney

Island, but soon after, when the first premature station in New York
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City opened at Cornell's New York Hospital, Couney closed his show for
good.

Maternal and Child Health Care Before 1945

In the early part of the 20th century, as scientific medicine
began to develop, hospitals came to be seen as an appropriate place for
others, beside the destitute, to receive care.

In addition to the care

of the sick, the hospital came to be seen as the appropriate place to
give birth.

Before 1900, less than 5% of American Women delivered in
hospitals, but the percentage increased greatly during the first half of
the century.

More than half the births in large cities took place in

hospitals by 1921 (Cone 1983).

[By 1950, 93% of whit; births and 58% of

non-white births took place in hospitals (Cone 1983).]

Rather than

receiving care at home, sick babies began to be cared for in hospitals.
Most care to newborns, however, was still delivered by the general
practitioners, midwives, or obstetricians who delivered the babies.
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, there were few
American specialists in Pediatrics.

In the 1930s, many pediatric

training programs started; in 1933 the American Board of Pediatrics
introduced certification (Thompson 1984).

Hess, in his 1922 text, Premature and Congenitally Diseased
Infants stated
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Hippocrates, in his writings of 460 B.C. ... [wrote] 'No fetus
coming into the world before the seventh month of pregnancy can be
saved.1 We note that the literature of our day records only a
limited number of exceptions to these conclusions that infants
born before the end of the twenty-eighth week are viable.
(p.205)

Hess, and other pediatricians, worked on developing safe methods to
artificially feed infants.

They also started to apply medical

interventions originally developed for the care of older patients, to
the care of infants.

It is very easy for us to take for granted very

basic medical interventions which were not in use even a comparatively
short time age.

For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, for the first

time, infants were given blood transfusions (without knowledge of blood
typing) and supplemental oxygen.

By the 1940s, techniques were

developed enabling surgery for some congenital impairments (such as a TE
fistula - see Baby Doe, below).

The general philosophy guiding the care

of premature infants was to protect them from infection and support them
with as little interference as possible.
allowed to enter the nursery.

Parents were generally not

The major efforts of the time to reduce

infant mortality, however, did not concern premature or sick infants,
but rather concerned the care of normal babies in the community and the
care of mothers at birth.

At the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the
twentieth century efforts were made to decrease the rates of infant
mortality and improve the health of young children.

Most of the

programs focused on preventative public health rather than acute care
measures.

There were major reduction in the infant mortality rate which
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fell from almost 30% in cities like New York inthe 1880s

to less than

4% in the 1940s (Rosen 1958; Lesser 1985).

In the 1930s, the first major move towards improving maternal and
child health measures focused on the safety of mothers.
maternal mortality was almost 6 per thousand.

In 1935,

With the war time

development of antibiotics which enabled treatment of puerperal
infection and blood banking which enabled treatment of hemorrhage, and
improvements in training in obstetrical techniques and anesthesia,
maternal mortality fell sharply to less than 1 per thousand by 1949
(Divitt 1977).

This reduction of risk for the mothers and changes in

the medical care system which took place after World War II led to a
shift in focus to more concern with the care ofinfants.

Post World War II Changes in the American Medical Care System which
Affected the Care of Infants.

Following World War II, efforts to improve the nation's health was
seen as an important component of the the Cold War strategy because it
would build up America's strength and would demonstrate humanitarian
concern.

Proposals for a National Health Insurance Program were

seriously considered, but were then defeated by a campaign which labeled
them as "socialistic" (Starr 1982).

Instead, the "war against disease"

used the same means that had brought America's victory in war, the
"massive mobilization of enormous material assets and a rapid increase
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in technological development" (Silverman 1980).

Science was "the new

frontier."

Previously, the federal government had spent little on health
expenditures; after World War II, the government began to invest
millions and then billions in the health field.

The 1946 Hill-Burton

Act provided money for hospital capital expenses and encouraged
investment in expensive hospital equipment (Richmond 1969; Starr 1982).
Some of the federal money was spent on preventive health programs and
the delivery of primary health services, but the major thrust of the
funding furthered the emphasis on technologically oriented acute care
and research.

It primarily stimulated research on hospitalized,

critically ill patients.

The size and significance of teaching

hospitals and medical schools within the medical care system increased.
(Starr 1982: Richmond 1969).

There were much greater rewards for

developing technologies which produced new solutions to unsolved
problems than to develop less costly methods to solve problems with
existing solutions (Warner 1978).

With the success of the polio vaccine in the 1950s and the
technological advances such as life support techniques in the 1960s, the
general public optimism toward the benefit of the application of
scientific research in medicine grew even further.

With this public

support and the medical research lobby, the federal medical research
budget became the fastest growing component of national health
expenditures reaching 1.5 billion by 1965 (Richmond 1969) [exceeding 4
billion dollars annually by 1983 (Science 1983)].

As will be discussed
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below, research on catastrophically ill newborns, about which little was
previously known, flourished (Silverman 1980).

Trends in Efforts to Reduce Infant Mortality - 1945-1965

During the first half of the twentieth century, there had been
dramatic reductions in infant mortality rates.

In New York City, for

example, deaths under one year fell from 136.7 per thousand in 1898 1900 to 26 per thousand in 1946 - 50 (New York City Dept, of Health
1982).

Despite the great reductions, however, people realized that

infant mortality was still a major cause of death.

A study at the time

noted that for every two soldiers who had been killed overseas during
World War II, three babies under one year had died at home.

Studies

were conducted to identify causes of mortality and programs were
initiated in efforts to reduce mortality rates (Corwin 1952).

After the war, a new system of record-keeping was initiated in
which both length of gestation and birthweight were recorded.

This led

to the realization that although deaths in children above one month had
been sharply reduced, deaths in newborns under one month had hardly
changed at all (Corwin 1952), and most of the deaths occurred in
premature, low birthweight babies (under 5 1/2 pounds).

The development

of glass walled incubators, which allowed clinicians to observe the
troubled respiratory efforts of unswaddled premature infants, and the
new statistical awareness, led to both a literal and statistical
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visibility of the problem of prematurity (Silverman 1980:70-71; Wallace,
et. al.

1949).

The problem was addressed by efforts to centralize the care of
such babies in special premature centers, some built with the help of
Hill Burton funding.

Some cities, such as New York, organized infant

transport systems and subsidized care that then averaged $400.00 for
each infant to discharge.

Although premature babies had been cared for

earlier at the Columbia University Medical Center, the first special
center for the care of premature infants, a 23 crib unit, opened at
Babies Hospital in 1949, the forerunner of the unit in which participant
observation research was conducted for this study.

Daily costs for New

York City to take care of premies were $14 - 17 a day (Wallace, et al.
1950).

Previously, most newborn care was delivered by general
practitioners, obstetricians, and general pediatricians (Budetti et al.
1981). At the premature centers, some pediatricians started to specialize
in the care of the newborn.

Along with funding from the federal and

municipal governments and the growth of academic medicine, the
concentration of babies with similar problems encouraged research both
to improve the treatment techniques and to gain understanding of basic
physiological processes.

Efforts were made to improve treatment by the

application of advances from other fields of contemporary medicine, such
as antibiotics.

In addition, there were applications derived from

research in chemistry, physics, and engineering, such as the use of
plastics (Graham 1981) that had an important impact on the ability to
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deliver care.

While overall, there were major improvements in treatment

during that period, some interventions had disastrous consequences.

The non-interventionist philosophy which had dominated the care of
sick newborns changed as physicians tried to apply newly developed
techniques.

For example, during the late 1940s and 50s, babies were

regularly fed with indwelling tubes, newly discovered antibiotics were
used, infants were given high concentrations of oxygen for the first
time and new surgical techniques were developed to shunt fluid from the
ventricles of infants who had hydrocephalus.

Iatrogenic Diseases of the 1940s and 1950s

Some of the treatment choices had drastic effects.

For example,

physicians acted on a theory that infants should be fed nothing by mouth
for several days after birth.

The smallest babies (under 2 lbs.) were

not fed for 4-5 days, 3 days for 3 lb.
four pounds.

babies, 1-2 days for babies over

Although it was debated, the first detailed clinical study

of the delayed feeding did not occur until the 1960s.

Drillien showed

that during the delayed feeding period, three-quarters of infants
weighing less than 1,367 grams at birth (3 pounds) developed severe
neurological handicaps, while infants born earlier or later had a much
lower (about 30%) rate (Cone 1983:19-20).

Cone quotes a lead article in the Lancet (1974) "the years when
modern neonatal iatrogenesis reached a peak when almost every major
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error in newborn care was widely practiced for at least a time."

Many

infants who were given high concentrations of oxygen were blinded by
retrolental fibroplasia (RLF).

By 1945, 12% of premature infants born 3

pounds or less were blind - primarily in the larger, better equipped
hospitals.

Other iatrogenic diseases included kernicterus (brain

damage) as a result of sulfisoxazole given to prevent bacterial
infections and "gray syndrome," a lethal condition, caused by excessive
doses of chloramphenicol (Cone 1983:24-26).

Other interventions

included keeping the infants body temperature low and restricting fluids
(Cone 1983:24-26; Silverman 1980).

Although clinicians were concerned about each complication, these
problems did not appear to have been perceived as part of a more general
social issue about the iatrogenic consequences of aggressive treatment.
When studies were suggested to test the effects of various
interventions, many clinicians objected that it would be unethical to
deprive infants in the control group of their benefits (Silverman 1980).
According to Dr. James, a young researcher at the time (now director of
the Division of Perinatology at Columbia) during the 1950s, as
clinicians were getting more aggressive in treatment, they thought that
the chance of cerebral palsy, blindness or deafness was greater than
70%, which had been the statistics shown by studies of the effects of
treatment for infants under 2500 grams (about 5 1/2 pounds).

The

impairment rates for those less than 1000 grams he reported at 90%,
those under 1500, 85% during 1948-52.

He said that the "driving force"

for neonatologists at that time was to improve care.
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Even as the beneficial treatments were separated from those with
serious iatrogenic effects, the capabilities were still very limited by
today's standards.

For example, Patrick Bouvier Kennedy, 2100 grams (4

1/2 pounds), delivered by Caesarean section five and one half weeks
before his due date, in 1963 (the only child of a US President born in
office this century) died on the second day of life of respiratory
distress syndrome (Cohen and Stevenson 1983:13).

Despite the developments in treatment practices, during the 1950s
and 1960s there was little decline in rates of infant mortality.

The

infant mortality rate of industrialized societies is largely determined
by the birth rate of premature babies (Lee et al. 1980) which, in turn,
is highly correlated with measures of social class.

Premature babies

continued to be born at a high rate and most did not receive special
care.

The U.S.

infant mortality rate fell to sixteenth among

industrialized nations, 24.7 in 1965.^

This was seen as an indication

of problems in the health care system, since infant mortality rates had
become a popular indicator of the quality of a nation's medical care and
the health of a society (Richmond 1969; Newland 1981; Miller 1985).

President Kennedy and other members of his family, concerned about
preventable mental retardation and better services for the retarded, and
President Johnson, citing the embarrassingly high rates of infant

^
Infant mortality rates are indicated by a number of deaths per
1000 live births unless otherwise noted
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mortality, called for efforts to improve the care of infants as part of
their "Great Society" programs in the 1960s.

Trends in Efforts to Reduce Infant Mortality - 1965-Present

Since the mid-1960s, there has been a dramatic improvements in
the care of critically ill infants.

This has resulted in a significant

decrease in the overall infant mortality rate and reductions in the
level of physical and mental impairment for many surviving infants.
This is due to a number of factors including biomedical advances,
changes in the organization of services, such as "regionalization," and
an increase in third party coverage.

However, there has been little

change in the rate of birth of premature infants, so that the U.S.
infant mortality rate remains higher than that of many other nations.

Organizational and Technological Changes: the Development of Neonatal
Intensive Care

The association of poverty and infant mortality had long been
acknowledged (Baird 1952; Antonovsky and Bernstein 1977) as well as
regional variation in facilities.

The solution to these problems was

sought in improvements in the accessibility of medical services through
medicaid and regionalization.

Little was done to identify and remedy

the factors associated with poverty which lead to more premature births.
The programs had relatively little impact on the rate of babies born at
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risk.

Both the medicaid program and regionalization were intended to

anddid provide both primary and acute services, their
was

greatestimpact

in improving access to acute services (Starr 1982).

Changes in third-party (from sources other than the patient or the
patient's family, or the provider) payments from Medicaid, Blue Cross
and other private companies were very important for the development of
neonatal intensive care.

They provided funds that allowed the

development of sophisticated and expensive equipment and methods to
treat catastrophically ill infants.

In the past, health insurance

programs often did not cover the costs of newborn care.

Pediatricians

lobbied and, in the 1970s, obtained law to require plans to cover care
from the first day of life (Thompson 1984:805).

The costs of care were

not limited to what the family could afford to pay.

From 1940 to 1980, the percentage of the medical expenses paid by
third-party plans increased from under 20% to over 70% of which more
than half came from government sources (National Center for Health
Statistics 1984).

In some states, Medicaid subsidized neonatal care for

others beside the poor because infants can become Medicaid eligible
without their families having to deplete their resources to poverty
level in order to qualify.

The structure of third-party payments has

provided relatively little for preventative services, and moderate
amounts for ambulatory care, but has been most comprehensive for acute,
hospitalized care, such as intensive care.

One study found that third-

party payers covered 85% of the costs for neonatal care, hospitals
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absorbed an additional 11%, and individual families paid only 4% of the
costs (Budetti 1981).

Intensive care units developed when the organizational and
technological innovations of post-surgical recovery rooms and
respiratory care units were combined with the capacities of the special
care nurseries in the early to mid-1960s.

The use of respirators,

electronic monitoring, analysis of small blood samples, and the training
of specialized staff of highly trained nurses, that characterize
intensive care, all contributed to the survival of small infants.

In addition, other life saving developments of the period included
the development of techniques of cardiac surgery for infants, the
availability of chromosome tests for clinical use, intravenous feeding
for premature infants, other improvements in the ability to deliver and
monitor oxygen, better ability to regulate temperature, and application
of pharmacological advances to the care of the NICU patients.
Physicians, nurses, respiratory therapists, and social workers and
others coordinated their efforts.

Regional networks were organized to coordinate services for
obstetrical and newborn care.

Regional centers developed services

specializing in high risk births and the care of sick infants.
and infants were transferred to these centers for tertiary care.

Mothers
These

centers were also responsible for training clinicians from community
hospitals and specialists in neonatology (Committee on Perinatal Health
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1976).

Some centers developed special expertise in the care of infants

with certain conditions such as cardiac lesions or spina bifida.

Neonatology became a Board Certified Subspecialty in 1975.

By

1981, 200 neonatal training programs were established nation wide.
(Budetti 1981).

Neonatologists developed and used even more

sophisticated technology.

Some physicians sought further specialized

training in both neonatology and other specialties such as neurology or
surgery.

Private companies selling specialized equipment and supplies

began to aggressively market products for use in the NICU.

Because

Americans have traditionally looked toward technological solutions to
problems, hospitals which had the latest equipment were able to attract
staff and patients who wanted the "best" facilities.

Current capabilities of neonatal intensive care

The vast majority of infants admitted to NICUs are premature
babies.

The capacity to treat infants with birth injuries and

congenital anomalies have developed along with care for the premature
infant.

Premature Infants

Premature infants are defined as those infants who are born before
completing the 37th week of gestation (of the normal 40 weeks).
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Survival rates for premature infants rose dramatically as further
development of respirators and other respiratory support devices, of new
methods of feeding, and other techniques, revolutionized their care.
The change was most striking for the treatment of very premature
infants.

Infants born after less than twenty-eight weeks used to be

considered "non-viable fetuses" and were usually classified as
miscarriages; now they are considered "live births" and many premature
babies born between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks have been
successfully treated (Budetti 1981; Driscoll 1982; Stahlman 1984).

(See

Table III - 1, Infant Survival by Birth Weight Group.)

In 1985, at some of the major centers, over 50% of all infants
500-750 grams ( 1 - 1 1 / 3 pounds) survive, over 70 % in the 750 - 1000
grams range and more than 90% of babies of 1000-1500 grams (Driscoll,
n.d.).
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TABLE III - 1
INFANT SURVIVAL (Z) BY BIRTHWEIGHT GROUP

New York City 1950 - 1980

YEAR

WEIGHT

lbs.

1950

1960

1970

1980

1/A

3.2

6.8

18.9

39.0

1001-1500

2 1 / 4 - 3 1/3

53.7

52.4

64.6

83.6

1501-2000

3 1 / 3 - 4 1/2

82.3

82.5

88.1

94.4

2000-2500

4 1 / 2 - 5 1/2

95.1

95.6

96.7

97.9

> 5 1/2

98.9

98.9

99.2

99.4

97.5

97.4

97.8

98.4

grams

approx.

<1000

<

> 2500

TOTAL

2

SOURCE: Unpublished Statistics,
NYC Dept, of Health n.d.
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Although infants who are born very premature and survive have
higher rates of impairment than infants who are not born at risk, most
are healthy.

For example, a follow-up study was conducted of the 25

infants who weighed less than 1000 grams who were cared for in the NICU
at Columbia in 1977 and 1978.

Two infants died after discharge, one of

sudden infant death, the second due to BPD (a chronic lung condition
associated with prolonged dependence on a respirator).

At three years

of age, 17% of the 23 survivors had neurological defects and 13% had
intellectual defects.

Of the four who were abnormal neurologically, two

had spastic quadriparesis, one static encephalopathy, and one
hydrocephalus secondary to intraventricular hemorrhage (Driscoll et al.
1982).

A more recent study of 33 school-aged children, who had weighed
1250 grams or less at birth, three were in classes for children with
major handicaps whereas 30 were found to be comparable to their
classmates by teachers and/or test scores.

About half of the thirty

were receiving remedial instruction and/or specialized instruction, but
with that help they were performing at grade level and were reported to
"compare favorably with their peers" (Eilers et al. 1986).

With continued improvement in techniques to care for very
premature infants, the rates of impairment for infants of a given
birthweight can be expected to decrease.

As new efforts are made to

save yet smaller and smaller infants, these new NICU patients may have
relatively high rates of impairments.

Even at the lowest weight ranges,

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

however, well over half of the survivors do not appear to have serious
impairments.

New medications to treat women who are threatening to deliver
prematurely and other advances in neonatal care are likely to save more
infants.

Although some have suggested that medicine is approaching a

theoretical limit beyond which developments in acute care may be unable
to lower infant mortality, such a limit has not yet been demonstrated.
The last 20 years have shown a continued ability to save premature
infants formerly thought to be untreatable.

Treatment for Infants with Other Conditions

Surgical techniques were developed to enable treatment of babies
born with many congenital anomalies.

Open heart surgery and new drugs

enabled treatment for infants with many cardiac defects.

For babies

born with severe spina bifida (a defect in the formation of the spinal
column causing damage to the spinal cord and other anomalies),
neurosurgical techniques were developed to close the spinal lesion and
shunt excess fluid from the brain.

There have been increased

capabilities, in general, to perform surgical techniques for smaller and
smaller infants.

For example, surgery can be performed to repair many

complex intestinal conditions.

Progress in respiratory therapy enables better treatment not only
for infants who are premature but also for asphyxiated babies who have
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suffered from lack of oxygen before, during or immediately after birth.
Improvement in pharmacological techniques has led to a greater ability
to handle infections, circulatory problems, and other conditions.
Greater ability to support infants with total parenteral nutrition
enables clinicians to sustain infants who cannot tolerate oral feeding
for a long period of time.

A new, still experimental, technological apparatus, ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation), enables treatment for some babies who
formerly could not have been saved.

It is a device which oxygenates the

blood, by-passing the lungs and heart, in a manner somewhat similar to
the heart/lung pumps used for shorter periods of time during open heart
surgery.

It can be used in the treatment of infants with a

diaphragmatic hernia, persistent fetal circulation, or who are badly
asphyxiated (who have suffered from lack of oxygen).

A baby on ECMO

needs at least 24 hours of care from both surgeons and nurses each day.
Infants have been sustained on ECMO for as long as two weeks.

Only a

few centers in the country are now using this device; Columbia is the
only center with ECMO between Boston and Washington, D.

C.

In addition to saving the lives of many critically ill infants,
NICU care has prevented impairments for many others who would have
survived even without intensive care, but who would have had
disabilities.

Although infants who were in an NICU have an higher

incidence of impairments than other children, the vast majority of NICU
survivors have no lasting impairments (Shapiro, et al. 1983; McCormick
1985).
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Over two billion dollars is spent each year on the provision of
care for the six to seven percent of all babies born in the U.S.

who

are admitted to close to 600 NICUs each year (Budetti 1981; Institute of
Medicine 1985).

In 1983, there were 545 NICUs, with 8,067 beds, an

average of 14.8 per unit (up from 413 units and 6,187 in 1980) (Richards
1985:67).

Recent information on infant mortality

The overall U.S. infant mortality rates have been sharply reduced
from 24.7 in 1965 to 10.9 in 1983 (Miller 1985).

Part of the reduction

is due to greater availability of family planning and abortion services
which have lowered the rate of birth to high risk mothers (Lee et al.
1976), but most of the reduction results from better treatment of
premature and other acutely ill infants (Budetti 1981).

Despite the improvements in acute care which has led to tremendous
strides in the ability to treat prematurely born infants, relatively
little has been done to correct those factors which led to a high rate
of birth of premature infants.
1981 were low birth weight.

6.8% of all babies born in the U.S, in

Therefore, despite advances in technology,

which greatly increased the rate of survival for low birth weight
babies, the U.S.

infant mortality rate still ranks 17th among

industrialized nations (Miller 1985).
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The association of socioeconomic factors, including race and
social class, with the rate of birth of preterm and low birthweight
infants has been well documented (Antonovsky and Bernstein 1977; Miller
et al. 1985; Institute of Medicine 1985).

Infant mortality rates among

Blacks, at 19.6 per thousand, are nearly twice as high as among whites.
In 1982, 124 of each 1000 black babies were of low birth weight while
the rate for whites was only 56 per 1000.

In some areas, the

sociodemographic difference is even more striking.

For the primarily

poor residents of Central Harlem, the 1983 infant mortality rate was
21.2, while for the primarily prosperous residents of Manhattan's Upper
East Side, the rate was only 7.2 (NYC Dept, of Health 1983).

Because of the primary thrust of expenditures for health care has
been to cure rather than to prevent, less has been done to prevent the
births of infants at risk than to cure them once they are born.

While

social and health services have not been adequate to significantly
affect the risk of low birthweight associated with sociodemographic
characteristics (Institute of Medicine 1985), high quality of neonatal
intensive care has been made available to infants of all social classes.
A study showed that in New York City, once a baby was born, the chance
of surviving the neonatal period for babies in a given weight category
did not vary significantly with socioeconomic factors (Paneth, et al.
1982).

Sociodemographic characteristics are strongly associated with post
neonatal infant mortality rates.

For example, the 1983 death rate of

infants 1 month to 1 year was only 1 per 1000 on the Upper East Side,
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but 11.7 in Central Harlem (New York City, Dept, of Health 1983).
Recent increases in infant mortality rates in some areas have been shown
to be associated with cut backs in programs for mothers and children and
increased economic stresses (Newland 1981; Miller 1985; Miller et al.
1985).

Studies have shown that increased use of prenatal care would be
cost effective by reducing later health care expenditures for low
birthweight infants (Institute of Medicine 1985).

Improvements in the

standard of living and the provision of better primary health care
services services for babies would also decrease the infant mortality
rate.3

Mortality rates especially for small premature infants declined
rapidly.

Neonatal units became showcases for the power of modern

medicine.

3
The clinicians who deliver neonatal intensive care do not usually
have the choice of giving more preventative and other primary care.
Rather, the resources available for different types of care are now
determined primarily by public policy decisions governing the
availability of medicaid and other third-party payments, and to a lesser
extent, by funds for research, training, and social service programs.
It is important to realize that acute interventions and preventative
measures need not be conceptualized as mutually exclusive choices.
Further reductions in infant mortality would probably result from more
investment in each of these area.
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Concerns About the Aggressiveness of
Treatment for Catastrophically 111 Newborns

Despite the overall feelings of pride, new concerns began to
emerge.

For the first time, large numbers of infants with similar

problems were brought together and cared for by specialists. Many
centers provided post~neonatal care for children with impairments.

Some

specialists came to see severely impaired babies not as isolated cases,
but as part of a group of cases for which newly developed techniques
were doing more harm than good.

Whereas previously, an isolated

practitioner and/or family might have privately decided to allow an
individual baby to die, practitioners at some regional centers now began
to discuss some treatment decisions as part of a new problem brought on
by technological advances.

The concern with the ethics of neonatal decision making arose in
the context of a growing concern with biomedical ethics in a number of
arenas.

These included concern with the protection of human subjects,

with abortion, and with decisions about the cessation of treatment
prompted, in part, by questions about the use of cardiac resuscitation,
respirators and organ transplantation (Pres.

Comm.

1981) and the

increased interest in "death and dying" (Kubler-Ross 1969).

These led

to a questioning of the major assumption guiding medicine in the
preceding period -- that death should be "fought" with aggressive
treatment.

It also occurred, in part, because of wider social trends in

American Society which involved questioning of professional authority,
not only in the health arena (exemplified by IRBs and the natural
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childbirth and women’s health movements) but in such areas as
educational reform and the peace movement (Barber 1978; Rothman, lecture
at Columbia 1984).

The ecology movement was growing, with fear about

the inappropriate use of technology.

In addition, there was increased

concern with mental retardation and disability rights.

The late 1960s

and early 1970s was also a time of much public debate about over
population, birth control and abortion.

The Beginning of the Debate About Selective Non-treatment

Those who write about withholding medical treatment from newborns
often assume that the debate on the issue began in the early 1970s with
the publication of articles by Lorber (1971), and Duff and Campbell
(1973).

There is evidence from multiple sources, however, that even

when there was the capacity to do so, infants were not always given
maximum treatment to prolong life.

For example, in 1921 an opponent of

euthanasia quoted an advocate as writing:

In one instance, in the case of a child suffering from
hydrocephalus and beyond hope of cure, only the most constant
attention could keep him alive; the matron finally somewhat
relaxed her vigilance in seeing that he was cared for, and
indigestion carried him off. ... death is brought on by neglect
rather than by administering a drug.
(Spaulding 1921:235-6)

The extent to which clinicians intentionally allowed death to
occur through withholding treatment is unclear since physicians rarely
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wrote about such practices.

Even during the beginning of the aggressive

period of neonatal treatment such practices and discussion about them
evidently continued.

In a 1961 editorial in the Journal of Pediatrics,

Veeder wrote:
One of the present day medical "ethical conflicts" revolves
[around] ... the "prolongation of death" by the use of recently
developed techniques, such as transfusion, intravenous feeding,
fluid therapy, and the cardiac pacemaker, along with the
development of such drugs as the antibiotics.
(p.

604)

He goes on to discuss the treatment of a condition he refers to as
"mongolian idiocy" noting that the causative mechanism was only
discovered within the last two years.

He states that "nature" had

provided a "compensating abnormality ...

low resistance to infection"

which usually led to death but that with the use of "modern techniques
and the newer drugs ...

the Mongol continues a vegetative existence,

worthless to himself and a burden to his family and society."

He asks

if "the use of 'miracles of modern medical science1" and "interference
with the process of nature [is] justified in this condition?" He states
that "the brilliant development of cardiac surgery" during the last few
years, adds to the problem.

In reference to attitudes towards use of these treatments, he
states "opinion is divided.

There is one group with a decided 'yes'

answer and another with a decided "no."
selective judgement."

A third group believes in

He concludes that ethical problems are matters

which cannot be decided by majority vote, rather, each physician "has to
decide for himself [sic.]."
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In 1963, a group of physicians agreed to withhold treatment when
a mother (who was a nurse) and father refused to give consent for
corrective intestinal surgery for an infant with Down's syndrome.

The

physicians felt that the Courts would not order the surgery over the
objections of parents (Gustafson 1973).^

Although many authors assert that aggressive treatment for infants
born with Spina Bifida became the norm only after modern neurosurgical
techniques were developed in the late 1950s, some surgeons advocated
aggressive treatment even earlier (Ingraham and Hamlin 1943; Bluestone
and Deaver 1953).

Even some of the early supporters of aggressive

treatment felt that it was sometimes appropriate to withhold treatment
for medical or social reasons.

For example, in 1961, two British

physicians wrote:

In deciding his attitude to the problem of spina bifida cystica,
the neurosurgeon must obviously consider first the conflicting
claims of all the various types of disorder, both congenital and
acquired, in adults as well as in infants and children, with which
he is called upon to deal, together with the resources in terms of
hospital beds, operating time and the like, to which he has
access. There is also the question of whether it is likely that
adequate after-care, both from the medical and from the social
point of view, can be provided for children with varying degrees
of physical, and possibly mental, handicap. The prospects of this
will undoubtedly vary considerably between countries, perhaps from
industrial to rural areas in the same country, according to the
attitudes and financial status of the parents, and to some extent
to the size and potential helpfulness of the family unit.
(Doran and Guthkelch 1961:342)

^
This case, which has come to be known as "The John Hopkins Case"
has been widely discussed in the debate on the treatment of newborns
(see below).
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Some physicians in the United States (Bucy 1960, Matson 1968),
England (Hide, Williams and Ellis 1972), Scotland (Stark and Drummond
1973) and Australia (Medical Journal of Australia 1971) practiced
selective non-treatment throughout the 1960s.

Commonly, people who write about the issue of withholding
treatment from newborns, date the beginning of the debate with articles
by Lorber and Duff and Campbell in the early 1970s.

There were,

however, many early articles and letters in the clinical literature
about withholding neurosurgery from some infants with Spina Bifida.
(Forrest 1964, 1965, 1967; Sweetnam 1965; Eckstein 1965; Sharrard,
Zachary and Lorber 1967; Zachary 1968a, 1968b; Sanders 1968; Wickes
1968; Fernandez-Serrats, Guthkelch and Parker 1968; Matson 1968; Zachary
1969; Bluestone 1969; McCann 1969; Shillito 1969; Katzen 1971;
Lightowler 1971; MacKeith 1971; Lorber 1971; Medical Journal of
Australia 1971; Slater 1971; Freeman 1972; Cooke 1972; Hide, Williams
and Ellis 1972; Eckstein, Hatcher and Slater 1973; Hunt, Lewin, Gleave
and Gairdner 1973; Lorber 1973; and Freeman 1973) withholding surgery
from infants with other conditions, (Rickham 1969; Hesse 1971; Shaw
1973), withholding resuscitation (Veghelyi 1970) and/or other treatments
(Crocker and Cushna 1972; Engelhardt 1973; Gustafson 1973; Harris 1973;
Duff and Campbell 1973) from some infants with impairments (see Chapter
VIII for a more detailed examination of the published debate on the
issue following an article by Zachary (1968).)
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In October of 1971, the Joseph P Kennedy Jr.

Foundation held an

International Symposium on Human Rights, Retardation and Research.

The

symposium began with a film, Who Shall Survive?. about the John Hopkins
case.

The case was discussed by prominent ethicists, lawyers, and

social scientists, as well as clinicians.

The symposium was written up

in the Boston Globe (Crocker and Cushna 1972).

An article by pediatric

surgeon Anthony Shaw, appeared in the New York Times Magazine Section on
withholding surgery from infants.

Another article about a case in which

a hospital obtained a Court order to treat an infant with Down's
syndrome after parents refused surgery appeared in Life magazine (Harris
1973).

Despite over twenty-five articles, including a few in the popular
press, published by 1973, many date the inception of the debate on non
treatment of newborns to the publication of two articles in the early
1970s.

The first article was published in England by Lorber in 1971;

the second was published in the United States by Duff and Campbell in
1973.

One can speculate as to why these are seen as the landmark

articles.

Although Lorber, and Duff and Campbell, might have advocated

withholding treatment in more cases than many other clinicians would
have, it appears that selective non-treatment per se did not run contra
to professional norms.

Rather, it might be suggested that what was most

controversial about their approaches was the manner that each advocated
for making selective non-treatment decisions.

It appears that most clinicians at the time saw non-treatment
decisions as essentially medical decisions to be made by physicians on a
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case by case basis.

Both Lorber's and Duff and Campbell's positions ran

counter to these norms, though in radically different ways.

Lorber

advocated the use of explicit standardized criteria to be used in all
cases.

Duff and Campbell advocated parental decision making which could

be expected to vary from case to case.
which were most controversial.

Perhaps it was these positions

Or, perhaps, political or personality

factors may have influenced the reactions.

Ethical and Social Concerns About the Treatment
for Catastrophically 111 Newborns, 1973 - 1982

For the following decade, clinicians and bioethicists continued to
debate questions about the care of newborns.

The debate had two main

dimensions 1) Should all babies be treated? If not, which babies shall
live?, 2) Who should decide? Starting in the mid-1970s, there were
numerous articles, conferences, and research groups both in clinical and
academic settings; the papers presented at some of the conferences were
published as edited volumes (Jonsen and Garland 1976; Roy 1978; Swinyard
1978).

Selective non-treatment of infants with impairments became one

of the most prominent issues to be addressed by philosophers, lawyers,
clinicians and others interested in bioethical issues.^

Virtually all

^
Robert Weir, in his monograph Selective nontreatment of
handicapped newborns (1984) and the chapter on newborns in the
President's Commission Report (1983) both provide excellent overall
reviews of clinical, legal, and ethical perspectives on the issues
involved in decision making about the treatment of newborns.
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of the issues of 1973-1982 continue to be debated.

(Some additional

issues are now part of the debate as well, as will be discussed below).

An article entitled "Infants" from the Encyclopedia of Bioethics
(Infants 1978) provided one the best contemporary reviews of the issues.
Hempill and Freeman began their section on "Medical aspects and ethical
dilemmas:11
The ethical dilemmas in the medical care of infants are
primarily the consequences of several developments: an increased
ability to save the lives of infants who formerly would have died
directing concern toward their future quality of life;
improved capability in diagnosing disease and disability in
advance of their manifestations; and an attitude which takes
seriously the dilemma of decision making by others on behalf of
the infant.
This article will delineate the highly complex issues
involved in decision making in infant care as seen from a medical
perspective, including birth defects; problems when the outcome is
unpredictable, experimentation with infants; and the management of
infants selected for nontreatment.
(Infants 1978:717)

Similar to the issues in the care of the critically ill adults
(see Chapter II), clinicians and bioethicists discussing the care of the
newborn considered the type of problems — mental or physical,
progressive or static, terminal or not terminal.

In addition,

unpredictability of the outcome, which is even more common for newborns
than for older adults was seen as an issue.

Options in the management

of children who were not to be treated were also discussed.
Differentiations were made between active and passive euthanasia.

The

goals of "preserving life" and "doing no harm" were seen to conflict
(Infants 1978:717-722).
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The roles of possible conflicting interests of the infant
(interests in both sanctity of life and quality of life), of the family,
of the health personnel and of society were considered.

Since infants

cannot make decisions about their own care, and they have no personal
history on which to base decisions, there was debate about who should be
empowered to make decisions on behalf of the patient.

Decision making

by parents, by physicians, joint decision by parents and physicians, and
decision making by committees was advocated by various parties.
Questions were raised about the appropriateness of court review, or a
priority of responsibilities in decision making (Infants 1978:722-724,
738-39).

Also in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Reich and Ost wrote a
section on ethical perspectives on the care of infants.

In outlining

the ethical theories applied by philosophers and theologians, they
listed the following:
... (a) traditional deontological positions: (b) contemporary
positions emphasizing a rethinking of the concept of "person"; (c)
consequentialist; and (d) approaches rejecting the "humanhood"
standard and proposing either an ethic of care or an ethic of
avoiding harm (a negative formulation of the consequentialist
positions).
(1978:724)

Deontological or rule based principles for decision making
included views of human life as a sacred trust, to be protected, both by
not deliberately killing an innocent human being, and an obligation to
sustain human life, especially on the part of those who have the
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responsibility of caring relationships (Infants 1978:726- 727).

In

addition, as for adults, distinctions were made between ordinary and
extraordinary means, omission and commission, and prolonging life and
prolonging dying.

Some philosophers advanced consequentialist, or

utilitarian positions, challenged those distinctions, advocating
instead, consideration of the effects of choices both for the baby and
for society.

Some philosophers advocated active euthanasia, in order to

spare infants the pain and suffering which could result from the
withholding of treatment (Infants 1978:726-735).

While consideration of the meaning of life and the definition of
personhood or humanhood have been an element in discussion of care of
critically ill adults, it has been an even more important issue in
discussions about treatment for infants.

For example, Joseph Fletcher

proposed 20 elements of "humanhood," including cerebration, selfawareness, intelligence, self-control, control of existence, and
communication."
(e.g.

He felt that babies who did not possess these elements

infants with Down's syndrome and/or IQ below 40 - questionable,

below 20 - not a person).

Others have supported a much more inclusive

definition of infants who should be treated.

For example, McCormick

suggested as a criterion, the potential for human relationships (Infants
1978:732-735).

Another concern of those discussing ethical issues pertaining to
neonatal decision making was the high cost of care and the allocation of
health care resources (Infants 1978:739-40).

Frequently, comparisons

were made between the high cost of intensive care and the benefits that
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could result from an equal investment in preventative and primary care.
A Hastings Center research group formed to examine issues related to
NICU care; allocation of resources was a major issue.

Throughout the 1970s and early 80s occasional articles or stories
appeared in the popular media on decision making in neonatology.
that was widely cited by clinicians "On the death of a baby."
appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 1979.

One

It

It was written by Peggy and

Robert Stinson, parents of a very premature infant.

Their son, Andrew,

had been treated for months in an intensive care unit and died after
suffering many iatrogenic complications.

Many of the clinicians who worked in neonatal intensive care were
familiar with the perspectives of bioethicists and other clinicians;
they were aware of the feelings of parents, such as the Stinsons, who
had objected to NICU care for their children.

Some neonatal units

established ethics rounds or had discussions about ethics in regular
teaching rounds.

Courses on ethics and values were established in many

medical schools, schools of nursing and other health sciences programs.
Most included discussion of the issues involved in decision making about
catastrophically ill newborns.

Another area of social concern, which did not appear to have much
salience with clinicians until the 1980s, was the linking of neonatal
decision making with the issues surrounding abortion and the "right to
life."

Some anti-abortion activists saw non-treatments of infants as a
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second step on a path from abortion, through infanticide to euthanasia
and genocide.

For example, one activist said:

Speaking as the official American witness at the Nuremberg
doctors trials, Dr. Leo Alexander commented on the genesis of the
medical atrocities revealed during the proceedings. "What ever
proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all
who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings.
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in
the basic attitudes of physicians. It started with the acceptance
of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is
such a thing as a life not worthy to be l i v e d . T o d a y we can see
the same shift in attitude occurring in American medicine. We can
see the substitution of a "quality of life" ethic for a "sanctity
of life" ethic and a discarding of our Hippocratic traditions in
favor of the cost-benefit morality of the new technology.
(Diamond 1982:55)

One strong proponent of such a position was Everett C.
become Surgeon General of the United States.

Koop, later to

In 1982, he wrote:

Infanticide is the killing of a born infant by direct means or by
withholding something necessary for its survival. This practice
in the United States is extraordinarily important to those who are
interested in the sanctity of human life because infanticide might
never have come about had it not been for abortion on demand.
When I read, in the months following the January 22, 1973 decision
of the Supreme Court in Roe v Wade, various references to Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion in that case, my blood ran cold. You
will remember that he considered the Hippocratic Oath which
forbids abortion to be irrelevant. He spurned whatever morality
he might have gleaned from the Judeo- Christian heritage of this
country and turned instead to the pagan religions of Rome, of
Greece, and of Persia. Although those countries practiced
abortion, it was infanticide and euthanasia which were more
important inhumanities in their cultures.
(Koop 1982:90)

Alexander, "Medical Science Under Dictatorship,"
241 New England J. Med. 39, 44 (1949)
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In the 1980s, Disability Rights activists also began to be
concerned about neonatal decision making, both for the sake of the
newborns, and also a concern with the implications of selective non
treatment for social value setting concerning society's attitudes for
people with disabilities (Anne B.
1984).

Swanson, personal communication

For example, Asch and Fine state:

Unacknowledged by those who deny treatment is ...
discrimination against people with disabilities. Such prejudice
is found throughout the population and thus it is no surprise
although quite dismaying to see people who decry discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or social
class urging that public policy embody their fears, terrors,
revulsion and ignorance of disability and people with
disabilities. Millions of citizens with biological limitations
would assert that their main obstacles to fulfilling lives stem
not from these limitations but from a society which stresses
mental and physical perfection and rugged individualism, that
often rejects, isolates and segregates them, assuming that
disabled people are unpleasant, unhappy, helpless, hopeless and
burdensome.
Such stereotypes lead inevitably to the first of three major
arguments given for non-treatment: that the child's quality of
life will be intolerable. We ask: intolerable to whom? How do we
know? And, if that child's quality of life is less than someone
else's, how much do we as a society contribute to its
impoverishment by denying needed health care, education,
independent living, rehabilitation and social supports to ensure a
better life? We do not know what the lives of any children will be
when they are born. People who decide that Down's Syndrome or
spina bifida automatically renders the children or adults
"vegetables" or "better off dead" simply know nothing about the
lives of such people today -- much less what those lives could be
in a more inclusive, person oriented society.
(Asch and Fine 1984:52-53)

Over the past two decades, the debates by clinicians and
bioethicists on issues of neonatal decision making have only become more
intense.
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The Law and Legal Cases Concerning the
Withholding of Treatment From Newborns

The applicability of various laws to the treatment of
catastrophically ill newborns has never been clear.

A number of

different bodies of law have been seen as appropriate to the regulation
of treatment decisions by various legal scholars.

These include states

laws pertaining to child abuse and neglect (Shatten and Chabon 1982),
civil liability (Ellis 1982) and criminal law pertaining to murder
(Ellis 1982).

In addition, some have asserted that federal law

proscribing discrimination against the handicapped (DHHS 1983) and
constitutional law pertaining to the rights to privacy, equal protection
and due process are applicable to decision making about the care of
newborns.

At the time that I did the majority of the field work on which
this study is based, as well as during the time since then, the
clinicians whom I studied, like many others who sought a sophisticated
understanding of the law, were not sure about the legal status of
various clinical decisions to withhold treatment.

In this section, I

will briefly review some of the more important cases and events
pertaining to the law and non-treatment of newborns.

No attempt will be

made here to reach conclusions about the constitutionality of any of the
decisions or the legal basis of the laws.

More thorough reviews of the

law pertaining to newborns have been written by Shatten and Chabon
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(1982), Taub (1982), The President's Commission (1983), Weir (1984), and
appear in Bowen v The American Hospital Association (1986).

Some legal scholars assert that decisions to withhold treatment
from catastrophically ill newborns fit the legal definition of murder;
they believe parents and clinicians could face charges ranging from
manslaughter to murder.
by another."

Murder is the "deliberate killing of one person

First degree murder is "willful, deliberate and

premeditated killing" (Ellis 1982:402).

Ellis asserts that such factors

as good motives, active or passive euthanasia, and/or the terminal
illness of the infant would not provide a defense against a charge of
first degree murder.

Although theoretically possible, no parents or

physicians have ever been found guilty of criminal charges because they
withheld or withdrew treatment from a catastrophically ill newborn.

In one case in Danville, Illinois, parents and a physician were
charged with attempted murder and thirteen other charges when they were
accused of withholding treatment from conjoined (Siamese) twins who were
born in May of 1981.

The mother of the twins, Pam Mueller, was a

registered nurse; the father was an emergency room physician in the
hospital where the twins were delivered.

When the twins were delivered,

joined with a single trunk below the waist, and sharing three legs (and
internal organs), the obstetrician decided not to resuscitate; the
parents concurred.
order —

The twins started to breathe spontaneously.

An

"Do not feed in accordance with the parents' wishes" -- was

written on the medical chart.
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An anonymous caller reported the case to the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services.

The department filed a petition of

neglect against the parents, temporary custody was granted to Family
Services, and the children were moved to another hospital for
evaluation.

On June 11th, when the infants were five days old, the

parents and the attending physician were charged with conspiracy to
commit murder.

When a hearing was held, no witnesses were willing to

give testimony linking the parents and physician directly to the order
to withhold food from the twins.

The charges were dismissed.

Four

months later, custody of the twins (who could not be separated) was
returned to the parents.

They were brought home.

Although they were

only expected to live for a few months, five years later they are still
alive.

(Material on this case derived from Taub 1982; Weir 1984).

The case in Danville received much national publicity.

Although

criminal charges have been threatened in other cases, I believe that the
case in Danville remains the only one in which criminal charges have
actually been made.

Some clinicians and parents fearthat decisions to

withhold treatment will lead to criminal charges.

The body of law that has more regularly been applied to cases
involving non-treatment of newborns has been the child abuse and neglect
statutes.

According to Shatten and Chabon (1982), in general, the law

has granted deference to the rights of parents to make decisions for
their children, including medical decisions.
to care for their children.
life saving treatment.

Parents have a legal duty

There is a legal presumption toward giving

If the parents refuse consent for treatment, and
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the child is found to be dependent or neglected, the Court can order
treatment.

Shatten and Chabon state:

Resolution of dependency and neglect cases requires more
than mere factual findings; in all but the most obvious cases it
required the court to balance competing interests. This balancing
reveals an effort by the courts to refrain from interfering in
socially, emotionally, medically, and legally private matters, yet
to ensure that children, whose parents really are not acting in
their best interests, will not remain uncared for. The line
between matters reasonably subject to state intervention and
private family matters is often difficult to draw.
(1982:63)

There have been a number of cases in which physicians have gone to
Court when parents have refused to give consent to treatment.

Decisions

have been made both to require treatment and to permit parents to refuse
treatment.

Therefore, there seems to be no clear legal precedent on the

basis of state law pertaining to child abuse and neglect.

For example, in 1974, a baby boy named Houle was born at the Maine
Medical Center.

He had no left eye, a rudimentary left ear, and a

tracheoesophageal fistula (necessitating IV feedings and allowing fluid
to enter the lungs, bringing about pneumonia) among other defects.
Brain damage was suspected.

One physician stated that he didn't think

that the baby should be treated, but the attending physicians and
pediatric surgeon did.

When the parents refused to give consent for

surgery, the physicians initiated a neglect case.

The judge ordered

surgery saying "the existence of the child herein gives the court
equitable jurisdiction to fulfill the responsibility of government in
its character as parens patriae to care for infants and protect them
from neglect."

Despite the surgery, the baby died the next day (Weir
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1984:93).

Similarly, the Court ordered surgery for a baby girl who was

born with meningomyelocele in New York City in 1979 (Taub 1982).

In other cases, however, the Courts have upheld the parents'
decisions to refuse consent for medical treatment.

For example, in

1972, physicians from John Hopkins were unsuccessful when they sought to
obtain a Court order for corrective surgery for a child with Down's
syndrome and an intestinal obstruction (Ellis 1982).

Physicians were

also unsuccessful in obtaining orders for treatment in what was to
become the most famous non-treatment case concerning the infant who
became known as "Baby Doe."

Baby Doe was born in Bloomington, Indiana on April 9, 1982.

He

had Down's syndrome and an esophageal atresia with associated
tracheoesophageal (TE) fistula.

At the time of his birth, he was also

thought to have an enlarged heart.
his care.

His physicians were divided about

Without surgery, he could not take nutrition by mouth.

Some

of his doctors argued that surgery to correct the defect had an 85 -90%
chance of success, while others argued that the chances of success were
only 50-50.

His parents refused consent and surgery was not performed.

He was not given IV nutrition or fluids; he was given sedatives.

The administrators of Bloomington Hospital sought legal advice on
the possibility of legal intervention to require surgery.

In an

emergency hearing, a circuit judge ruled that the parents had the right
to withhold treatment.

The judge appointed the Monroe County Welfare

Department as guardian ad litem; they decided not to appeal the judge's
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ruling.

The next day, the county prosecutors intervened and the judge

encouraged an appeal of his own ruling by appointing one of the
prosecutors as guardian ad litem. He filed an emergency petition with
the circuit court which failed.

The prosecutors then appealed to the

Indiana Supreme Court which conducted an informal hearing.
voted three to one not to intervene.

The justices

According to Weir, they were

apparently concerned about second- guessing physicians on medical
matters.

After the Supreme Court decision, the prosecutors flew to
Washington in an attempt to bring the case to the Supreme Court.

They

planned to raise the issues of whether the child had a right to continue
living under the 14th amendment, was denied Due Process, and/or if the
child was denied Equal Protection because of his handicap.
were en route to Washington, Baby Doe died.

While they

(Material on Baby Doe is

derived from Pless 1983; Weir 1984; Lyon 1985.)

This case received much national publicity.

In response to the

case, President Reagan instructed Richard Schweiker, Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to notify health care providers
that recipients of federal funds are forbidden "from withholding from
handicapped citizens, simply because they are handicapped, any benefit
or services that would ordinarily be provided to persons without
handicaps" (Weir 1984:131).

Such a notice was sent in May of 1982.

It

informed health care providers that they risked losing federal funds if
they did not comply.

Other efforts were begun to pass laws in Congress
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to involve the federal government in selective non-treatment decisions;
that year, the efforts were unsuccessful (Weir 1984:132).

When I did the most intense period of observation in the neonatal
unit in the Fall of 1982, federal efforts at intervention had little
visibility.

Most of the clinicians had been aware of the Baby Doe and

Danville decisions.

Many were aware of other neonatal cases.

There was

growing public awareness of neonatology because of these cases, and
occasional TV shows and articles in the popular press.

The issue of

neonatal decision making was primarily conceptualized as an ethical
issue of concern to bioethicists, clinicians, and the parents of
catastrophically ill newborns.

In the following year the public

awareness of the issue of neonatal decision making was to rise
dramatically.

In the Spring of 1983, President Reagan announced plans to enforce
the 1982 regulations issued by the Department of Health and Human
Services by requiring signs to be hung in every nursery, obstetrical
unit, and pediatric unit, installing 'a toll free hotline for reporting
cases to the federal government, and establishing mechanisms to
investigate reported cases.

The regulations, opposition from the major

health organizations and others, and related court decisions and
revisions received much national publicity.

Also in the Spring of 1983, the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Biomedicine and Behavioral Research
published an influential report, Decisions to Forego Life-sustaining
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Treatment. It promoted the use of a standard based on "the best
interests of the baby" for making neonatal decisions.

The Commissioners

believed that in some cases, those interests were best served by
decisions to forego life saving treatment.

They recommended review of

such decisions by hospital-based ethics committees (Pres. Comm. 1983).
The report received much attention from the media.

In 1983 decision making for catastrophically ill newborns had
become a public issue.

The issue remained prominent in the Press

throughout 1983 when there was extensive media coverage concerning court
cases about the care of a child with spina bifida, known as "Jane Doe,"
who was born in New York that Fall.

The case of Jane Doe is discussed

in Chapter VII; the Baby Doe Regulations, including federal child abuse
regulations, are discussed in Chapter VIII.

Research on Neonatal Decision Making

Although there has been much written on clinical decision making
about neonates, especially during the past two years (including such
books as Frohock 1986; Gustaitis and Young 1986; Kuhse and Singer 1985;
Lyon 1985; Magnet and Kluge 1985; Murray and Caplan 1985; Weil and
Benjamin forthcoming; Weir 1984) there has been little systematic social
science research on the topic.
attitudes of clinicians.

There have been a number of surveys of

Social scientists have conducted research on

neonatology, including two in depth observational research studies on
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neonatal decision making (Anspach forthcoming; Guillemin and Holmstrom
1986), which will be reviewed briefly in the following section.

Surveys

Between 1970 and 1982, there have been at least eight surveys of
pediatricians' and other clinicians' attitudes about treatment for
catastrophically ill newborns (Crane 1975; McKilligin 1976; Johnson and
Garland 1976; Shaw, et al. 1977; Todres et al. 1977; Singer, et al.
1983; Levin 1985).

An additional study is currently nearing completion

(Guillemin 1985).

I will try to draw some general conclusions, although it is
difficult to make comparisons because there were major differences in
the design and phrasing of questions on the surveys.

On each of the

surveys, most clinicians expressed support of selective non-treatment
for some cases.

On the three surveys where clinicians were specifically

asked if there were circumstances in which it is appropriate not to
sustain life, 83% to 100% of the respondents agreed that for some
infants, some aggressive treatments are not mandatory (Jonsen and
Garland 1976; Shaw et al. 1977; Singer et al. 1983).

Respondents expressed less consensus when asked about treatment in
specific cases.

For example, when asked about treatment for infants

with Downs syndrome and other complicating conditions, which would be
routinely treated for newborns without impairments, four of the surveys
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from the 1970s indicated that approximately half the clinicians would
treat aggressively (Crane 1975 [based on combined data on two
vignettes]; McKilligin 1976; Todres et al. 1977; Shaw et al. 1977).

On

a survey conducted shortly after the announcement of the first "Baby Doe
Directives" in 1983, almost 90% of the respondents said they would
recommend intestinal surgery for a baby with Down's syndrome (Levin
1985).

On those surveys which asked about treatment of infants with
meningomyeloceles at various levels and with various social and medical
complications, 33% to 73% responded that that would recommend
neurosurgery (Crane personal communication; Shaw et al. 1977; Todres et
al. 1977).

Although selective non-treatment is often thought of in terms of
"giving treatment" or "withholding treatment," in a modern hospital, a
patient is virtually never "not treated" in the sense that no treatments
are given.

Rather, decisions about both giving and withholding

treatment involve decisions about which treatments to give and which to
withhold from the range of possibilities.

Therefore, the important

questions include not only: "Who should be treated?" and "Who should
decide?" but "Which treatment should be given and which should be
withheld?"

Since clinicians give patients some treatments while they withhold
others from the same patients, they make distinctions based on
characteristics of the treatments as well as characteristics of the
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patients.

Such distinctions have been made for a long time and

characterize decision making at least in the English speaking medical
community.

When Singer and his associates surveyed Australian

pediatricians in 1981-82, more than three-quarters responded that they
felt that it was important to distinguish between ordinary and
extraordinary means of preserving life.

Variations in the rate at which clinicians would recommend
withholding different treatments was reflected in the marginal data from
Crane's survey, conducted in 1970-71 (see table III - 2).
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TABLE I I I

-

2

TREATMENT OF CONGENITAL ANOMALIES AND
SEVERE BIRTH DEFECTS IN NEWBORNS

% who would give
each treatment

1.

Maybe

No

63

20

16

77
60
52
22
16
17

10
17
20
29
24
13

12
21
25
46
58
66

41
53
72
44
47
60
20

14
22
14
22
21
18
15

40
23
12
28
28
20
62

INFANT WITH HYPOPLASTIC LEFT HEART

Intravenous fluids for maintenance
Medical management of congestive heart
failure (i.e. digitalis, diuretics, oxygen)
Catheterization for diagnosis
Antibiotics for infection
Bag-breathing for respiratory distress
Respirator for respiratory distress
Resuscitation for cardio-respiratory arrest

2.

Yes

INFANT WITH HIGH LUMBAR MYELOMENINGOCELE
(20 y.o. parents, not H.S. grads)
Local antibiotic for myelomeningocele
Operation - early closure of defect
Manage urinary tract infection
Perform crede massage on the bladder
Shunt if hydrocephalus developed
If meningitis developed, would you treat?
If cardiac arrest, resuscitate?
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TABLE III - 2 (cont.)
% who would give
each treatment
Yes

Maybe

No

3. 1500 gm. INEANT WITH DOWNS' AND RESPIRATORY DISTRESS
(35 y.o. Mom wants child, limited financial resources)
73
Perform appropriate cultures (blood, CS
72
Treat with antibiotics
83
Correct acidosis
65
Pneumothorax, aspirate chest?
Stops breathing 2 min., bag breathe 2-3 hrs? 20
21
Respirator if apneic spells continue?
19
Resuscitate if cardiac arrest?

12
15
10
20
22
26
14

15
12
7
13
58
53
66

Based on responses from national sample of 232 pediatricians.
Unpublished data from a larger study (Crane 1975).
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Observational Studies of Neonatal Intensive Care

A number of social scientists have conducted studies in neonatal
intensive care units.

Some have focused on the reactions of parents

(Barnett et al. 1970) or their perceptions of their infants, on
communication and interactions between staff and parents (Bogden, Brown
and Foster 1982; Sosnowitz 1984), or on ethical issues involving
families from different subcultures (Clausen 1985).

Two social

scientists reported their own experiences, and those of their older
daughter, following the birth of their catastrophically ill newborn
(Scrimshaw and March 1984).

Some have examined the environment for

infants (Newman 1980; Glass 1985).

Other have looked at social factors

pertaining to staff interactions with other staff members and patients
(Weiner et al. 1979; Brody and Klein 1980).

There have been two major studies of neonatal care based primarily
on participant observation.

The first, by Renee Anspach, examined life

and death decisions in two neonatal intensive care nurseries.

She

examined decisions from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge,
relating decision to the social context in which they took place.

A

major finding is that attending physicians, residents and nurses,
because of their experiences in the intensive care nursery, differ
systematically in their views of infants' prognosis.

She also discusses

such issues as uncertainty in medical decision making, negotiations
between parents and practitioners and negotiations among staff (Anspach
forthcoming).
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Guillemin and Holmstrom (1986), in a new study just published on
neonatal intensive care, report on their participant observation
research in a neonatal intensive care unit and visits at fourteen other
units in the U.S.

and six other countries.

They report on professional

roles and responsibilities, the process of clinical decision making, and
on the family in the NICU.

They situate decisions within the larger

context of the national organization of health care.

They were struck

by the similarities in organization and behavior from unit to unit in
all of the NICUs they studied.

Although there are some differences between the units studied by
Guillemin and Holmstrom and Anspach and the unit at Columbia, much of
the process of decision making they describe is similar to that which I
observed.

Accounts in both studies reflect the importance of

clinicians' conceptualizations of characteristics of patients and
treatment.

As I found at Columbia, there is variation in the

categorizations of particular patients and/or treatments; overall the
categorizations are similar.

The decision making appears to be guided

by the same norms and goals as those that will be discussed below.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CHOICE THOUGHTS:
CULTURAL CATEGORIES AND DECISION MAKING

The choices concerning the aggressiveness of treatment for a
catastrophically ill newborn involve (1) the evaluation of
characteristics of the patient condition and characteristics of the
treatment options (2) in relation to the goals of treatment (3) guided
by norms about clinical decision making.

In order to make such choices,

information about the patient, treatments and goals are evaluated
according to culturally relevant categories.

Disagreements about

appropriate treatment decisions may result from differences between
clinicians about the categorization of particular patients and
treatments into the culturally relevant categories, variation concerning
the goals of treatment, or differences in the norms to guide decision
making.

In this chapter, I will briefly discuss some of the literature on
decision making.

Then I will present discussion of a cognitive model

for decision making.

Finally, I will present a model for making

decisions about the care of catastrophically ill newborns.

I do this to

set the ground work for a discussion of how clinicians themselves think
about the factors they find relevant in decision making.

Much of what

has been written on clinical decision making uses abstract categories
defined outside the clinical context.

These discussions often miss much
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of the complexity of actual clinical decision making.

The complexity of

categorization of patient condition, treatments and goals as well as the
norms for decision making will be discussed in more detail in Chapters V
through VII.

Review of the Medical Decision Making Literature

The model of decision making presented here draws primarily on
work in the anthropological literature on decision making in natural
settings.

It is based on work done by cultural anthropologists and

cognitive psychologists.

Most of the work on medical decision making

has been focused on developing formal analytic models of how clinicians
should made decisions, the aim of this research, however, is to explore
the concepts clinicians themselves use in decision making and to place
those conceptualizations within the larger economic, political and
social environment.

Most research on medical decision making has used quantitative
methods.

Much is prescriptive, intended for use by clinicians in making

more rational diagnoses or treatment choices (Lusted, 1968; McNeil,
Keeler and Adelstein 1975; Pauker 1982).

For example, Kassirer

developed a model for use in determining if a patient suspected of
having a particular condition, subphrenic abscess, should have surgery.
He builds a decision tree based on probability values and assigned
utility values for the value of various outcomes (100 for no surgery and
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spontaneous recovery, 65 for correction after serious surgical
complications, and 0 for death) (Kassirer 1976).

Other quantitative work investigates the impact of various
sociological factors on decision making by clinicians including
characteristics of the patient, characteristics of the clinician, the
clinician's interaction with his profession and the health care system
and the clinician's relationship with the patient (Eisenberg 1979).
Such factors as the number of physicians in a geographic area (Wennberg
and Gittelsohn 1982), the nature of the practice setting (Fink,
Colombotos and Barr 1984) and the medical specialty (Greenwald et al.
1984) have been shown to affect medical decision making.

Some of the research on clinical decision making has focused on
psychological factors (Elstein et al. 1982).

For example, Elstein and

his colleagues have sought to discover the cognitive processes used by
clinicians in making decisions.

They have examined the steps used by

experienced and novice clinicians in diagnosis (Elstein, Shulman and
Sprafka 1978).

Wallstein examined sources of bias in decision making

(1981).

Although there are exceptions, almost all of the research on
clinical decision making assumes that the usual goals of treatment, cure
and the preservation of life, are the goals of the decision makers.
While they are the primary goals in most medical decisions, decision
making about the aggressiveness of treatment for catastrophically ill
infants involves decision making

ii\

those situations in which cure is
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not felt to be possible or probable and the value of the continuation of
life is brought into question.

Studies on decision making in those situations where the value of
preserving life is questioned was reviewed in Chapters II and III.

In

sum, there has been relatively little social science research in this
area.

The major work remains the study by Crane (1975) based primarily

on a large scale sample survey of physician attitudes.

A recent study

examined what treatments residents intended to have withheld when they
wrote no-code (do no resuscitate) orders for actual patients, and
compared them with the interpretation of other residents who took care
of the same patients.

They found "both the intention and interpretation

of no-code orders were characterized by variability, and interpretation
of the orders was characterized by uncertainty as well" (Uhlmann, Cassel
and McDonald 1984).

There is some work which has endeavored to devise models to
incorporate value considerations into formal, prescriptive models for
decision making.

Some of the research has looked at differences in the

way people value various types of risks (Pochin 1982; McClain 1983).
Studies have also examined preferences for various outcomes (Eraker and
Sox 1981; Berwick and Weinstein 1985) including some in which the
benefits of survival are weighed against other values (McNeil,
Weichselbaum, and Pauker 1981; McNeil and Pauker 1979).
has been little work on this area.

However, there

Most of it has, out of necessity,

had to delimit the factors examined which might influence decision
making in order to use quantitative methods.
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Most of the work on clinical decision making has been based on
chart review or consolidated quantitative data about treatment decision,
procedures, admissions, discharge data etc.
formal interview schedules.

or the use of surveys or

While informed by the current research on

clinical decision making, the methods and aim of the research reported
in this dissertation lies closer to the work of medical anthropologists
and sociologists who have used participant observation, historical and
document analysis and interview techniques.

The purpose of the work is to explore the complexity of factors
influencing clinical behavior.

In some ways, it was inspired by and

builds on the work of those who used participant observation to study
clinicians' behavior towards the critically ill, such as Glaser and
Strauss (1965; 1968), Sudnow (1967), Fox and Swazey (1974) and BluebondLanger (1978), and on the work of others who have done participant
observation research in clinical settings such as Bosk (1979).

It is

also related to research on the social construction of medical work
(Foucault 1975; Hahn and Gaines 1985; Wright and Treacher 1982; Atkinson
and Heath 1981).

A few qualitative studies have examined clinical

decision making.

These include decision making pertaining to prenatal

diagnosis (Rapp 1986; Rothman 1986), a study of decision making by
surgeons (Katz 1985), and a study of differences in decision making in
different specialties (Burkett and Knafl 1974).

As reviewed in Chapter III, there have been two major participant
observation studies of neonatal intensive care (Anspach forthcoming;
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Guillemin and Holmstrom 1986).

While Anspach examined clinician's

conceptualization of prognosis, neither has utilized the frameworks
developed by cognitive anthropologists who have worked on decision
making in natural settings.

Work of anthropologists working on decision making in natural
settings has been useful in providing a frame work with which to
research clinical decision making.
making in a variety of settings.

Their work had dealt with decision
Some of it has concerned decision

making in relation to economic activities such as agricultural decision
making (Barlett 1980) and shopping decisions (Murtaugh 1984) and
conflict resolution (Quinn 1976).

There has been research on medical

decision making in natural settings but it has generally concerned
choice between medical systems or within a traditional medical system
(Kleinman 1980; Young 1981).

Some of the understandings of cognitive

anthropologists about categorizations, goals, and norms and their use in
the process of decision making will be presented in the course of this
chapter.

A Decision Making Model

The model that I will later use to describe clinical decision
making about the aggressiveness of treatment in intensive care is based
on a more general model of decision making (see Figure IV - 1).

This

model is based in part on work by Spradley (1972) and other cognitive
anthropologists.

According to that model, in order to act, an
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individual must organize information about factors relevant to the
problem being addressed.

Cultural knowledge systems function to "(1)

provide a scheme for the storage of knowledge in memory, (2) to select
appropriate knowledge for problem solving; and (3) to supply a logic for
solution of a problem" (Nardi 1983:697-98).

Sensory stimuli which are

perceived by the individual are cognitively organized into categories.
Categorization involves deciding how a particular case fits into a class
of similar entities.

Norms (or cultural rules) indicate relationships

between categories and provide prescriptive guides about behavior on a
cognitive level which are then translated into concrete behavioral acts
and performed.

The categorization of stimuli, the norms, and

translation from categories to acts are all influenced by the context -political, economic, social, technological and ideological factors from
the environment at both microsocial and macrosocial levels.
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Perception and Categorization

When humans behave, they make choices (conscious or unconscious)
between possible behavioral options based on categorizations of
perceived phenomena.

While perceptions are in part determined by the

physical stimuli, perception also depends on the interpretation of the
observer and are, in part, culturally determined.

(Berlin and Kay,

1969) In order to be acted upon, such perceptions must be organized
cognitively.

One way the quantity of stimuli is simplified is by

division of aspects of the perceptual stream into categories.

For

example, rather than differentiating each shade, a variety of shades may
be referred to as "red" in some circumstances.

Sometimes there may be

finer distinctions reflected in more differentiation within categories.
For example, tones such as "crimson," "wine," and "rose," may be
differentiated within the "red" category.

Criteria for categorization

may be physical traits alone, or may involve subjective dimensions.

Multifactorial Categorization

While some categorizations are made on single traits, others
involve many dimensions.

Categorizations may be based on emotional

quality such as "scary" versus "comical" to categorize movies, or may
involve complex moral evaluation of behavior such as "forthright" versus
"underhanded" acts.

Multifactorial categorization may be used to

simplify very complex phenomena.
clinical settings.

Such categorization is used in

For example, a judgment may be made that an infant
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is "at risk" for neurological impairment on the basis of results of
ultrasound data, electronic tests of brain activity, lab tests, as well
as "soft signs" of tone, activity, etc.

Discrete and Overlapping Categories

Much of the ethnoscientific work in anthropology has concerned the
explication or classification of biological species and diseases that
are presumed to form discrete categories, often hierarchically arranged
(Casson 1981:75-91).

For example, Frake studied the diagnosis of

disease among the Subanun of Mindanao.

He found that disease terms

formed a taxonomic hierarchy comprised of different sets of contrasting
categories.

The categories of any one level were included in the

category at the next level.

For example, at one level a "sore" was

distinguished from a "bite," while at the next level they were both
categorized together as "skin disease" (1961:117-118).

Similarly, much

of the clinical decision making literature has focused on discrete
choices such as making a diagnosis (assumed to be a discrete entity) or
whether to order a test or do a procedure such as surgery.

Ranked and Relational Categories

Beside models based on hierarchically arranged, discrete
categories, however, other model of categorizations can be designed.
Rather than simply discrete categories, categories may refer to a
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collection of points on a ranked or continuous dimension.

For example,

Galdwin and Murtaugh, in a study of car choice, used four
"transportation requirement" categories: (l) cars for a large family,
(2) cars for a small family, (3) limited family use car, and (4) single
person car (1984:218).

Relative as well as absolute features can also be used to form
categories (Casson 1981:86). For example, in some situations a color "color A" - may not be categorized as "purple" but as "more blue" or
"less blue" than another color, "color B" The fact that such a
categorization is relative, is illustrated by the fact that (the less
blue) "color A" shade may be considered "more blue" than yet another
color, "color C".

On an ordered dimension, there may be clear,

operationalized, breaking points between categories or there may be no
clear divisions.

Most of the cognitive anthropological work on categorization may
be seen as pertaining to noun categories (e.
species, color names).

g.

disease categories,

Th'ese are seen as discrete entities.

A number

of features may be used to define each category having to do with form,
function etc.

Criteria are used to determine which category an entity

belongs in and theoretically, each entity would only belong in one such
category at the same hierarchical level.

There may be variation in how

an item is categorized because individuals may use different criteria
for categorization (Kempton 1978).
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Other categories may be thought of more as adjectival or
adverbial.
actions.

They are used to identify characteristics of things or
While color terms can be looked at as "nouns" themselves, they

can also be used to refer to aspects of other things - for example, they
can be used to describe furniture.

A red chair, a blue chair, etc.

Other categorical judgments can be make about the same entities in
another domain.

For example, in describing the appearance of a chairs,

one could talk about them as hard or soft.

One could also look at

another domain, for example, having to do with value.

One could make

judgments about price, about whether it was a name brand or not, etc.
In trying to make a decision about which chair to buy, one could
consider characteristics of chairs in two domains, "Appearance" and
"Value":

CHAIRS
CHARACTERISTICS OF APPEARANCE
color
texture
material
CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE
price
workmanship
brand

Some elements significant in determining the category in one
domain may be relevant in making categorization in another.

For

example, the material that a chair is made of (if it has gold trim), may
be part of what determines price.

Likewise, workmanship, in part, is

related to appearance, as well as value.

But, if one wanted to discuss

how people think about making a decision about which chair to buy, you
could discuss considerations about characteristics in each of these two
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domains.

Entities can be categorized on all characteristics from each

domain (although all may not be relevant for a particular decision).

Some categorizations describe a relationship between attributes.
For example, one could refer to a purchase as extravagant.

This

categorization would depend not only on the price of the chair, but
would also depend on the relationship of the price to other domains,
like the purchaser's budget, which could be seen as forming part of the
context of the decision.

Some of the categories that I will refer to as characteristics of
patient condition and treatment are relational categories.

For example,

I will discuss categorizations of treatments as ordinary and
extraordinary.

These are defined by clinicians both by characteristics

of the treatments and by their benefits to patients.

Categorization of

blood pressure provides a clinical illustration of such categorizations.
Blood pressure is sometimes discussed as "high," "normal" or "low" blood
pressure as if it fell in discrete categories (although it is based on a
continuous dimension).

A patient whose blood pressure measures a given

amount may be seen as having "high blood pressure" or "low blood
pressure."

The categorization does not depend on the value of the blood

pressure measurement alone, however.

Such factors as age, whether or

not the patient is pregnant, will affect how the blood pressure is
categorized.

Therefore, a value which is seen as "high" blood pressure

for one patient, may be seen as "normal," or even "low" for another.
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Variations in Categorizations Between Individuals

Categorization about some phenomena may be universally shared by
all members of a culture.

Sometimes, however, categorizations vary

among individuals of different social groups or even between individuals
within a social group (Mervis and Rosch 1981).

This may occur because

of differences in the perceptions about the stimuli which are considered
in making the categorization (either because of physical differences one person may see red while someone who is partially red/green color
blind may see black, or because one person may have learned to
discriminate shocking pink from coral while another has not), because
there are differences in opinions about what is important in defining
the category (one may discriminate more on brightness while another on
hue when categorizing as purple or pink), or differences concerning the
cut off points between categories (some may define aqua as green while
another may see it as blue).

Returning to a clinical example, clinicians may vary in how they
interpret an X-ray.

A number of physicians may examine the same x- ray

but may come to different conclusions about the diagnosis of the patient
because of differences in equipment or eye sight, differences in
training or differences in criteria used in making a diagnosis.

(For

fuller discussion of physician variation see Eddy 1984.)

There also may be differences because clinicians disagree about
the criteria to use.

For example, one clinician may feel that for an

adult male, a diastolic blood pressure of 95 is normal, while another
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clinician may feel that it is abnormal and prescribe antihypertensive
medication.

Categorizations in Cultural Contexts

Categorizations may also vary for the same individuals when asked
to make categorizations in different contexts.

For example, in many

indigenous medical systems, foods are categorized as "hot" or "cold".

A

food which is considered hot in one context, such as healing, may not be
considered "hot" in another (Mathews 1983).

This is true as well in the

clinical situation; a heart rate which may be high at rest, may be
normal after exercise.

Attentive and Preattentive Categorizations

Categorizations may be made consciously by an individual when
confronted with a new situation or a categorization may be preattentive
- made unconsciously according to previously learned criteria (Murtaugh
1980).

For example, if shopping for dining room chairs, one might

categorize a number of chair as falling in the category of dining room
chairs preattentively, without consciously thinking about whether they
were the appropriate height, material, etc.

If one encountered one,

however, that wasn't clearly a member of the category, one might
consciously consider whether or not it was a member of the category
"dining room chairs."
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Similarly, in the clinical context, a nurse in the emergency room
screening incoming patients could make a preattentive categorization
that a patient who was bleeding heavily from a gun shot wound was a
"seriously ill patient," while she might have to consciously evaluate
the criteria to decide if a child who arrive with abdominal pain was
"seriously ill."

Norms

Norms have been defined a number of ways by anthropologists and
sociologists.

According to Cancian, a typical definition of norms is a

combination of "two elements (1) shared rules or beliefs about how a
person should behave (2) that are backed by sanctions, or are the
criteria for reward and punishment" (Cancian 1976:357).

Social

scientists have varied in the extent to which they use "norm" to refer
to the ideal prescription about how people should behave as opposed to
using "norm" as a behavior rule that provides guidance for real
behavior.

In this dissertation, I am using the concept of norm to refer

to cultural rules that guide behavior, or provide "patterns for action"
(Schneider 1976).

More abstract ideals providing prescriptive guides

about how people should behave, as well as other types of desirable
ends, will be discussed in terms of "goals" (see below).

An example of a behavioral norm is "Stop at the corner when you
see a red light.

When the light turns green, drive through

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"intersection and wait until the light turns green."
clinical behavior as well.

Norms guide

For example, clinicians are explicitly told

to do a throat culture before giving antibiotics for a mild sore throat.
If it is a protocol they follow, then for them it is a behavioral norm.
Other physician follow a norm which dictates that they should let the
patient feel they are "doing something" when they come for an office
visit.

Guided by that norm, a physician may order antibiotics without a

throat culture.
practice.

There are other informal norms to orient clinical

For example, Scheff (1963) identified a norm that guides

physician behavior that it is better to judge a well person sick, than a
sick person well.

Bosk (1979) identified a norm in relation to surgical

mistakes - "To forgive and remember."

Changes in Norms by Context

Cultural rules may vary by context (Wallace 1972).

For example,

the rules about stopping at a red light may be generally true, but may
vary by context.

For example, it may apply in most circumstances,

however, it may not guide the behavior of some individuals if the light
has just turned red.

For others, who generally obey the rule, the rule

may be modified late at night if there is no policeman present.

In that

context, they may follow a rule such as, "drive up to the intersection,
look both ways, then drive through."

Or, the rule may not apply if the

actor is in a particular role, for example, an ambulance driver in an
emergency situation.

In the clinical situation, as the cultural norm to

treat may be modified in the situation in which the treatment itself is
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very risky and the likelihood of lasting problems from the condition is
small.

As will be discussed in Chapter VIII, both norms and the meaning

of norms for decision making about newborns have varied as conditions
from the larger context have changed.

Goals-*-

Behavior may vary according to the goal.

"Goals comprise the aims

and aspiration, whether object or actions, that a person values and
strives after" (Nardi 1983:689).

For example, if one's goal is to go

straight ahead, one may have to stop at a red light before going through
an intersection.

If, however, one want to turn right, in some contexts,

one may be able to turn after a full stop.

Actors act in order to achieve certain goals.
set of goals at a number of levels of abstraction.

One can look at a
For example, at one

level, the usual goal of driving a car is to get somewhere.
subsidiary goal may be to exhibit one's new sports car.

A

At another

level of abstraction, one can look at goals in terms of the desire to
earn money; driving to work contributes towards that goal.

At yet more

-*One can use the concept of goals to encompass the concepts
sometimes referred to as norms, when norm is used for ideal prescriptive
statements. For example, in some models "Honor thy mother and father"
would be considered a norm. In this model, it would be a goal. "Don't
use foul language in front of your parents," or would be an example of a
norm, a prescriptive statement about behavior oriented toward achieving
the abstract, ideal goal. "Don't use language in front of your parents
that they wouldn't use" would be an example of a norm that changed,
although the underlying goal of respect for parents could remain the
same.
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abstract levels, one can look at such goal as satisfying basic needs
(e.g.

hunger, thirst) or to achieve sense of self esteem.

An

individual may be able to achieve the same goal a number of different
ways in the same context, or there may be constraints on options.

One can look at goals at different levels of abstraction in the
clinical context too.

For example, at a low level of abstraction, one

may want to increase the level of oxygen in the blood and therefore
increase the rate, pressure or concentration of oxygen on respirator
settings.

At a higher level, the same behavior can be seen as working

toward the goal of preserving the life of the patient.

At a still more

abstract level, the goal may be to continue the existence of a socially
active member of a family.

Sometimes goals may come into conflict.

For example, the desire

to show off a new sports car may come into conflict with the goal of
driving safely.

Similarly, the goal of trying to minimize the chance of

brain damage (from too little oxygen) may conflict with the goal of
trying to minimize the chance of eye damage (from too much oxygen).

At

other times, goals from different levels of abstraction may conflict.
For example, the goal of minimizing the chance of infection may conflict
with the goal of maximizing the chance of an older sibling to establish
a good relationship with a newborn.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Process of Decision Making

In making a decision, one considers what to do about a situation,
based on perceptions, by categorizing phenomena, and acting according to
norms in order to satisfy goals.

Some parts of the decision making process take place consciously,
however, much of the decision making process may take place at an
unconscious or preattentive level.

For example, in making a choice

about what to eat for lunch, an individual may unconsciously eliminate
foods which are culturally defined as inappropriate food choices (cat
food) and those which are inappropriate in a given context (e.g.
cheerios which is a "breakfast food" or filet mignon which is a "dinner
food.") One can think of these in terms of choices governed by norms
about the appropriate categories of food choices: "Eat food which is
appropriate for human consumption" and "Eat food appropriate to the time
of day."

In the clinical context, there are many potential options which
are never consciously considered.

For example, artificial insemination

provides an opportunity for a woman to give birth to a healthy child
even if both she and her husband carry a rare recessive gene with a one
in four risk of occurrence.

Although her husband would be the child's

social father, he would not be the biological father.

Some genetic

counselors do not routinely raise the possibility of donor insemination
to the carriers of genetic diseases presumably because they don't think
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that the couple would find it an acceptable option (Barbara Katz
Rothman, personal communication).

Next the actor may preattentively or unconsciously consider which
culturally appropriately options are alternatives by an approach known
as elimination by aspects.

(Tversky 1972) First, a set of criteria are

generated to use in making choices.

Possibilities may be reviewed in a

hierarchical fashion (Galdwin et al. 1984).

They may be judged on one

criteria first, and only those that rate as acceptable on that criteria
may be considered in relation to the next.

Those possibilities which do

not meet certain criteria, such as easy availability (no tuna in the
cupboard) are eliminated.

There may be a number of criteria by which

alternatives are serially evaluated.

After one criterion, availability,

the actor may consider others one at a time, or the advantages and
disadvantages of a number of possibilities may be considered at once
according to a number of criteria

(e.g.

baloney, salmon, fried eggs

may all be considered at once in terms of utility values such as cost,
ease of preparation and taste).

Each possibility is also considered in

relation to larger goals (to satisfy hunger, to have a pleasant
experience, to return quickly to work).

Similar processes take place in a clinical context as well.

For

example, suppose a patient presents in the clinic complaining of
abdominal pain.

The clinician hopes to discover the diagnosis.

Certain

types of diagnostic procedures are ruled out as inappropriate
preattentively in a Western medical setting, such as divination.

Other

potential methods of diagnosis, such as those that are very costly
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and/or involve the use of sophisticated technology, such as use of a CAT
scan or NMR that may be appropriate in some contexts, would not be for
first presentation with mild abdominal pain.
eliminated without conscious thought.

Such alternatives are

Other alternatives such as

ultrasound, a lower GI series, liver function tests or an IVP may be
evaluated in terms of such criteria as staff time, cost, availability of
equipment, discomfort for patient, future risks, etc.)

The utility

values of various choices in relation to various goals will be
considered.

The goals of trying to cure the patient, bringing relief

from pain to the patient, educating the student, finishing quickly in
order to help as many other clinic patients as possible or leave early,
or discovering a patient with an unusual condition, may all be
considered in evaluating diagnostic procedures.

Such decision making,

or parts of the decision making process, may be 1) standardized by use
of a protocol, 2) may be learned in the process or socialization or
through repetition, or 3) may take place consciously in a particular
case.

Through an elimination of aspects, a decision might be made that

a liver scan is too expensive, an IVP is too risky, and a few particular
tests, such as a lower GI series and an ultrasound may be ordered.

The Context of Decision Making

Numerous factors from the larger social, political, economic and
technological environment affect the process of decision making.
both enable choices and establish constraints on behavior.
consider clinicians in an emergency room.

They

For example,

Options are determined in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

part by the level of technological development of the society, and also
by equipment available at the institution.

The costs of use of the

equipment, determined by factors outside of the institution, and the
policies concerning use of the equipment within the institution affect
it's use.

The sanctions exerted for over or under utilizing tests, the

possibility of a malpractice suit as well as the relationships
established with patients, the patients' past history and current living
situation, and clinicians' training and personality may affect decisions
made.

Although the cognitive approach can help in understanding the

meaning of factors from the larger environment to the actors involved how they are perceived, interpreted and utilized - the factors
themselves must be taken as given.

Decision Making About the Aggressiveness of Treatment

The model of decision making has proven useful in studying how
decisions are made about the aggressiveness of treatment for
catastrophically ill newborns.

In order to make choices concerning

treatment behavior, clinicians must evaluate the suitability of various
possible treatment options for particular patients.

Such decisions

involve the categorization of characteristics of patient conditions and
treatments and also involve evaluations about which choices would
further the achievement of desired goals.

For example, a decision might be made that a patient should have
heart surgery because she would be able to enjoy a good quality of life.
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In another case, a decision might be made that a patient should not be
put on a respirator because such extraordinary treatment would be
undesirable for a patient who is terminally ill.

Such decisions cannot

be reduced and made on the basis of physiological criteria alone but
involve categorizations into culturally defined categories such as "good
quality of life," "terminal illness" and "extraordinary treatment".

For

example, categorizations about the "quality of life" depend not only on
the physiological findings but also on ideas concerning the
stigmatization of those with disability and the societal circumstances
which facilitate or impede realizing satisfactions with a disability.

Treatment decisions also depend on value judgments about what
types of behaviors and outcomes are desirable — these clinical norms
and goals are also culturally defined.
preservation of life.

For example, one goal may be the

The cultural definition of life and death (see

Chapter II) will, in part, determine the meaning of the goal.

In making treatment decisions, I have found the following model
useful for understanding how clinicians make decisions and how
clinicians categorize patient condition and treatment characteristics.
(This is not a model that is consciously used by clinicians.

While it

can be used to represent the dimensions discussed by clinicians, it does
not purport to be the only model, or necessarily an actual model, used
by clinicians for conceptualizing this issue.)

As I will discuss below, although categorizations of particular
patient conditions or treatments may be described as if each category
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was dichotomous, each of these dimensions of patient condition and
treatment characteristics can be seen as forming a continuum.

While, on the whole, there is agreement among clinicians that each
of these dimensions are relevant in decisions making, there is variation
in how particular patient conditions and treatments are categorized on a
given dimension and on the importance of each dimension.

In the following chapters, I will discuss each of these
characteristics of patient condition and treatment and illustrate the
ways in which they are culturally determined.

I will describe each,

discuss the dimensions involved in defining the characteristics, and
present areas of consensus and variability among clinicians.

I will

explain how these relate to elements of the wider clinical and societal
context of decision making.

Although each of these dimensions may be discussed separately for
analytical purposes, they are, in the context of neonatal decision
making, interrelated.

In some cases, the categorizations on one

dimension may be heavily influenced by categorizations on other
dimensions.

Examples of this will also be discussed below.

(Please see

Figure IV - 2, next page.)
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MODEL OF DECISION MAKING ABOUT THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF TREATMENT

i

to

Clinical norms
The context of decision making including!
Medical technology; bioethical traditions; laws pertaining to treatment;
funding of health care; attitudes toward impairment, reproduction,
roles of parents, professionals, and the state; links to other issues,

U1

MODEL OF DECISION MAKING

START WITH COLLECTION OF DATA
"Data" are collected about the condition of the infant.
Information consists of perceptions collected through the senses
(physical features, skin color, tone) and through such means as lab
test, radiographic exams, electronic monitoring. Information on the
patient's history, social situation, etc.
Information is also selected that is culturally defined as
relevant about the patient's condition and treatment options from
previous clinical studies and past experience (e.g. natural history of
disease, outcome, equipment and staff time involved in treatment, pain
etc).
Selective collection and attention to data are informed by
socialization and cultural norms. While some of the data collection is
consciously done, some is preattentive.

CATEGORIZE INFORMATION INTO CULTURALLY RELEVANT CATEGORIES
Information is translated into culturally meaningful terms by
organizing data in relation to characteristics of patient conditions and
treatments. The following categories can be used to represent the
culturally meaningful categories.
PATIENT CONDITION CHARACTERISTICS
Quality of life
Uncertainty
Nature of the Critical Condition
Social Value

TREATMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Aggressiveness
Ordinary/Extraordinary
Withholding/Withdrawing Treatment
Active/Passive Euthanasia
These categorization are, in part, based on the data collected
above but also involve subjective evaluations informed by the socially
determined values of the decision makers.
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CONSIDERATION OF THE GOALS OF TREATMENT
The condition of the patient and the treatment options are
considered in terms of the goals of treatment:
GOALS
To cure
To Care
To Preserve Life
To do no harm
DECISION MAKING ABOUT HOW AGGRESSIVE TO BE IN TREATMENT GUIDED BY
CLINICAL NORMS
It is this step in the decision making process which is usually
thought of as THE DECISION. It involves making the principle decision
about how aggressive to be in treatment. A decision is made about which
goal(s) will be maximized and how they will be achieved in a manner
which is appropriate given the patient and treatment characteristics.
The decision is guided by the norms of clinical decision making.

TRANSLATION OF DECISION FROM CATEGORIES TO BEHAVIOR
The decision is meaningful in cultural terms but does not specify
behavioral acts. The decision has to be translated from a decision at
an abstract level to "preserve life," or to "give ordinary treatments
but not extraordinary ones" into a decision about what specific
treatments to give and which to withhold.
TREATMENT BEHAVIOR
Actions are performed to provide treatment to the infants.

CONTEXT
The entire decision making process occurs within the context of
technological, ideological, social, economic, and political factors.
Technological factors include the high technology of neonatal intensive
care. Ideological factors include the traditions of medical ethics and
societal values related to children, death, and impairment. The social
factors include the attitudes and relationships of families and
caregivers, and the health care system. Economic factors include the
systems of third party supports and the larger capitalist system which
supports the NICU. Political factors include larger political issues
concerned with the rights and duties of families and the state, and
legal definitions of life and death. All of these, plus many other
aspects of the larger environment shape norms and categorizations and
help determine the decisions which take place.
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Summary

After a brief review of the literature on decision making, a model
was outlined for use in examining decision making in natural settings.
The importance of cultural factors in perception, was discussed.
Multifactorial, discrete and overlapping, and ranked and relational
categories were explicated as well as variation in categorizations
between individuals, categorizations in cultural contexts and attentive
and preattentive categorization.
decision making was discussed.

Norms, goals and the process of
Finally, a model for the examination of

treatment decisions in neonatology was introduced.
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CHAPTER FIVE

EXAMINING BABY DATA: CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENT CONDITION

As discussed in the previous chapter, decision making about the
aggressiveness of treatment for newborns involves the evaluation of
characteristics of patient conditions and treatments and classification
into culturally defined categories.

In this chapter the cultural

categorizations of characteristics of patient conditions will be
discussed.

The main dimensions to be discussed are quality of life,

uncertainty, nature of the critical condition, and social value. Other
patient condition characteristics categories sometimes used by
clinicians are discussed under these main headings.

Quality of Life

Quality of life has been defined a number of ways.

(Pres.

Comm.

1983:299; Njaman and Levine 1981; Van Dam, Sommers and Van Beck-Couzijn
1981; Arras forthcoming).

According to Wenger, Mattson, Furberg and Elinson:

Quality of life may be defined in terms of 3 major
components: functional capacity, perceptions and symptoms
and their consequences. Functional capacity has 5
subcomponents: the ability to perform activities of daily
life, social function, intellectual function, emotional
function and the often-resultant economic status.
Perceptions are a person's views and value judgment of the
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components; of concern are perceptions of general health
status, level of well-being and satisfaction with life.
Symptoms of the disease, whether induced by treatment or
concurrent illness, or reduced or abolished by the
intervention are the third major component. They may
influence functional capacity and perceptions; in fact, all
3 are interrelated.
(1984:908)

A working definition of quality of life may be taken to be the
overall balance of positives (pleasure, satisfaction, etc.) versus
negatives (pain, sadness, etc.) experienced by an individual over a
period of time.

In the present study, when not otherwise specified,

"quality of life" is used only to refer to considerations of the quality
of life as judged from the perspective of the individual patient.
Considerations pertaining to the future quality of life for others, such
as family members, will be referred to as "social value" considerations
(these will be discussed below, at the end of this chapter).

In addition to quality of life, a variety of terms have been used
when referring to considerations along this dimension.

These include:

"prognosis" (Crane 1975), a "best interest standard," (Arras 1985) or
the "amount of pain and suffering" (Murray, 1984).

Each of these

domains will be discussed here in the section on quality of life.

Quality of life is the first dimension usually considered by
clinicians in decision making concerning the possibility of withholding
treatment.

In the neonatal intensive care unit, if a clinician feels

that a baby has a significant chance of enjoying an acceptable quality
of life, then a decision will usually be made to provide all treatment
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necessary in order to maximize the probability of survival.

The only

major exceptions occur in situations which involve very experimental
and/or expensive treatments including those which involve a very rare
resource (e.g.

a liver or heart transplant) (see Chapter VII).

The vast majority of infants admitted to NICUs, are felt to have a
significant chance of having at least an acceptable quality of life.
Most are

expected to be "normal" and have a good capacity to have a

good quality of life.

Usually this evaluation is made without conscious

consideration; for most babies, the possibility of limiting treatment is
not considered.

The next largest category of babies admitted to an NICU is
comprised of those babies who are terminally ill, and who could not
survive for long no matter what treatment decisions were made.

While

decisions are often made to withhold treatments from such babies, such
decisions are not usually seen as ethically problematic or as involving
quality of life considerations.

(For a discussion of the complexity of

such decisions and the way in which they do involve quality of life
considerations, see below, section on the critical condition).

1
Murphy (1966) has written about the fact that "normal" entails
more than a notion of a statistical norm. It must also encompass
philosophical dimensions about the meaning of deviations from a
statistical norm. "Normal" as used by the clinicians in the NICU
usually refers to an infant who will have no, or only minor,
impairments. Clinicians vary in where they draw the line between
"normal" and "abnormal."
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When clinicians think about ethically problematic decisions to
withhold treatments, they are usually thinking about decisions for a
third category of infants — those who could survive with certain
treatments but who would be expected to have a very poor quality of
life.

It is in these cases that clinicians may consciously consider

withholding treatment.

Quality of life involves a number of components.

In making

decisions in the NICU, quality of life is usually thought of primarily
in terms of the degree of physical and/or mental impairment.

Quality of

life is also sometimes discussed in terms of the amountof pain and
suffering experienced by the baby.

Clinicians also sometimes talk about

a quality of life worth living as one in which a personcan interact
meaningfully with others, sometimes described as havingthe capacity to
give or receive love.

In the survey I conducted in 1983 on attitude about neonatal
decisions (see appendix), the respondents, the majority of whom were
clinicians working in neonatal intensive care or other health care
professionals, were asked to express their opinions about the basis for
decisions by indicating which of 21 factors they felt should be
important when deciding about the care of individual newborns.

About

two thirds of the respondents indicated that they felt one of the
quality of life considerations - severity of intellectual impairment,
severity of physical impairment, amount of prolonged pain and suffering,
or capacity to give and receive love - should be the most important
factor.

Among respondents, there was consensus that severity of
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intellectual impairment and amount of prolonged pain and suffering
should be among the important factors considered in decision making.
addition, parents' wishes, which some clinicians used to indicate that
parents should be able to make quality of life decisions, and
uncertainty about the extent of impairment, which also relates to
quality of life, were circled as most important by an additional sixth
of respondents (see Table V-l).
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In

TABLE V - l
IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC FACTORS FOR DECISION MAKING
n = 249

Factor

Percent who
thought
it should be
THE MOST
important
factor

Percent who
thought
it should be
AN
important
factor

29
20
15
15
4

87
77
72
69
30

3
3

47
42

3
2
2
2
2

21
49
33
25
18

0
0
0

38
33
30

0

26

0
0

20
20

0

19

0
0
1

18
15
6

Severity of intellectual impairment
Amount of prolonged pain and suffering
Severity of physical impairment
Parents1 wishes
Capacity to give and receive love
If chance of successful treatment is
small
Uncertainty about extent of impairment
If non-treatment would be active
euthanasia
Impact on parents
If treatments are heroic
Danger of lessening the "value of life"
If treatments are already started
Long term cost of caring for disabled
child and adult
Financial burden to the family
Impact on siblings
Availability of resources for other
sick children
Ability of the parents to have other
healthy children
Cost of neonatal intensive care
Availability of resources for other
medical care
Availability of resources for other,
non-medical social needs
Feelings of staff caring for baby
Other factors
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Although both physicians and nurses indicated that they felt that
quality of life considerations should be the most important, they
differed in the rates at which they cited individual factors.

More

neonatologists cited the amount of intellectual impairment (45% vs 25%),
whereas more neonatal nurses thought that the amount of prolonged pain
and suffering should be the most important factor (28% vs 3%).

Prognosis related to degree of impairment

The elements described above which are seen as indicating future
quality of life all have to do with the physical and intellectual
capacity of the infant.

The impairment alone does not determine quality

of life, for it is also determined by the meaning of the impairment for
the individual in a given social environment.

In general, clinicians feel that the type of impairment that would
have the most devastating impact on the future quality of life is mental
impairment, especially if it is severe.

In most cases where the

withholding of treatment is considered, there is thought to be a
significant neurological impairment.

In the survey, about a quarter of

the respondents, (almost half the neonatologists) felt that the severity
of intellectual impairment should be the most important factor in
decision making.

In addition, a few respondents indicated that the

capacity to give and receive love should be most important, which is
also related to the degree of neurological impairment.

There was a
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clear consensus with almost nine out of ten respondents indicating
intellectual impairment as one of three most important factors.

Some of the infants who are cared for in an NICU have devastating
mental impairments that leave them unaware of their surrounding.

Almost

all clinicians would agree that such infants should not be treated
aggressively.

Some others are left minimally aware of their

environment, including the attention of caretakers.

While a few

clinicians feel that even minimal awareness (being able to enjoy rocking
and attention from parents, for example) does provide a quality of life
worth living, it appears that most do not.

Others babies, of course, have more moderate or even mild
impairments.

In talking about intellectual impairments as a factor to

consider in decision making, most clinicians are concerned about severe
impairments.

Some clinicians would consider non-treatment for an infant

with more moderate impairments, such as someone who as an adult would
have the intellectual capacity of a baby, toddler, or preschool child.
Other clinicians would not consider non-treatment for such infants.
Most clinicians are disturbed at the thought that someone would withhold
treatment because of mild mental retardation.

A number of the children

who leave the NICU have mild mental impairments including learning
disabilities.

Many clinicians believe that the majority of their

critically ill infants could be considered at risk for such problems
(although only a minority develop significant ones).

They are not

considered grounds for non-treatment.
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About a seventh of the respondents listed the severity of physical
impairment as the most important factor, while almost three quarters
reported that it should be an important factor in decision making.

Even

if a physical impairment is fairly severe, if there is not thought to
also be intellectual impairment, treatment will usually be aggressive.
An exception may occur in the most extreme cases.

For example, in the

case of the Danville Twins (see Chapter III) treatment was withheld from
Siamese twins even though there was no suggestion of retardation.

Quality of life may be discussed as if it formed a dichotomy (a
"good quality of life" versus a "bad quality of life,") but it is often
conceptualized by clinicians as if it formed a continuum.

At one end of

the continuum are cases of permanently comatose and anencephalic babies
(babies born without a brain).

Such babies may even be thought to lack

those qualities which define a human existence (see discussion, Arras
1985).

The only time that I heard clinicians who worked regularly in

the NICU refer to a patient as "it", (rather than "he" or "she") was in
reference to an baby who was thought to be anencephalic.

Philosophers have written a great deal about the concept of
personhood;

there is debate about whether a newborn,

especially a severely impaired one, does or does not have the same
claims as older individuals, or is actually a "person" with all the
rights which come with personhood (Khuse and Singer 1985).
don't appear to think about it at all in these terms.

Clinicians

With the possible

exception of an anencephalic baby, they seem to see each infant as fully

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

human - their questions concern appropriate treatment choices for their
human patients.

Another issue related to personhood, however, that is relevant to
clinicians, concerns the beginning of life.

While some people who do

not work regularly in the NICU, may see very small premature babies as
less than human - living fetuses - that is not true for the people who
do work with them regularly.

All babies in the unit are seen as people.

However, there is a point of division between live birth and non-viable
fetus.

The dividing line has changed during the past 10 - 20 years.

used to be generally though to be at about 28 weeks.

It

When I started

field work, in 1977, about 25-6 weeks was considered to indicate the
divide between miscarriage (not a person) and newborn (a full person).
Now it is lower.

There are indications that new technology may be

pushing the divide still lower so that some people seem to

consider the

fetus/patient still in utero who can be monitored, visualized with
ultrasound, and treated with fetal therapy to be a person.

In the case of anencephalic babies, there is consensus about
withholding aggressive treatment by virtually all clinicians including
such staunch "right to life" advocates as Surgeon General Koop.

In

response to questions on the survey, there was clear consensus to
withhold most treatments from the anencephalic baby (see Table V - 2).
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TABLE V - 2
TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS WOULD RECOMMEND
n = 2492
CONDITION AND TREATMENT

% WHO WOULD RECOMMEND

BABY WHO IS ANENCEPHALIC
Feedings by mouth
Tube feeding
Antibiotics
Resuscitation in the delivery room
Cardiac catheterization
Arrest page
Open heart surgery

76
56
32
13
3
2
2

BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES
(BEFORE CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS)
Nutrition and fluids
Antibiotics
Resuscitation
Respirator

90
81
76
65

BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES
(AFTER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS
INDICATES TRISOMY 13)
Nutrition and fluids
Antibiotics
Respirator
Surgery for cleft palate
Cardiac catheterization
Arrest page
Open heart surgery

85
60
24
14
13
10
8

2
For the Baby with trisomy 13, and for questions on resuscitation
in the delivery room and an arrest page for the anencephalic baby, n =
119; actual base varies slightly depending on the number of ineligible
answers (in all cases, ineligible answers less than 5% of total n.)«
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TABLE V - 2 (cont.)
CONDITION AND TREATMENT

% WHO WOULD RECOMMEND

A SMALL PREMATURE BABY WITH
AN IVH
Nutrition and fluids
Suctioning
resuscitation in delivery room
Increased respiratory settings
Pressors
Arrest page
Kidney dialysis

93
92
64
53
39
26
13

A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME
AND DUODENAL ATRESIA
Intravenous feedings
Antibiotics
Surgery for intestinal defect
Cardiac catheterization
Open heart surgery
Kidney dialysis

91
88
87
71
59
28
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Many clinicians also believe that aggressive treatment would not
be appropriate for other infants who would also be expected to have an
extremely poor quality of life such as those with intracranial bleeds
and some very premature babies.

These categories were given as examples

of babies who did not require treatment under the first revised version
of the Baby Doe Regulations (DHHS 1983b).

Sometimes, when it is suggested that treatment should only be
withheld in such circumstances, it is said that such decisions are made
because treatment would be "futile;" it is claimed that such decisions
are not being made on the basis of quality of life.

(DHHS 1983b) Such

decisions, however, do reflect a consideration of quality if life, even
if at an extreme.

As long as it is possible to prolong physiological

life, and a decision is made that the condition of the person or the
short span of time before death does not warrant treatment, treatment is
being withheld on the basis of a quality of life consideration (For a
discussion of this point, see Rhodan and Arras 1985).

There are also other conditions for which there is general
agreement against aggressive treatment by most clinicians including
situations where there is profound brain damage and genetic anomalies
such as trisomy 13 or 18 (which are usually associated with a short life
span and always associated with numerous physical defects and severe
retardation).

For example, on my survey, three quarters of the

respondents answered that they would not recommend aggressive
respiratory support for a baby who was diagnosed as having trisomy 13
(see Table V - 2).
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At the other end of the spectrum lie those cases with the smallest
amount of impairment thought significant enough to raise the question of
withholding treatment.
of the continuum.

There is much controversy surrounding this end

Indeed, among clinicians, as among other members of

society, there is much variation in opinion concerning what constitutes
handicap and concerning the implications of particular physiological
conditions for quality of life.

The Disability Rights Movement has done

much to challenge prevalent assumptions about the quality of life of
those with disabilities.

Almost nine out of ten clinicians would

recommend intestinal surgery for an infant with Down's syndrome and an
intestinal defect,

(see Table V-2)

It is not deviations from physiological norms, in and of
themselves, which determine quality of life.

Rather, the

interdependence of cultural factors (such as the degree of stigma
and architectural barriers) which interact with individual
background characteristics of the person who has impairments, which
determines the quality of life.

There is debate about the extent to which factors pertaining to
the future environment of the newborn should be considered in making
treatment decisions.

The significance of factors in the general social

environment for all people with certain disabilities, such as financial
assistance to provide mobility aides or the quality of care in long term
care institutions, is one set of issues under debate.

There is also

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

controversy about the relevance of the financial and emotional resources
for an individual infant from his or her family.

One article which has become a focus of the debate on the
relevance of family characteristics is a report of an Oklahoma study in
the October, 1984 issue of Pediatrics. It reported on the use of a
formula to determine the future quality of life of infants with spina
bifida which included contributions from the family and from society
(Gross et al. 1984).

Both this group, and Shaw (1977), who wrote the

article from which the formula was derived, used the formula in a
schematic way as a model of factors to consider in decision making.
Many, however, interpreted the article as if the formula was used to
determine a numerical estimate of the "quality of life."

The degree to which family and societal contributions determine
quality of life is a very controversial area.

While some people believe

that having a loving family who is able to to accept the child is the
most important factor, others believe that such social factors should
not be considered in decision making.

The role of the economic resources of the family and society is
even more controversial.

Some have argued that consideration of the

financial contribution of the family could lead to double discrimination
against the poor, since poor mothers have higher rates of prematurity
and other factors associated with risk factors for disabilities.
Referring to consideration of economic resources from society, others
have argued against considering such factors as the quality of care in

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

institutions because such decisions would serve as a disincentives for
improving the quality of care in such institutions.

(Arras, 1985)

There is a high degree of agreement among clinicians that certain
deviations from the norm do not significantly alter a baby's chances of
a good quality of life.

In one case in which a decision about complex

heart surgery was being discussed, it was noted that the infant, Maria,
also had features which are associated with Turner's Syndrome, an XO
deletion syndrome which is associated with mild retardation, short
stature, certain physical stigmata and infertility.

A senior

neonatologist, Peter, noted that Turner's syndrome is not something that
affects "quality of life" and is not relevant in making non-treatment
decisions.

When clinicians feel that a condition will clearly not prevent an
infant from enjoying an acceptable quality of life, even if the parents
objected to certain treatments, all treatments thought necessary to
preserve life will be given.

If necessary, clinicians will seek a court

order to obtain custody in order to be able to make decisions.
Frequently, upon threat of losing custody, parents agree to treatment.

For example, upon seeing his child who had a cleft palate, a
father said "shouldn't a monster like that be killed."

The clinicians

would not allow consideration of non-treatment in such a case.

They

felt that their role as caregivers was to provide counselling to help
the parents adjust after an emotional reaction to an unexpected outcome.
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Within hours, the father was able to begin to relate positively to his
new baby.

In a 1982 interview, Dr.

Raymond Duff, one of the most outspoken

proponents of parental decision making, spoke about a baby who was born
with cosmetic deformities of the hands and face.

The baby's parents

wanted to withhold treatment and allow the child to die.

Dr.

Duff said

that they couldn't do that and, if necessary, he would go to Court in
order to obtain permission to treat.

After discussions with the staff,

the parents agreed to treatment.

Norms have developed among clinicians which lead to a high degree
of consensus that some conditions lead to such a bad quality of life
that treatment is futile and that other conditions enable a good quality
of life so that non-treatment decisions are out of the question.

For

other conditions, such consensus has not developed and there is
disagreement about future quality of life.

For example, the spina bifida task force of the Project on Ethics
and Values in Health Care (see appendix) interviewed two physicians who
had very different views of the quality of life of Ellen, a child with
spina bifida.

Her lesion had caused her to be paralyzed and to lack

feeling from approximately her umbilicus (belly button) down.

Her urologist believed that she would have a good quality of life.
He believed that she was bright and capable and would be able to handle
such things as catheterization for urinary incontinence necessitated by
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her condition.

Although she would never have genital sensation, he said

she was a bright girl with an active imagination, so she could have an
active sex life.

He thought, perhaps, she would become a mother and

would be able to be employed.

Her neurosurgeon, on the other hand, felt that because she would
be unable to learn to walk, unable to control bladder and stool, (he
characterized her as "sitting in her own urine and feces,11), she would
face social stigma.

Although she was a happy child at 6, he felt that

as an adult "she would regret that she survived."

Not all clinicians agree about which cases are clear-cut and,
therefore, to them, involve medical criteria alone, and which involve
ethical dilemmas.

This is due to at least three factors.

First, based

on personal background characteristics and experiences, clinicians
differ about which impairments they believe can be compatible or
incompatible with a good quality of life.

Second, differences exist

because of uncertainty about outcome (see section on uncertainty).
Finally, some variation in decision making reflects differences in
assessment of prognosis based on differences in attention to various
types of information about the infants.

Anspach found systematic

variation in assessment of prognosis among nurses, house staff, and
attending physicians.

This occurred because the work environment

differentially structured access to information for each professional
group.
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To parents who are not socialized in the clinical subculture, with
inadequate understanding of the medical situation, and/or who have very
different values than the clinicians, a judgment may be made which
differs radically from clinician assessments.

In such situations

clinicians often see their role as one of educating parents, since
decisions they see as clear-cut are conceptualized as "medical
decisions."

This differs from those situations that they do not see as

clear-cut that they conceptualize as "ethical decisions."

They also may

define cases as involving "ethical decisions" in which they acknowledge
that differences of opinion may reflect valid variations in values
rather than lack of information or irrational thinking on the part of
parents.

Pain and Suffering

Another component which people often consider in relation to
quality of life is the amount of pain and suffering.

For example, in

response to the question on my survey concerning factors considered
important in making treatment decisions, about three quarters of the
respondents indicated that they thought the amount of prolonged pain and
suffering should be an important factor and a fifth responded that it
should be the most important factor.

Neonatal nurses (28%) were significantly more likely to consider
the amount of pain and suffering to be the most important factor as
opposed to neonatologists (3%).

Some of the nursing leadership were
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surprised and upset that so many nurses felt that this should be the
most important factor.

It may have been more characteristic of newer

nurses who had not yet been socialized to share the philosophy of the
unit.

Some people have hypothesized that nursing has traditionally been

more concerned with providing "comfort" and attracts individuals more
concerning this nurturing, while medicine, has been more focused on
cure, and attracts individuals more concerned with the capacity for
intellectual achievement.

Although the amount of pain and suffering is a frequently
mentioned factor, especially by non-clinicians, there are relatively few
neonatal conditions which themselves lead to long range physical pain.
Most of the pain and suffering which would diminish quality of life
comes from two sources: emotional or psychological pain from limitation
of function and/or stigmatization, or, pain engendered as part of
medical treatments to correct congenital problems or treat subsequent
complications.

Assessments of clinicians about future pain and suffering probably
vary even more than about prognosis for degree of future impairment.
For example, some physicians have said that children with spina bifida
who have mental impairments suffer more because they cannot learn to use
crutches and other aides.

Others feel that children with spina bifida

who are not retarded suffer more because they are aware of what they
cannot do because of their condition.
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Some non-clinicians are so disturbed about the pain and suffering
experienced by babies during an NICU admission, that they sometimes feel
that infants should not be subjected to painful treatments.

For

example, some of the strongest advocates of "natural childbirth" would
prefer a less intensive level of care to NICU care even if it there is
more risk to survival.

Clinicians who work in NICUs, on the other hand,

virtually never consider the pain and suffering associated with a
treatment to be severe enough to justify non-treatment in an infant who
can be saved and enjoy a good quality of life.

Usually this is also

true for those situations for which a good outcome is uncertain or
unlikely.

For example, some non-clinicians may be concerned about such
issues as the suffering of an infant because of separation from the
mother.

Some fear that the experience of hospitalization and separation

may cause a significant diminution in quality of life.

Clinicians,

however, because of their familiarity with hospitalization, are rarely
concerned with separation per se.

Clinicians rarely seem to acknowledge

the pain associated with routine procedure, perhaps because of its
familiarity, and perhaps a need to build defenses in order to work in
the environment.

The pain associated with procedures appears to be seen

as an accepted part of a beneficial intervention rather than as a focus
of concern.

Clinicians may not even appear very concerned about pain

associated with more invasive procedures, such as insertion of chest
tubes or cardiac catheterization (which is sometimes done without
anesthesia), and very invasive procedures (such as open heart surgery).
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Many clinicians believe that newborns don't suffer with pain the same
way that older people do (Murray 1985).

While the pain of routine procedures is rarely considered
significant for any patient, pain from the more invasive procedures is
considered important for patients when there is felt to be little hope
of benefit from treatment.

For example, if a baby is dying, efforts may

be made to minimize procedures which would cause discomfort.

Opinions

vary about the degree to which pain and suffering should be considered
in making treatment decisions for infants who have little chance for
long range survival.

For example, many clinicians believe that an infant with a heart
defect which can probably not be corrected should not be subject to the
pain of open heart surgery.

Clinicians expressed mixed opinions about

the care of Andrew Stinson, a premature baby whose parent wrote a book
about his treatment.

He suffered many complications (some iatrogenic)

and died after 6 months in a NICU.

(Stinson and Stinson 1979) Some

believed that it was appropriate that his physicians continued to try to
treat him as long as they felt he had a chance at survival.

Others

believed that he was treated much too long after it seemed likely that
he would die and that treatment should have been stopped earlier to ease
his suffering.

While clinicians in neonatology rarely consider the pain and
suffering involved in treatment during the newborn period, they do
sometimes consider the pain and suffering associated with repeated
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medical treatments throughout childhood.

For example, the need for

repeated surgery will often be mentioned as a significant problem
associated with severe spina bifida or very severe, complex cardiac
lesions.

They are even more likely to consider pain and suffering

associated with permanent dependence on life support equipment such as a
respirator or TPN (total chronic intravenous feeding) or kidney dialysis
(which are also associated with a shorter life span).

While most clinicians do not seem as concerned with the pain or
suffering associated with treatment, as non-clinicians, they often seem
to be even more sensitive to pain and suffering associated with non
treatment.

For example, non-clinicians may be more likely to feel that

an infant with a lethal condition should not receive treatments such as
intravenous fluids which may cause pain while many clinicians are more
likely to feel that discomfort will be associated with the lack of
fluids.

Diana's care provides another example.

Diana was a child who had

already been in the NICU for over a year, chronically dependent on a
respirator.

She had very bad lung disease leading to virtually no hope

of long term survival and had been classified as no arrest page (she was
not to be given emergency treatment if her heart stopped). One day she
had and received received vigorous aggressive treatment for what was
characterized as a "respiratory arrest" (bronchial spasms), including
numerous emergency drugs and was "bagged" or given artificial respirator
by hand for over an hour.
have died in minutes.

Without the treatment, she probably would

It appeared that the clinicians felt that they
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had to treat the respiratory arrest, otherwise she would suffocate which
"would be a horrible way to go."

In the case of an infant who could survive, clinicians often find
the pain and suffering associated with non-treatment to be all the more
disturbing.

In at least some of the "non-treatment" cases involving

babies with Down's syndrome, surgery was not performed and therefore the
infants could not eat but they were given fluids by IV and sometimes
sedated (see John Hopkins case, Chapter III).

While it prolonged the

dying process, it was considered to lead to a more humane death.

In the

1982 case of Baby Doe of Bloomington, Indiana, fluids were not given
(Lyons 1985).

To most clinicians, especially nurses, the thought of not

giving fluids is extremely disturbing.

Beyond the concern about the

original non-treatment decision, upset caused by withholding fluids may
have been part of what compelled the nurses to report the case of Baby
Doe to the authorities.

Uncertainty

The concept of uncertainty has received a considerable amount of
attention in the literature on Medical sociology (e.g.

Fox 1957; 1980;

light 1979; Atkins 1984), and in the literature on decision making (e.g.
Tversky and Kahneman 1974; McNeil, Keeler and Adelstein 1975; Eddy 1984)
Chibnik, in discussing agricultural decision making, cites Cancian's
distinction between risk and uncertainty. In risky situations decision
makers can form intelligent guesses about the odds for or against
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desirable outcomes from a given course of action while in uncertain
situations they have difficulty making these estimations.

Chibnik

points out that risk/uncertainty can be thought of as a continuum rather
than as a dichotomy as presented by Cancian.

Decision makers in neonatology face both risky situations in which
statistics are available for infants who had a similar condition, and
other situations in which there is uncertainty because it is a rare
conditions and the risks or not known, or because there is a new
treatment and there has not yet been time for follow-up.

There are at least two components of uncertainty which are
important in neonatal decision making.

The first concerns uncertainty

about the severity of the impairment.

The second concerns uncertainty

about the existence of impairment.

In considering how aggressive to be

in neonatal treatment, there is consideration of both the existence and
severity of impairment.

When the probability is high that the pat-ient

will not be "normal", then there may be consideration of withholding
treatment.

Then the severity of the impairment is considered.

However,

a high probability of severe impairment alone is not usually thought to
be grounds for withholding treatment in the NICU, if there is also a
chance that the baby could be "normal."

(See note on "normal," in

section on quality of life.)

This contrasts to the concern in prenatal diagnosis where
possibility of severe impairment is often thought enough to justify a
selective abortion even if the probability of impairment may not be
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high.

For example, in cases of fetal exposure to Rubella, many

clinicians would counsel a selective abortion even when the risk of
anomalies is only 25% because the defects could be very severe.

After

birth, most clinicians would never consider non-treatment in a situation
in which there was a only a 25% chance of severe impairment if there was
also a good chance that there would be no impairment.

For example,

there are cases in which infants have had bleeding in the brain which
would be expected to result in severe damage but if there is also
thought to be a significant chance of the child being normal, the child
will receive aggressive treatment.

How much chance of being normal is necessary to justify aggressive
treatment in the face of a high probability of severe impairment varies
from clinician to clinician.

Some clinicians will say even if there is

a 5% or a 10% chance that the baby will be normal, the baby should be
treated aggressively.

Others will say things like "even if the chances

are one in a million" the baby should be treated.

Some clinicians will

say, "this baby could be another Einstein or Beethoven" to explain the
rationale for treatment in those cases where treatment seems futile.

I believe that it is the emphasis on the uncertainty that a baby
could be normal that has led to a focus in the literature on ethical
issues in neonatology on treatment decisions concerning infants with
Down's syndrome and Spina Bifida.

These are conditions where the level

of impairment is often not likely to be as severe as in some other NICU
patients but the existence of at least a minimal level of impairment is
certain.
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In some neonatal cases, such as trisomy 13 or short bowel
syndrome, there is no uncertainty that a child will not be normal and
will in fact have severe defects.

In some such cases, even advocates of

aggressive treatment, such as Surgeon General Koop, will sanction the
withholding of aggressive treatments.

In many other cases, however,

critics of withholding treatment will cite examples of children with
spina bifida or very small premature babies who turned out to have much
greater capacity than predicted, even when limits were thought to be
known.

The Critical Condition

The third factor which clinicians consider is the nature of the
condition which, if untreated, could lead to death.

The severity of the

condition, if the condition is acute or chronic, if it involves a unique
discrete episode or will have repeated critical episodes, can all affect
treatment decisions.

Crane, in The Sanctity of Social Life, examined the implications
of "salvageability" (1975).
dichotomous category.

Crane treats salvageability as a

In the clinical context, I think it may be more

useful to think in terms of "the critical condition." It can be seen as
forming a continuum.

At one end of the continuum, one can identify

patients who by old criteria could have been said to be "dead" (because
they have no heart beat or because they have stopped breathing) (see
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Chapter III).

Others at the most critical extreme are premature babies

born at the border or viability and "fresh still born" babies, born
without a heart beat but possibly able to be resuscitated.

Close to

this end of the continuum are patients with terminal conditions,
conditions which despite treatment will lead to death.

At the other end of the continuum, one can say that everything
that is alive is in a critical condition for all life will end in death.
While the concept that life is a critical condition has become almost
trite, it is useful in this context to think of everyone as having a
potentially critical condition.

Life as a critical condition usually

refers to acknowledging that life does not last an unlimited time.

In

this context, it is also useful to think about life as being a critical
state if certain needs are not met, such as the needs for nutrition,
fluids, oxygen, warmth.

While we usually do not question provisions for

these needs, in certain circumstances, choices about giving or
withholding treatments pertain to these needs.

Relevance to medical

decision making will be discussed below.

Virtually all of the infants admitted to the neonatal unit fall in
between the two ends of the continuum.
that necessary to sustain most newborns.

They need some treatment beyond
Some have very serious, life-

threatening conditions, some of which are terminal.

In general, all

other things being equal, the more critical the condition, the more
likely that questions about the aggressiveness of treatment will arise.
In this section, the role of the nature of the critical condition for
treatment decisions will be discussed.
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Unsalvageability and Non-treatment

Although the debate concerning non-treatment has focused primarily
on those infants who are considered salvageable, non- treatment
decisions are also very important concerning babies who are considered
unsalvageable.

This is true for two reasons.

First, some of those

babies who are expected to die, live if they are given particular
treatments.

Second, the choice of treatments may affect the timing of

death and the nature of death.

Patients in a modern hospital virtually never receive no
treatment.

Even if a patient is felt to be dying, that patient will

generally be fed, open lesions will be kept sterile, etc.

Even more

aggressive treatments may also be given for a baby for whom "nothing
more can be done." For example, a baby may be given antibiotics and the
acid/base balance may be aggressively managed (requiring frequent blood
tests and injections), a baby may be given powerful drugs to maintain
blood pressure, chest tubes may be inserted through the chest wall, a
baby may be given massive blood transfusions, and/or may be on a
respirator even when "nothing more can be done." In some cases, with
this support, despite the expectation of death, the patient may survive.
Whereas, if such support had been withheld, the patient would have died.
In some cases, this may be clearly beneficial, as when a baby with
serious cardiac lesions, who is felt to be unsalvageable, is given
experimental surgery and is successfully treated.

However, in other
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cases, it is sometimes felt to be a tragedy when treatment prolongs
dying or a very poor quality of life.

This will be illustrated by a

discussion about the treatment for Devon in Chapter VI.

A second way that decisions about withholding care from
"unsalvageable" babies becomes important is in terms of the timing of
death and the costs (financial and emotional) of care.

Even though the

care provided may not lead to long term survival, it may lead to
survival for a period of time - it may be only minutes or it may be
weeks, or months after the patient is classified as "unsalvageable."

In some cases, the timing of death may be "managed" consciously by
clinicians.

For example, a decision may be made to remove a baby who is

unsalvageable from the respirator, but the actual act of taking the baby
off the respirator may be delayed to give the parents an opportunity to
deal with the fact that the baby is about to die and to give the parents
an opportunity to hold their babywhile he or she dies if they want to.
If parents do not want to be there when life supportis discontinued,
such actions may be postponed until after they leave.

Sometimes there is conscious management of the timing of death for
the benefit of health care professionals.

For example, a particular

person may want to examine a baby before the baby dies or they may want
to wait until a quiet time in the unit before discontinuing life
supports.

There are reports thaton some occasions, terminally ill

babies may have been removed fromlife supports when there was a
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shortage of space or equipment in the NICU.

While the "last bed in the ICU" is a problem frequently discussed
in the ethics literature, I never saw life supports removed from a
terminally ill infant because of equipment shortage during the course of
my observations.
events.

Such actions, if they occur at all, are very rare

Such problems may be rarer in neonatal intensive care than in

other types of intensive care.

Since NICUs frequently have a less acute

section, and the service may include facilities in the labor and
delivery area, it provides an opportunity to care for a greater number
of critically ill children than the theoretical capacity of the unit.
For example, at Columbia, when the unit was full, critically ill infants
could be cared for in the transitional nursery until it was possible for
a space to be made.

Over the years, sicker and sicker children were

cared for in the semi-acute unit.

In many units, the critical resource is not beds, or respirators,
but staff time, particularly nursing time.

On occasion, when a unit is

extremely busy and staff time is short, there may be tension between
trying to give adequate attention to the infants who are unsalvageable,
and those who are terminally ill.

The staff members may feel that not

enough time is being spent devoted to the care of critically ill infants
who are salvageable, but such "competing needs" issues are likely to
affect micro-allocation issues, not life and death decisions about
discontinuing care.
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Although sometimes the timing of death is consciously managed to
achieve certain goals.

More often treatment decisions are made which

also affect the timing of death, but the management of the timing of
death is not consciously addressed.

For example, a baby might be sent

for cardiac catheterization for diagnosis of a cardiac lesion.

If the

lesion is found to be incurable, the baby may be removed from
respiratory support, or such support may be continued; powerful heart
medications may or may not be continued, if there is an arrest, there
may or may not be resuscitation.

Different decisions about these

treatment options might mean the difference in days of survival;
sometimes value questions relating to the timing are addressed, other
times such decisions are seen as technical "medical" decisions and the
goals of treatment, when cure is no longer the goal, are not consciously
addressed.

(See Chapter VII, discussion on norms for decision making.)

There is a norm that it is better to see infants as salvageable
who are unsalvageable, than to see infants who are salvageable as
unsalvageable.

In some ways this seems to be the reverse of the norm

discussed by Sheff that it is better to define a well person as sick
than a sick person as well (1963).

Sheff's norm assumes that the

patient is sicker, while this norm assumes that the patient is
healthier.

Yet, both norms support more treatment, and more chance for

physician activism.
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Social Value

The last dimension involved primarily with patient condition
characteristics, for lack of a better term, I will label Social Value.
This term is sometimes used to refer to aspects which I have referred to
as quality of life.
the baby.

Some people speak of the social value of life for

I use this term, however, only to refer to the value of

treatment or non-treatment to persons other than the baby.

Some would argue that considerations concerning this dimension are
unacceptable because every human life is uniquely sacred and of equal
value; no other values may be weighed against the value of a single
human life (Koop 1983).

Some state that all decisions must be made only

in the best interests of the child (e.g.

Pres.

Comm.

1983).

Others,

however, feel that the net costs and benefits of survival and continued
treatment to others beside the baby may also be considered (Khuse and
Singer 1985).

Most, though not all, who take this position feel that

the interests of the baby in life are great, and the quality of the
baby's life would have to be very poor, and the costs to others would
have to be very great, to outweigh the baby's interest in survival.

The social value connected to treatment decisions may be thought
of not only in terms of the benefits to others of the death of the baby
despite the baby's interest in survival, but also the benefits to others
of the survival of the baby, despite the potential that the baby's death
might be in the babies best interest.

The social value of treatment or

non-treatment can be looked at from at least three perspectives - those
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of the

family,^

the health care professionals involved in caring for the

baby, and society at large.

Social Value to the Family

Many clinicians believe that impact on the family should be
considered in making decisions and even more feel that the parents
wishes should be considered.

In the survey, almost half said that the

impact on the family should be considered and almost three quarters
thought that the parents' wishes should be important in decision making.
Sometimes the clinician's assessments of the implications of treatment
for the family are based on extensive, open conversations with the
family.

At other times, however, clinicians judgments may be based on

general or stereotyped assumptions about the parents' wishes.

For example, clinicians sometimes assume that upper middle class,
educated parents would be less likely to want a mentally retarded child
to survive than working class parents.

While this may be true in many

cases, it is not true for all parents.

Sometimes such basic beliefs are

taught through stories that become legends of the unit.

One story,

repeated many times, recounted the case of a doctor, who upon learning
that his child was born quite premature, said that he didn't want the
child treated unless the doctors caring for her could guarantee that she
would be normal.

(Despite persistent objections from the father, they

3
As noted in the introduction, I did not interview family members.
Here I report primarily on clinicians' view of social value for the
family.
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stalled for time, continued treating, and the child survived with no
major problems.) On the other hand, other educated, articulate parents
have expressed anger about the assumptions that clinicians have made
that they would not want their children to survive, when they very much
wanted everything possible done.

While some people have said that working class families are more
upset about impairments which affect physical ability and educated
parents are more disturbed by impairments which affect mental ability
others feel such statements are based on prejudicial attitudes and that
working class parents have as much concern about the mental ability of
their children as more educated parents (personal communication, Raymond
Duff 1982).

The degree to which clinicians can accurately perceive the social
value of the infant to the family is dependent on a number of factors.
One is the degree to which the beliefs and values of the family are
similar to those of the physicians.

Similarities and differences in

social class, religion or ethnic background, education, or socialization
in the medical subculture may affect the degree to which the clinicians
can understand the beliefs and values of the parent.

Such background characteristics also indirectly affect
communication.

The degree to which the clinician feels he or she can

communicate with the parents may influence what information is imparted,
and how information is shared.

Those parents who are felt to be

"medically sophisticated,11 usually the more educated, may be given more

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

information.

It is probably no coincidence that a number of well known

cases, such as the "John Hopkins case" and the case of the Danville
Twins, both involved children of doctors/and or nurses who were familiar
with the options as defined by the medical subculture and were able to
get clinicians to act on their wishes.

Clinicians sometimes feel that a baby has special value to a
family because of the family's reproductive history.

Referred to as a

"premium" baby because of the advanced age of the mother, infertility
problems, multiple miscarriages or neonatal deaths, such an infant is
assumed be especially wanted.

It is felt that if such a baby were to

die, it might not be possible to "replace" the baby by another
pregnancy.

For example, extra efforts may be made to resuscitate an

extremely premature baby born close to the edge of viability (around 24
weeks of gestational age) to a mother who had 5 previous pregnancy loses
and no living children, while such vigorous efforts might not be made
for the third child of a young woman with no previous losses.

In part this occurs because of a perspective focused not on the
neonate about whom one is making a decision as unique individual but
rather as a constituent piece of a family. One area of concern is
whether, if this child dies, can he or she be "replaced" in the family.
In some cases clinicians may talk about whether the family had to be
concerned with reoccurrence of the same problem or, if they are likely
to have a healthy baby if this baby dies.
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I have heard clinicians talk of a child as a "replacement" for one
who died, and talk about babies who were not born because of the
survival of a child with impairments.

They believe that if an impaired

baby dies, the parents will have another child, while if a baby
survives, and is severely impaired, the parents will not have another
child because they will be so distressed and/or burdened by the
handicapped child (Khuse and Singer 1985).

It is as if the goal of

reproduction was the production of healthy "children." A child with an
impairment doesn't count as a "successful pregnancy outcome." In some
cases, however, the reverse may be true.

Rather than preventing a

subsequent pregnancy, parents may choose to have an additional child if
one or more of their children has a handicap.

One concern expressed by clinicians is about the impact of
severely impaired child on the functioning of the family.

The studies

are inconclusive, some showing a higher divorce rate, others showing no
increase, and still other studies showing a higher divorce rate
following neonatal death.

In addition to concern for family

integration, there is also concern about emotional impact on both
parents and siblings.

Although rarely, one also hears concern about

members of the extended family as well.

For example, the reproductive

choices of an aunt or uncle may be affected by a bad neonatal
experience.

Some people speak of how meaningful raising a handicapped
child has been for some families, others speak of how stressful and
still others talk about both joys and hardships.

Many clinicians
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believe that the impact on the family is dependent to a great extent on
the nature of the society and available resources.
the U.S.

In most places in

today, information and referral systems, and coordination of

services for children with disabilities and not as well developed as
clinicians think they should be.

Clinicians express anger at federal

government regulations that require treatment at the same time that the
federal government has been cutting support services.

In opposition to all the negatives, clinicians often recognize the
value of these babies to their parents and believe parents are firmly
committed to their well being.

I have heard clinicians comment on the

fact that even for a child who is dying or who has major visible
anomalies, parents will notice and get pleasure from features like their
own or like members of their families.

While some parents have trouble

becoming attached to a child with problems, others are able to bond
immediately, or are able to continue bonds which formed before birth.

Sometimes, especially when the child has very serious problems,
clinicians are more able to perceive the distress and do not fully
recognize the positive attachments of a family to a baby nor how great
the loss would be from the child's death.

Other times, especially when

the baby has a problem which is minor by NICU standards, some clinicians
are unable to understand why the family is having trouble adjusting.

Both parents and clinicians generally feel that they are genuine
advocates for the babies.

Parents sometimes mistrust the motives of the

clinicians, and clinicians sometimes mistrust the motives of parents.
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Both find it hard to understand how the other could feel that they could
not be interested in the well being of the baby.

Diana Crane, in The Sanctity of Social Life, writes that the
capacity to perform social roles is an important determinant of
treatment.

Since even a severely impaired neonate has the capacity to

perform the social role of being a baby, it may be more likely that such
an infant will be treated than an older person with a similar condition,
if the focus is on the ability to perform immediate social roles.

For

example, incontinence may not be thought of as a very serious problem
for a baby who would not be expected to be toilet trained for 2 or 3
years

anyway, whileit is a very difficult problem for families to

handle for the elderly.

If the focus is on the ability to perform social roles through
life, however, then the infant may not be treated for the newborn with
impairments may not be able to carry out social roles of adulthood, such
as reproduction or employment, may not be able to take care of parents
or care for him or her self after the parents have died, and may
therefore, be less likely to be treated.

Sometimes parents desire treatment choices that differ from those
of the clinicians.

Sometimes the parents want more aggressive

treatments than the clinicians would recommend because they want the
baby's life sustained despite the chance of severe handicap.

Other

times they are not ready to accept the fact that the baby is dying or
they feel that the baby's life should be sustained for as long as
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possible, even if the baby is dying.

If the parents want a baby to get

treatments, then the clinicians will give them, while sometimes also
trying to persuade the parents to accept their recommendations.

In other cases, parents don't want treatments to be given that the
clinicians believe the baby should have.

Most often the reasons for

non-treatment are not seen as acceptable to the clinicians.

Sometimes

parents beliefs are seen as determined by religious convictions that the
clinicians do not feel should determine treatment choice.

For example,

Jehovah's Witnesses believe that having a blood transfusion will prevent
a person from going to heaven.
a blood transfusion.

They may therefore refuse permission for

In such a case, clinicians will go to court to

obtain permission for transfusions, even if the chances for saving the
baby's life are small.

In other cases, clinicians see parents' refusal as resulting from
the parents' emotional problems or inability to understand the risks to
the baby.

In one case, a father wanted to take him still very sick baby

home from the acute unit; the clinicians called security to prevent him
from doing so.

Clinicians see such cases as problems, but not as

ethically problematic.

They try to manage what they see as irrational

behavior on the part of parents, and go to court, if necessary, to
obtain authority to treat.

Sometimes parents want to have treatment withheld from infants
because they feel that the quality of the life for their baby will be so
poor that treatment shouldn't be given, while the baby's clinicians feel
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that treatment is in the baby's best interests.

At Columbia, these

cases have been managed though discussions between the parents and
clinicians.

When decisions have not been seen to clearly violate in the

best interests of the baby, parents have been able to make choices to
withhold treatment.

There seems to be recognition of a fairly wide

range of treatment choices as not being clear-cut, which may reflect a
fairly wide range of beliefs among the physicians who work in the unit.
It may also result from the persuasive powers of the clinicians who were
able to convince hesitant parents to continue treatment.

As far as I

know, neither clinicians nor parents have seriously thought about
bringing such a case to court from Columbia.

At other centers, such

cases have been brought to the courts, both by parents and by
clinicians.

Social Value to Health Care Professionals
and the Health Care System

There are a number of ways in which variations in the treatment of
patients may have particular costs and benefits to the health care
professionals who care for that patient and to the health care system as
a whole.

First, for doctors and nurses who care for a patient, the primary
professional goal is usually to cure, or, if that is not possible, to
provide care.

The socialization of the practitioners in an intensive
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care unit generally has rewarded the aggressive use of available medical
technology.

Personal and professional satisfaction is usually derived from
intervening and treating.
Chapter

VII.)

(See further discussion under goals in

Many doctors and nurses have spoken of how difficult it

is not to treat aggressively because of the extent to which it goes
against their socialization.

Often health care practitioners have seen

death as a "failure" and have trouble acknowledging its inevitability.
On the other hand, some health care professionals, particularly some
physicians, also often see chronic illness or disability as a failure
and sometimes find dealing with chronic impairments as a continuing
confrontation with failure.

They may feel that continuing an activist

role in prolonging a poor quality of life is worse than passively
letting death occur.

Many clinicians and others, however, feel strongly that, in order
to avoid undermining the morale of health care professionals and their
value system, that they should continue to treat aggressively, or at
least not play a active role in causing death.

On a crude level, "success" is often measured in terms of
mortality statistics.

The overall infant mortality rate, or the weight

or disease class mortality rate may sometimes be taken as a measure of
the success of a unit.
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Often practitioners also derive satisfaction from being able to
study an unusual case, sometimes referred to as a "fascinoma" (Shem
1971).

They may derive status from describing a new clinical entity,

gaining a new understanding of an existing one, or in performing new
experimental procedures.

Prestige often comes from being able to do

something which was never done before, or by conducting a clinical
trial.

Fascinomas are also useful as teaching cases.

The benefits to the clinicians from being able to work with a
fascinoma are generally seen as secondary to the benefits for the
patient, and the patients family.
clinicians may assume priority.

Occasionally, the benefits for the
For example, a baby who is thought to

be unsalvageable may be intubated (have a tube inserted in the
respiratory passages) to allow a student to be able to practice
intubation in a non-emergency situation.

I was told about a case in

which a baby who was believed to be unsalvageable was intubated "for
practice" in the emergency room.

To everybody's surprise, the baby

survived as a result of the intubation and did very well.

In addition to benefits of aggressive treatment for professionals,
however, there are also costs.
usually very busy.

For one, the intensive care unit is

Staff members often feel that they do not have

enough time to do all of what they should to do for some of their
patients.

For example, clinicians often said that they would like to

spend more time with the families of their patients.

They sometimes

feel frustrated if they think they are putting time and energy into a
hopeless situation when the time and energy would be better spent for
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other patients with a better prognosis.

In some situations, staff

members may find that they are making "triage" decisions about how to
best utilize their time which may lead to less aggressive care for one
patient in order to provide more care for another.

While one hears neonatal staff members express frustration at
efforts to provide aggressive care for the terminally ill, when they
have other critically ill infants to care for, they derive satisfaction
from working with most of their NICU patients.

Staff members who

generally work in other settings, however, may express frustration at
having to care for infants who have impairments when they could be
providing care to other patients.

For example, a primary care pediatrician apologized for being late
for a routine office visit explaining that he had to take care of an
emergency situation for a baby who had just been born with
hydrocephalus.

He continued to complain about having to take care of

"that kind of baby."

In a similar situation Morgan, in her book, the

making of a woman surgeon, complained about having to care for a child
with hydrocephalus (1981).

Neonatologists sometimes have trouble

getting physicians from other specialties to perform procedures promptly
for some of their patients, if those practitioners don't want to work
with patients who may have severe lasting handicaps.

If clinicians feel that they are actually "doing harm" by
treating, by prolonging the dying process or causing pain for the
patient without compensating benefit, providing treatment is an
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emotional burden for them as well.

This situation can occur for a

junior physician or nurse who must follow the orders of a more senior
physician, or for any clinician who follows parents directives for
aggressive treatment, although they feel it would be in the baby's best
interest for treatment to be limited.

Space is also often at a premium in the ICU; aggressive treatment
may keep an infant in an acute ICU bed when some staff may feel that
such a bed would be better utilized by another patient.

While the

"classic," ethics hypothetical of an infant who is about to die, being
denied emergency care because there are no more beds in the ICU
virtually never occurs; babies are cared for in less intensive settings
sometimes who could benefit from placement in a more acute setting,
because the more acute setting is filled to capacity.

Sometimes the costs and benefits of particular treatments to
different providers may vary.

For example, traditionally doctors are

more oriented towards "cure" and may find fewer rewards when "cure" is
not possible, while nursing has be characterized by more concern with
"care" and relief of suffering.

Therefore, nurses may get more

professional satisfaction out of treatments which provide "comfort care"
while physicians may be frustrated by the fact that the same treatment
is not going to lead to a cure.

Frequently, clinicians, particularly primary nurses who care for a
baby daily, themselves develop emotional attachments to the baby.
occasion, it has appeared that some babies may have received more
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aggressive care than they otherwise would have because of the attachment
of a particular nurse who would have wanted treatment.

Although I never

heard of a case in which it appeared to lead to less aggressive
treatment, sometimes, in the case of an infant who seems to be
suffering, the clinicians who are most attached to the baby may be in
favor of less aggressive treatment.

Finally, the costs and benefits of providing care for
catastrophically ill newborns varies greatly depending on the
particulars of the patient and treatments and on one's perspective in
the system.

For example, more utilization of certain diagnostic

machinery and laboratory equipment may lead to greater profit for the
hospital (in an era of retrospective payment) while labor intensive care
of an "chronic" ICU patient may lead to greater costs than reimbursement
(especially under prospective payment mechanisms).

While financial

considerations are important factors in the budgeting which determines
the equipment and staffing for the NICU, considerations of the financial
cost for the health care system appear to have little effect on the
decisions made about the care of individual newborns.

One hears a position articulated which states that the clinicians
caring for particular patients should only be advocates for their
patients, and should not consider the costs of care.

Clinicians, in

fact, are often unaware of the costs of particular treatments.

Many

have said that the period of financial naivete may be ending with the
end of retrospective payments.
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Indirectly, financial factors do strongly affect decisions that
are made.

While they do not affect conscious choices made about the

care of individual infants, they do set the options or context in which
decisions are made.

There may only be a limited number of particular

pieces of equipment available for use.

For example, when there was only

one monitor capable of continuously measuring the level of oxygen in a
baby's blood through the skin, only certain types of babies were seen as
candidates for monitoring with such a system.

When more such monitors

were available, infants with a greater range of conditions were
monitored with the equipment.

While for those directly involved in decision making the economic
costs and benefits of treatment may not be considered important, clearly
neonatal care helps to support aspects of the health care system
including a large biomedical equipment and supply industry.

Large

amount of specialized equipment is developed and aggressively marketed
for use in the NICU.

Overall, intensive care units are often profit

centers for hospitals and help to support less profitable services.

Social Value for Society

Much has been written about the implications of decisions making
for catastrophically ill newborns for "society."

The concept of "the

society" in these discussions is vague; for the purposes of this study I
will use it to mean anybody beside the neonate whose care is under
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question, the neonates family, and those health care professional
involved in the care of the baby.

Some discussions of "social value" refer to the need of society to
maintain certain standards.

For example, while it may be in the

interest of a baby to die quickly and therefore put a quick end to
suffering, it may be said that active euthanasia should not be performed
in order to protect society from undermining a central value which
forbids the direct killing of innocents.

Arguments are also made that

tolerance of and caring for dependent peoples is an important attribute
for society (Fiedler 1985) and that not to do so would undermine the
caring for other dependent peoples and/or others who are "different" in
society (Horan and Delahoyde 1982).

Although clinicians talk about the

implications of neonatal decision for societal values, it does not
appear that these concerns actually affect their decisions for
individual newborns.

The presence of efforts for handicapped newborns may be very
important ideologically in order to demonstrate the humanitarian
concerns of society and technological expertise.

On the other hand,

some of those who object to the level of investment in NICU care, do so
for they feel it diverts resources from other humanitarian concerns,
including the prevention of the birth of low birth weight infants or the
birth of infants with impairments.

There is also concern about the

overall costs to society of neonatal care.
terms of two aspects.

It is usually discussed in

The economic costs of care and the burden caused
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by treatment leading to the survival of people with impairments and/or
severe impairments.

Neonatal care is very expensive.

It has been estimated that the

cost of neonatal care in 1981 was approximately 1.5 billion dollars a
year (Budetti, et al. 1981), with both inflation and new technology,
costs have undoubtedly increased.

While non-neonatal clinicians

sometimes talk about how some of the money could be better spent for
other, non-medical needs, the neonatal staff rarely seemed to consider
economic cost, except perhaps in terms of comparison with preventive
health care to prevent the types of problems they were treating.

In the survey, some of the factors least likely to be considered
important in making treatment consideration were the availability of
funds for other medical care and for other, non-medical social needs,
each of which was chosen by fewer than one fifth of respondents.

(Many

of the respondents who did indicated agreement, checked all of the other
factors as well).

Furthermore, although such factors might be mentioned

in conversation, they appeared to play no part in actual decisions made
about individual newborns.

There is concern among clinicians about the effect of NICU care on
the prevalence of impairment.

While risk of impairment for the

individual is considered in making individual treatment decisions,
clinicians focus on their own patients; the number of impaired
individuals in the population is not considered an important factor in
making decisions about individual newborns.

Both economic costs for
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society and the prevalence of impairment in the population may be
important in determining the macro-allocation decisions determining the
resources available to clinicians for treating individual newborns, but
they are not consciously considered in decision making about individual
cases.

Summary

Chapter V discussed characteristics of patient condition.
Clinicians consider the quality of life (for the baby) to be a very
important factor in decision making.

Quality of life is influenced in

part by physical and/or mental impairment, the capacity to give and
receive love, and the amount of pain and suffering.

There is debate

about the degree to which the influence of family and societal factors
about the quality of life should be considered.

Clinicians also

consider risks and uncertainty both about whether an infant will be
normal, about the severity of impairment, and about the likelihood of
success with a particular treatment.

The critical condition -- what the

infant needs to stay alive -- is also an important factor.

Finally,

clinicians talk about the social value of treatment or non-treatment for
others -- family, clinicians and the health care system, and the larger
society, the social costs and values to society seem to play a small
role in the decision making process about individual newborns.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER SIX

EXTRAORDINARY CARE?
CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATMENTS

As discussed in Chapter IV, decision making about treatment for
catastrophically ill newborns involves not only consideration of
characteristics of patient condition, but also involves consideration of
the characteristics of possible treatments.

This is illustrated by the

fact that clinicians give patients some treatments while withholding
others from the same patient.

For example, in the much publicized case

of Baby Jane Doe, a child with spina bifida, her parents and clinicians
chose to withhold neurosurgery to repair her spinal lesion, but they
administered antibiotics when she developed meningitis.

While each

treatment could be considered a life saving intervention, the two
treatments differed in a number of respects (See Chapter VII for a
discussion of this case).

Decision making about which treatments to give and which to
withhold involves the categorization of possible treatments along a
number of culturally defined dimensions.

In this chapter, I will

discuss the dimensions of aggressiveness, ordinary/extraordinary
treatment, withholding/withdrawing treatment and passive/active
euthanasia.

Although some of these dimensions may seem to be purely

objective and/or dichotomous, in fact, like the patient condition
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characteristics, each may be seen to form a continuum and each is, at
least in part, culturally defined.

Aggres sivenes s

On the basis of observations of how clinicians talk about
treatment options and make treatment choices, I concluded that
clinicians categorize treatments according to what I refer to as a
treatment's level of "aggressiveness."

Treatments which have such

attributes as a large physiological effect, which are experimental,
which are not frequently done, which are invasive or involve the use of
high technology, and/or which are costly in terms of staff time or
monetary costs, and/or which are risky, are ranked as more aggressive
than other treatments which do not share those attributes to the same
degree.

At one end of the dimension of aggressiveness lie those treatments
which are seen as the most aggressive.

These include life support

treatments that replace organ function such as chronic kidney dialysis,
or the use of an artificial heart or a liver transplant.

At the other

end are procedures which may be considered so routine that they are not
even usually considered "treatments" by clinicians.

This would include

such procedures as giving IV fluids, keeping an open lesion covered with
a sterile dressing, wearing surgical gloves, or keeping a baby in an
isolette.

It is worth noting that some such procedures (such as IV

fluids) are themselves relatively recent developments, and are not
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routinely done in all parts of the world today; doing or not doing each
of them can have life or death consequences in some circumstances.

Categorizations about treatments, in terms of their level of
aggressiveness, are very basic to the way that clinicians think about
treatments.

Because they are so central, however, they are often made

preattentively -- without conscious thought.

Like many core cultural

concepts for people socialized in a culture, to people socialized in the
clinical subculture, differentiating on the basis of aggressiveness may
form part of assumptions about the nature of their world; since the
assumptions are so basic, they are often hard to articulate.

To others,

not socialized in the cultural system, behavior based on such
distinctions may seem unintelligible.

I first became interested in what I was later to understand as the
concept of aggressiveness in 1977 as I was observing treatment decisions
which were made about the care of an infant whom I will call Sal.

Sal

was born three months premature and weighed two and one half pounds.

He

suffered from respiratory distress syndrome, a severe disease caused by
lung immaturity.

Soon after birth, he was put on a respirator which

provides high levels of oxygen and can mechanically "breathe" for a
patient.

When I first saw him, he was on a respirator, receiving all

that modern medicine had to offer to promote his survival.

As his respiratory status improved, he was weaned to CPAP (a
sophisticated respiratory device which maintains air pressure to help
keep the lungs inflated and can deliver a high concentration of oxygen
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but, unlike a respirator, does not "breathe" for the baby by delivering
bursts of air to the lungs).
turn for the worse.

Soon after, his condition took a sudden

His muscle tone and movements decreased.

Suspecting a problem, a spinal tap was done (which was the diagnostic
test routinely used at that time to test for bleeding in the brain).
Normally the fluid obtained was clear; Sal's fluid contained blood,
indicating that he might have had bleeding in his brain.

This led to consideration of Sal's condition according to the
patient condition characteristics discussed in the last chapter.

Blood

in the spinal fluid indicated that he might have suffered brain damage,
resulting in serious impairment and a severely diminished quality of
life.

There was, however, a high degree of uncertainty because the test

had low predictive value.

(The test itself could have been traumatic

and led to the blood, the bleeding could resolve leaving no serious
deficit, or the bleeding could have caused damage in an area of the
brain which would not have seriously impaired the future quality of
life.)

The need for sophisticated respiratory support meant that the baby
was seriously ill, but his condition was not seen to be as critical as
if he had needed to be on a respirator.

Social value, while not the

central concern, may also have been considered.

Potential very high

costs of care and the impact for his family, could have been thought to
be too high if, indeed, he did have severe impairments.

For whatever

combination of reasons, Sal's parents and clinicians decided that he
might be so sick, it might be better if he was allowed to die.
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The next time I returned to the nursery, I was told that a
decision was made to continue CPAP, but if his respiratory condition
deteriorated, the decision had been made that he would not be put back
on the respirator.
resuscitation.

If his heart stopped, he would not be given cardiac

Other treatment, such as intravenous feedings, anti

seizure medications, and continuous monitoring of heart and respiratory
rate and other forms of intensive medical and nursing care, would be
continued.

I didn't understand why he was on CPAP yet would not be put on a
respirator.
me.

At that time the treatments looked virtually the same to

Both meant that the baby was hooked up to sophisticated machines

and both involved tubes into the baby to deliver oxygen.

It was

explained to me that the need for a respirator or cardiac resuscitation
bore no necessary relationship to his future quality of life.

The baby

could have been severely impaired, yet have had no further respiratory
or cardiac problems and survived.

On the other hand, his cardiac or

respiratory status might have temporarily been worse, yet he might not
have had any brain damage.

Therefore, because treatments were withheld,

he might have died even though he could have survived without serious
impairment.

Conversely, he might have survived with the current level

of treatment, yet have been severely impaired.

I had thought that decisions about treatment were all or nothing
decisions to "maintain life" or "pull the plug."

The decision to

continue CPAP but not use a respirator didn't seem to make any sense to
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me because I thought that the use of CPAP did not differ in any
significant way from the use of the respirator.

However, for the

clinicians involved, the use of the respirator, conceptualized by the
clinicians as a more aggressive treatment, was significantly different.
I asked repeatedly why he was on CPAP but wouldn't be put on the
respirator.

I was repeatedly told that "it wouldn't make sense to put

him back on the respirator if his quality of life would be poor."

Each

time, I asked, "then why is he still on CPAP?" and was told that "that
was different."

Yet because the conceptualization of why there was a

difference was felt to be due to variation in the aggressiveness of
treatment, which reflected such a basic and unconscious assumption, the
clinicians in the unit had difficulty understanding what I didn't
understand.

Sal's condition did not deteriorate and he never had need for a
respirator or resuscitation.

At five years of age he had cerebral palsy

which affected his lower limbs but he has no intellectual impairment.

When making decisions to withhold treatments, clinicians are more
likely to recommend giving those treatments which are less aggressive
while withholding those which are more aggressive.

This notion of a

ranking of treatments is widely shared among clinicians both in

1
Another possible factor entering into the distinction between CPAP
and the respiratory was that stopping CPAP would be withdrawing
treatment, while not putting the baby on a respirator was withholding
treatment (see withdrawing/withholding, below). However, even in terms
of withholding or withdrawing treatments, the level of aggressiveness
makes a difference for I had been told that if he needed them, Sal would
be given antibiotics, blood transfusions, and other, not very
aggressive, types of treatment.
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neonatology and in other clinical specialties.

This is evidenced in the

pattern of responses about treatment decisions on surveys of clinician
decision making.

For example, as part of her research on physicians'

treatment of the critically ill, Diana Crane asked physicians if they
would give or not give a series of specific treatments to patients
described in hypothetical vignettes.

The respondents indicated that

they would give some less aggressive treatments, while withholding
others which would be more aggressive from the same patients (Crane
1975; personal communication, 1981 -- see example of survey results in
Chapter III).

I also found that clinicians were more likely to recommend less
aggressive treatments and more likely to withhold more aggressive
treatments in the survey I conducted in the Spring of 1983 (see
appendix). I presented respondents with a series of hypothetical
vignettes about catastrophically ill newborns and asked respondents if
they would recommend or not recommend a series of treatments for each
baby.

In each case, the number of respondents who would recommend each

treatment, varied from treatment to treatment (see Table VI - l).
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TABLE VI - 1
TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS WOULD RECOMMEND
AND MEAN ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY SCORE
n = 2492
CONDITION AND TREATMENT

% WHO WOULD
MEAN SCORE
RECOMMEND ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY

BABY WHO IS ANENCEPHALIC
Feedings by mouth
Tube feeding
Antibiotics
Resuscitation in the delivery room
Cardiac catheterization
Arrest page
Open heart surgery

76
56
32
13
3
2
2

1.9
2.6
3.1
4.0
4.6
4.7
4.8

90
81
76
65

1.6
1.9
2.0
2.4

85
60
24
14
13
10
8

1.9
2.8
4.1
4.0
4.5
4.6
4.7

BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES
(BEFORE CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS)
Nutrition and fluids
Antibiotics
Resuscitation
Respirator
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES
(AFTER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS
INDICATES TRISOMY 13)
Nutrition and fluids
Antibiotics
Respirator
Surgery for cleft palate
Cardiac catheterization
Arrest page
Open heart surgery

2
For the Baby with trisomy 13, and for questions on resuscitation
in the delivery room and an arrest page for the anencephalic baby, n =
119; actual base varies slightly depending on the number of ineligible
answers (in all cases, ineligible answers less than 5% of total n ).
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TABLE VI - 1 (cont.)
CONDITION AND TREATMENT

% WHO WOULD
MEAN SCORE
RECOMMEND ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY

A SMALL PREMATURE BABY WITH
AN IVH
Nutrition and fluids
Suctioning
Resuscitation in delivery room
Increased respiratory settings
Pressors
Arrest page
Kidney dialysis

93
92
64
53
39
26
13

1.6
1.7
2.3
2.3
3.5
4.1
4.6

A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME
AND DUODENAL ATRESIA
Intravenous feedings
Antibiotics
Surgery for intestinal defect
Cardiac catheterization
Open heart surgery
Kidney dialysis

91
88
87
71
59
28

1.3
1.5
2.2
2.9
3.7
4.3
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This variation can be seen to correspond to what clinicians would
consider the aggressiveness of treatments.

Less aggressive treatments

were more often recommended while respondents less often recommended
more aggressive treatments.

The pattern of responses on the survey indicated a high degree of
consistency in the rank ordering of treatments to be given or withheld,
reflecting consistency in categorizations.

For each case, a Guttman

scale analysis yielded a coefficient of reproducibility for the
treatment recommendations exceeding 0.92.

This indicates a high degree

of correlation which corresponded to rankings along the dimension of
aggressiveness.

There may be more consistency in the ranking of some treatments
choices than others.

For example, the most consistency in the ranking

may occur for treatments alternatives that would be given in the same
situation, the least in ranking treatments given in very different
situations.

To illustrate, responses to the survey indicated that when

respondents were asked about their recommendations at two points in time
(in the delivery room and in the ICU) the coefficient of reproducibility
was lower than when all questions pertained only to treatments in the
ICU.

When only the responses about treatments to be recommended in the

ICU were considered, the coefficient of reproducibilty was above 0.97 in
all cases, indicating a very strong degree of ordering according to
aggressiveness.
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When treatments are close to the same level of aggressiveness or
involve treatments from different domains, such as diagnostic tests and
surgical procedures, ranking may also be less consistent.

For example,

while in general, diagnostic tests are seen as less aggressive than
surgery, very invasive tests like cardiac catheterization or expensive
tests like CAT scans may be considered more aggressive than minor skin
surgery.

Although clinicians may speak of questions about which treatment
to give and which to withhold as questions of "how aggressive to be in
treatment," it is not a single labeled category recognized by
clinicians.

Indeed, a number of different terms may be used to refer to

this concept including "heroic" versus "conservative" treatment, or
"supportive" or "ordinary" care versus "extraordinary" care (See the
next section for a more complete discussion of the use of the terms
"ordinary" and "extraordinary.")

In addition, the term "aggressiveness" is also used in a number of
different ways.

It is sometimes used as a synonym for "extraordinary

treatment" (as discussed below, defined by both patient and treatment
characteristics).

Although rare, it is even occasionally used to refer

to almost the opposite situation when it is used her to indicate a
decisive choice to stop a treatment as in the statement "They were
aggressive in their decision to take the baby off the respirator."
Although the term is used in a number of ways, when used in context in
the sense that it is used in this thesis, it is understood by clinicians
both in neonatology and in other specialties.
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To illustrate, I present the case of Devon, an infant for whom
questions arose about the aggressiveness of treatment:

Devon was born about eleven weeks before his due date.

When she

was in labor, his sixteen year old mother was crying for her own mother.
She hadn't used contraception, she didn't really think she would get
pregnant.

She had thought about having an abortion, but her mother

discouraged her.

She, her mother, and her thirteen year old sister

lived on welfare.

Her boy friend was eighteen.

had dropped out of school.

Both black teenagers

Neither was working.

The birth was difficult, although Devon weighed only two and one
half pounds.

Stephen, a neonatal fellow had difficulty intubating

(putting in a tube for oxygen) and asked Martha, a neonatal nurse, to
call upstairs for Tom, the anesthesiologist from the NICU; by the time
he arrived Stephen had successfully placed the tube.

Apgars were 1/1/5.

Tom, Stephen and Martha brought Devon to the transitional nursery and
stabilized him.

After about two hours, on their way to the NICU, they

stopped in the recovery room so that his mother, grandmother and father
could see him.

His initial course was rocky but not uncommon.

He had a PDA

(problem in cardiac circulation) and was scheduled for closed heart
surgery.

He also had a grade III IVH (bleeding in the brain).

were not unusual for a baby his size.

Both

In fact, there had been a number

of very small babies in the unit; compared to them, he was doing quite
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well.

Anne, the resident most involved in his care, commented that the

four babies she was caring for weighed less than some full term babies.
His mother and grand mother visited daily, his father often came as
well.

When he was about nine days old, he developed meningitis, an
infection of the central nervous system.

Although low birthweight

babies are at risk for developing meningitis, it was much less usual
than the other complications and its implications were worse.
that small, it often leads to severe brain damage or death.

In a baby
His heart

surgery had to be postponed while he was treated for three weeks with
powerful antibiotics.

Meanwhile, his respiratory condition couldn't

improve much because he badly needed the surgery.

His weight fell to

less than one and three quarters pounds,

As soon as he finished the three weeks of antibiotics,
immediately for heart surgery.

he was sent

Unfortunately, by then, his tissues were

friable and a nick of a vessel led to a massivehemorrhage — he needed
two times the volume of his own blood supplybefore he could leave the
operating room.

He returned to the NICU in critical condition.
mother, and his father and his parents came in.

His mother and her

He was still bleeding,

his blood pressure was low, he was on the respirator, with tubes through
his chest on each side.

He wasn't expected to make it.

They left, not

knowing if they would see him alive again.
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Anne and Martha worked on him constantly, sometimes assisted by
other doctors and nurses as well.

They were giving him syringes fill

with blood to replace the blood lost, as well as bicarb to control the
acid/base balance in his blood, in an attempt to stabilize his
condition.

Anne was frustrated.

She wasn't sure that he should have had

aggressive treatment like surgery because of the meningitis.
been up to her, she might not have sent him.

If it had

She said that other

doctors has pushed for the surgery and now they were saying "don't be
too aggressive."

She found it difficult to know what to do for Devon,

who was probably dying.

She said "Some people mean everything but

intercardiac meds [powerful medications injected directly into the
heart] while others mean much less when they say don't be too
aggressive."

She thought she might give him dopamine, a powerful drug

to maintain blood pressure.

Anne said, "That's a treatment some people

wouldn't give if they weren't being too aggressive."

" Yet," she said,

"here he is with chest tubes on each side on a respirator."

She talked to the fellow, Frank; he decided to call the attending,
Lane, who was covering that night.
did give specific instructions.
could increase the bleeding.
heart if it stopped]."

Lane decided not to come in, but he

He said "don't give dopamine because it

Don't give adrenaline [to stimulate his

"But," he said, "keep giving the bicarb."

"Give

one, maybe two more pushes [syringes] of blood if he needs it, but then,
stop."

The feeling was that nothing more could be done, he was dying.
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He only needed blood once more.

If he had died that night, no one

would have considered it a case of withholding treatment.

He would have

been seen as a terminally ill baby who died.

For a few days his condition improved,then deteriorated and
was again put back on the respirator.
baptized in the NICU.

he

His family arranged for him to be

Anne, Frank and Lane's month on service ended and

other doctors, Andy, Stephen and Ruth took their places.

Most of the doctors and nurses caring for Devon were disturbed.
They felt that the bleeding in his brain and meningitis had caused much
damage.

They called in a neurological consult.

He found that Devon

only responded to deep pain; he didn't try to cry.

The shape and

movements of his eyes, lack of primitive reflexes,and a general lack of
muscle tone all indicated significant nervous system injury.

The

neurologist wrote in the chart: "The prognosis for normal neurological
development is very guarded."

The doctors and nurses most involved in his care met to discuss
his case.
died.

Both Stephen and Ruth said that it would be better if he

They talked to his family.

treated.

His mother still wanted him to be

His grandmother wasn't sure, but she said it was her

daughter's baby so she should decide.

Some of the nurses thought that

Devon's mother was denying the seriousness of his illness.

Ruth felt the mother had made a poor decision.

She felt the baby

should be taken off the respirator or at least be "no arrest page" (not
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to have the heart started if it stops).
antibiotics.

I asked about giving bloods or

While those choices might have been possible when he was

dying, now all three doctors, Ruth, Stephen and Karen, another
neonatologist who was nearby, looked uncomfortable at the thought.

Ruth

said, "I feel alright about disconnecting the respirator, or not doing
an arrest, but not giving bloods or antibiotics, that's different."
Later Karen said that if he arrested, he probably wouldn't be
resuscitated.

After that, his respiratory condition did improve, after about a
month he could be moved to the semi-acute unit.
aware and gained weight.

He became somewhat more

About two months after that he went home.

He

continues to be followed and his neurological condition continues to be
poor.

Ordinary/Extraordinary Treatment

Another dimension on which treatments are classified is the
ordinary/extraordinary dimension.

Unlike the dimension of

aggressiveness, which in theory depends only on characteristics of
treatments, in making judgments about whether treatments are ordinary or
extraordinary, characteristics of both patients and treatments are
considered.

The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means grows out
of Catholic moral theology (see Chapter II).

The most commonly used
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definition was offered by Father G. Kelly (1958) "Ordinary means" were
defined as "all medicines, treatments and operations which can offer a
reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and which can be obtained and
used without excessive pain and other inconvenience."

"Extraordinary

means," on the other hand, are defined as those treatments that do not
meet the above criteria.

Since the distinction rests on "benefit for

the patient," considerations concerning issues related to the patient's
benefit, such as the patient's quality of life, as well as the cost and
invasiveness of treatment are considered.

When philosophers and theologians use the terms, (reflected in
virtually all of the philosophical literature written before 1983) they
usually do so in a manner which indicates that they see ordinary and
extraordinary treatments as each forming a discrete category.

In

discussing the withholding of treatment, philosophers often used the
terms with the assumption being that the categorization of treatments as
ordinary or extraordinary was not problematic.

The terms have been used in the same manner in some court
decisions.

For example, the terms were used in a pair of 1981 cases

before the New York State Court of Appeals, known as the Father Fox and
the Storars cases.

The decision, issued to clarify policy after the

death of Father Fox, stated that "ordinary care must be given while
"extraordinary care" could be withheld.

(New York Law Journal 1981:5)

However, in doing field work in the neonatal intensive care unit,
I observed that clinicians often did not use the terms as dichotomous.
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Rather, clinicians seemed to perceive treatments as falling along a
continuum between "ordinary" and "extraordinary.11 Clinicians would talk
about treatments being "more extraordinary" or "less extraordinary" than
another.

There was often disagreement among clinicians about whether a

particular treatment was ordinary or extraordinary in a particular case.

In addition to evaluations based on benefit to the patient, most
clinicians seemed to be incorporating other elements beside benefit to
the patient in making categorizations of treatments as "ordinary" or
"extraordinary."

Many clinicians considered how usual or unusual a

treatment is, whether the treatments were high tech or low tech,
invasive or non-invasive, and other characteristics, here discussed in
terms of "aggressiveness" in making distinctions according about whether
a treatment was ordinary or extraordinary.

For example, a clinician

might say, "it used to be extraordinary to put a baby this small on the
respirator, but now we do it all the time."

Sometimes clinicians will categorize as ordinary any treatment
which they feel would be beneficial to a baby and categorize any
treatment which they don't feel would be beneficial as extraordinary.
However, clinicians have trouble using the terms without incorporating
aspects of aggressiveness.

Therefore, clinicians will sometimes

classify as ordinary less aggressive treatments even if they feel they
will not have benefit for the baby and classify as extraordinary
aggressive treatments even if they feel they will be of benefit for a
baby.

On the survey I distributed in 1983, I asked respondents to rank

each treatment option on a scale of 1 (ordinary) to 5 (extraordinary)
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(see appendix).
Table VI - 2.

Mean scores for each treatment choice are shown on
The variation in categorization of treatments as

ordinary or extraordinary was reflected in the responses.

The

respondents' rankings for every treatment on the survey ranged from "1"
(ordinary) to "5" (extraordinary).

In part the ratings of treatments as "ordinary" or "extraordinary"
reflected the respondents feelings about the potential benefit of
treatment for a particular infant.

This is reflected in the differences

in ranking of treatments from case to case and in the correlations
between rating on the ordinary/extraordinary scale and respondents'
treatment recommendations (see Tables VI - 2 and VI - 3).

The ranking

along the ordinary/extraordinary scale, however, also reflect the fact
that respondents* categorizations incorporate characteristics of
treatments as well as characteristics of patients.

This is reflected in

the fact that the relative ranking of treatments as more or less
ordinary was consistent from case to case (Table V - 1) and the fact
that even respondents who would not recommend less aggressive treatments
would categorize them as more ordinary than more aggressive ones, and,
even respondents who would recommend more aggressive treatments would
categorize them as more extraordinary than less aggressive treatments
(see Table V - 3).
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TABLE VI - 2
COMPARISON OF RATINGS ON THE ORDINARY/ EXTRAORDINARY SCALE
BY PATIENT CONDITION AND TREATMENT3
RATINGS
TREATMENTS AND
PATIENT CONDITIONS

ORDINARY EXTRAORDINARY
1 2
3
4
5

IV FEEDINGS/NUTRITION AND FLUIDS
Down's syndrome and duodenal
Trisomy 13 with cleft palate

atresia

83
63

8
16

5
4

2
7

2
10

71
28

17
18

7
18

2

3
19

33
4

33
9

22

7

18

22

5
47

4

9
0

27

27
11

33
81

ANTIBIOTICS
Down's syndrome and duodenal atresia
Trisomy 13 with cleft palate

17

SURGERY
For duodenal atresia (Down's)
For cleft palate (trisomy 13)
OPEN HEART SURGERY
For baby with Down's syndrome
For baby with trisomy 13

3
Numbers represent the
each treatment a particular
scale." For treatments for
For treatments for the baby

2

6

percentage of respondents who would assign
rating on the "ordinary/extraordinary"
the baby with Down's syndrome, n = 249.
with trisomy 13, n = 119.
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TABLE VI - 3
RATINGS ON THE ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY SCALE
BY RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING TREATMENTS FOR
A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME4

RATINGS
ORDINARY EXTRAORDINARY
1 2
3
4
5

TREATMENTS AND TREATMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS

INTESTINAL SURGERY
Would recommend
Would not recommend

n
n

216
31

n
n

142
97

n
n

67
173

37
7

10

19
45

6
16

2
23

15
1

39
9

20

19
54

36

CARDIAC SURGERY
Would recommend
Would not recommend

35

KIDNEY DIALYSIS
Would recommend
Would not recommend

10

1

15
3

21
6

22

16

31
74

4
Numbers represent the percent of respondents within each treatment
category (recommending or not recommending treatment) who would assign
the treatment a particular rating on the "ordinary/extraordinary scale."
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Singer, Kuhse and Singer, in a survey of obstetricians and
pediatricians in Australia, also found that while some clinicians
classified treatments as ordinary, others categorized the same
treatments as ordinary (Singer, Kuhse and Singer 1983).

While I had not seen the variation in use of the terms "ordinary"
and "extraordinary" discussed a few years ago, it has recently been
discussed in a number of contexts.

Critics have suggested that the

terms are used in so many ways that the distinction is no longer useful
(Pres.

Comm.

1983:88-89).

The terms, however, are still frequently

used by philosophers and in the clinical setting in the context of
decision making.

Withholding/Withdrawing Treatment

In discussions concerning decision making about the aggressiveness
of treatment, a distinction is often made between withholding (or not
starting) and withdrawing (stopping) treatments.

While many clinicians

now feel that the distinction should not have much importance in
decision making, it continues to play a role in treatment choice.

At first glance, criteria for deciding how to classify a treatment
on this dimension may seem to be clear cut and objective.

Indeed,

"stopping treatment" or "pulling the plug" are the idioms most often
used to refer to the subject of limiting the aggressiveness of
treatment.

However, as discussed earlier, plugs are almost never pulled
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and, as with the other dimension of patient condition and treatment
characteristics, categorizations of behaviors as starting and stopping
treatment are complex and culturally defined.

In many instances, the categorization of a treatment behavior is
clear.

For example, in choosing not to perform surgery to repair

duodenal atresia, the decision clearly pertains to a choice about
starting a new treatment, rather than a decision about withdrawing an
ongoing treatment.

In other instances, however, when a treatment

modality can be seen as made up either one single treatment composed of
a number of parts, or a series of individual treatments, the distinction
between starting and stopping treatment becomes unclear.

The following

anecdote will illustrate the issue.

Ray was born with a spina bifida.

He had a high level lesion and

other anomalies which meant that if he survived he would have multiple
impairments.

At first the exact extent of the anomalies was unclear and

his parents didn't know what decisions to make.

Antibiotics were

started soon after birth and the child was examined by multiple
consults.

After meetings with physicians, nurses, social workers, and

others, his parents decided that "treatment should be stopped and the
baby should be allowed to die."

The following morning at social service rounds, a social worker
who was involved in the discussion was surprised to find that the baby
was still being given antibiotics.

She said to the resident "you're not

going to give any more antibiotics then, right?" She felt that adding
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more antibiotics to his intravenous solution would constitute a "new
treatment."

The resident, however, seeing the addition of more

antibiotics as only part of a single, continuous, seven day course of
treatment, said he would "finish the seven days and then stop."
added "that will give the baby time to declare himself."

He

He felt that

not to finish the seven day course would be withdrawing treatment; he
didn't feel that it would be right to withdraw treatment.
worker was disturbed.

The social

She would not expect the current IV bottle

containing medication to be removed, but she didn't think that
antibiotics would be added to any subsequent IVs.

She conceptualized

that as withholding, not withdrawing treatment.

The preceding example illustrates the fact that treatments which
require multiple administrations create an ambiguous situation in which
not providing the treatment may be considered either withholding or
withdrawing treatment.

In addition to administration of continuous

medication, there may also be differences in categorization when
treatments are interrupted.

If a baby was ever given a treatment for a

problem, for example a blood transfusion, and the baby again needs a
treatment for the same problem, not giving the treatment for the problem
the next time it occurs may either be considered withholding or
withdrawing treatment.

The same is true when something happens to

interrupt an ongoing treatment.

For example, if a baby has been

intubated (had a tube placed to deliver oxygen) and the tube becomes
dislodged, in some situations a clinician may consider it withholding
treatment if the tube is not replaced.

Others may feel that not

replacing the tube would constitute withdrawing treatment.
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Another area in which questions arise about whether a treatment
choice involves withholding or withdrawing treatment concerns
respiratory care.

Very sick babies are often on respirators.

The

respirators have settings which vary rate, pressure and concentration of
oxygen in the gas the baby receives.

In general, when a baby's

respiratory status is poorer, higher respirator settings are needed for
survival.

If clinicians feel that a baby is doing poorly, especially if

they feel that no matter what they do the baby will not be able to
survive, they may not turn the respirator setting up, even if the baby's
respiratory status deteriorates.

(Pres.

Comm.

1983:73- 77) In that

situation, as in the example of Sal at the beginning of this chapter,
they may feel that they are letting the baby's condition rather than the
treatment choice determine survival.

(This will be discussed at greater

length later in this chapter under active/passive euthanasia and in
Chapter VII.)

Clinicians may also adjust respirator settings in a way that helps
them feel that they are withholding rather than withdrawing treatment
entirely if they decide to decrease the aggressiveness of treatment.
For example, if a decision is made that it would be best if a baby dies,
rather than "pulling the plug" and discontinuing the respirator
entirely, the settings on the respirator may be lowered.

In that

situation, the respirator may be set in such a way that the clinicians
know that the baby will die but some clinicians feel that it enables a
baby to die more comfortably than if the respirator was disconnected
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entirely.

In addition, the clinicians are spared having to remove the

respirator and confront the act of withdrawing treatment as directly.

The distinction between not starting a new treatment and stopping
a continuing treatment becomes important in the context of the
distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where stopping
treatment is sometimes seen as "causing death" and not starting a new
treatment is seen as "allowing death to occur."

This will be discussed

in more detail below.

A number of people have criticized those who make a distinction
between between withholding and withdrawing treatment from a number of
perspectives.

Some have written that either it is the outcome or the

intention rather than the means that is important.
Dr.

Clinicians, such as

Driscoll, director of the nurseries at Columbia, has talked about

the importance of being able to initiate treatment in a situation in
which the prognosis is very poor or very uncertain in order to be able
to establish a proper diagnosis, knowing that treatment which is not
beneficial can be discontinued later.

Indeed, fear that a treatment

once started, could not be stopped has been reported to have prevented
clinicians from initiating treatment in cases where it could haye been
beneficial (Pres.

Comm.

1983:75-76).

Sarcastically Gorovitz suggests an ingenious way to handle the
problems:
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There is a timing device used in English apartment-house halls
which automatically turns off the light after a few minutes. We
can get devices made to shut off after twenty- four hours, and
install them between all respirators and their plugs. Then all
the physician would have to do is — nothing at all; he could let
the patient die. of course, each day, before the twenty-four
hours is up, a decision would have to be made whether the switch
should be reactivated, thereby to prolong the life. But if it is
decided not to do anything, then the case ends.
It is obvious that this scheme fails. It fails because
there is no morally significant distinction between the
circumstances with the timing device and the circumstances without
it.
(1978:5)

Extending this concept still further, Father John Paris, a Jesuit
priest, at a conference for clinicians at Columbia in 1984, suggests
that each drip of fluid from an IV or each pulse of air from a
respirator can be considered a unique treatment.
be stopped at any time.

Therefore each could

Although, in theory, many of the clinicians

appreciated the concept, it is harder to accept in real situations.

Despite problems with the operationalization of the distinction,
and intellectual arguments about the lack of moral relevance of the
distinction, it is clear that the distinction feels very real and has
cultural significance to many clinicians.

Frequently, clinicians find

it more difficult to stop a treatment than to not start a new treatment.
Some feel that by stopping a treatment they would be actively ending a
life, which is itself a natural process, while by not starting a new
treatment, they are not prolonging death, or allowing a natural process
to occur (see discussion under active/passive euthanasia and goals,
below).
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Beyond the issues of control over the outcome, knowledge of the
likely outcome, or intention of the decision maker, the physical act of
stopping a treatment has importance.

Those lower in the staff

hierarchy, for example, are upset if the act of stopping a treatment is
"dumped" on them.

For example, residents are upset if they have not

been part of the decision making process to discontinue treatment, but
are asked to extubate a baby (remove the tubes attaching a baby to a
respirator).

Some senior physicians therefore feel that it is their

responsibility to physically carry out the act of stopping treatment, by
extubating a baby or turning down the respirator settings, as well as
take responsibility in decision making.

Sometimes, clinicians who object to a parents wishes about the
discontinuation of treatment, say "if that's what the parents want, they
should have to carry it out themselves," feeling that the parents would
be less likely to stop treatment if they had to do what is seen as the
"dirty work" themselves.

Although clinicians often feel that in the

long run the decision is in the best interest of a baby, the act of
discontinuing a treatment is usually seen as a sad event at best, and is
usually emotionally upsetting to carry out.

It is sometimes likened to

an act of an executioner.

Sometimes efforts may be made to avoid having to stop treatment.
This may be done by continuing to treat a terminally ill baby.

In other

situations, in which a baby's condition is known to be deteriorating, if
it is felt that the baby should be allowed to die, ongoing treatments
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will be continued, knowing that new treatments will be needed but will
not be given.

Passive and Active Euthanasia

Probably the most important distinction in the minds of many
clinicians in choosing between treatment options is the distinction
between active and passive euthanasia.

Although there is growing

acceptance both among clinicians and in American society as a whole of
"allowing death to occur," or "passive euthanasia" there is remains a
strong taboo against "active euthanasia" or deliberately causing death
(see Chapter II).

While the considerations of selective treatment may start with
considerations of quality of life, they will often end with and be
decided on the grounds of whether a particular treatment choice would
constitute active or passive euthanasia.

In almost all cases, treatment

choices which might lead to death will only be made if they can be
thought of as constituting passive euthanasia.

The passive/active distinction is defined in part by some of the
distinctions discussed above.

Passive euthanasia is often thought of as

not initiating an extraordinary treatment while active euthanasia is
often thought of as withdrawing an ordinary treatment.

To the extent

that there is lack of agreement about the dimensions of
ordinary/extraordinary treatment and withholding/withdrawing treatment,
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there is also controversy concerning the operationalization of that
definition.

In addition, there is controversy about whether withholding

an ordinary treatment or withdrawing an extraordinary treatment
constitutes active or passive euthanasia.

Part of the philosophical basis and acceptance for a distinction
between active and passive euthanasia evolves from the distinction
between omission and commission.

Others feel it is not a useful

distinction because what is important is the responsibility for the
outcome if one has the ability to control it, and the intention to bring
about death.

Despite the philosophical criticisms of a distinction between
active and passive euthanasia, culturally it is a crucially important
distinction to those who work in neonatal units.

Although some

practitioners may say that the nature of the treatment may not matter,
and that there is no real difference between not starting or stopping
treatment, every clinician with whom I discussed the question, including
a number who would be categorized as in favor of non-treatment in many
circumstances, felt that certain types of non- treatment choices would
constitute active euthanasia, and would therefore be unacceptable.

While the norm against active euthanasia is very strong and
pervasive among clinicians, there is a lot of variation in the beliefs
about whether or not particular choices would constitute active or
passive euthanasia.

Here the differences in definition between ordinary
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and extraordinary and between stopping and not starting treatments often
become crucially important.

For example, let's consider the case of Baby Doe of Bloomington
Indiana.

Baby Doe was born with Down's syndrome and a TE fistula (a

defect in the formation of the trachea and esophagus).

According to his

pediatrician, at the time of his birth, it was also thought that the
baby might have had an enlarged heart indicating a serious heart defect
(Pless 1983).

The presence of Down's syndrome indicated that the baby

would be mentally retarded, the TE fistula meant that the baby could not
take normal feedings. The baby would have needed surgery to correct the
defect or long term intravenous feedings and fluids in order to survive.
Baby Doe's parents and obstetrician decided not to operate and not to
give either intravenous feedings or fluids.

It seems reasonable to suppose that his parents and obstetrician
considered surgery and intravenous feedings and fluids to be
"treatments."

Indeed, 50 years ago, before the development of modern

medicine, these treatments which we now think of as routine would not
have been available.

They probably felt that the Down's syndrome, TE

fistula, and enlarged heart created a situation in which the baby could
not have a good quality of life.

Therefore, any treatments could be

considered "extraordinary" for they would be without benefit.

They

probably felt that they could therefore choose to withhold these
treatments, and that such a choice would constitute a decision to allow
death to occur, or passive euthanasia.
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Other people, including many clinicians, would not consider a
decision not to do surgery or provide food and fluid for a child with
Down's syndrome as passive euthanasia.

They feel that a baby with

Down's syndrome can enjoy a good quality of life.
that prolongs survival would be of benefit.

Therefore, treatment

Surgery which is commonly

done, and which is not seen as very expensive, invasive, risky, etc.
would not be seen as extraordinary.

Some people feel that the providing

food and fluids does not constitute "treatment," and, for a variety or
reasons, is something which can never be withheld.

Some of the nurses involved in the care of Baby Doe evidently
shared this view.

They felt that withholding surgery and food and

fluids constituted active euthanasia in the case of Baby Doe and
therefore felt that it should not be allowed to occur.

The different attitudes toward various treatment options reflect
differences of opinion about what constitutes active and passive
euthanasia.

In the 1970s, at the beginning of the debate about the care

of newborns, there were clinicians and bioethicists who argued that the
choices of treatment made in the case of Baby Doe were acceptable.
(Duff and Campbell 1973) As attitudes towards the developmentally
disabled, and the political climate about the regulation of medical
treatment has changed, it is difficult to find any support for that
position among clinicians in the literature.

Many clinicians would

feel, however, that the withholding more extraordinary treatments from
an infant with Down's syndrome, such as complex cardiac surgery or
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kidney dialysis, was appropriate (see survey results, Table VI - 1) and
that it would constitute passive euthanasia.

In the case of Baby Doe, the definition of treatment choice as
active or passive euthanasia rests primarily on the
ordinary/extraordinary distinction.

In other cases the

withholding/withdrawing distinction may be the important distinction.
In yet others there may be a combination of factors and both may be
important.

This was the case in a decision about treatment for a very

small premature baby which I will describe.

Sarah had a grade IV IVH and a cyst (indicating severe brain
damage).

In this case, Christine, a neonatologist who usually advocates

very aggressive treatment, stated that she agreed with a parental
decision and would not put the baby back on a respirator, if she needed
it, after the baby had been weaned to CPAP (less aggressive respiratory
support).

Christine, however, said she would not "feel comfortable"

actively removing a baby from a respirator who had the same condition.

Another neonatologist, Ruth,

felt that the first physician was

making a meaningless distinction between intubating (putting a baby on
the respirator) and extubating (taking the baby off the respirator).
This second doctor, however, who has a reputation for advocating the
discontinuation of aggressive treatment for infants who she feels could
only have a very poor quality of life, said that she, herself was
uncertain and uncomfortable about taking the baby off CPAP.

She noted

that although other clinicians agreed that the baby would not be
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reintubated, only the parents really questioned why CPAP was being
continued.

Although a decision to withhold the aggressive treatment,

the use of the respirator, was acceptable, stopping a less aggressive
treatment, CPAP, was not acceptable to any of the clinicians, although
they all acknowledged that the severe brain damage would preclude the
possibility of meaningful life for the baby.

Although the decision may not be understood analytically, and may
be operationalized differently in different institutions and among
different clinicians, virtually all clinicians internalize the
importance of these distinctions during the socialization process; they
are strongly felt.

One final vignette will illustrate.

Justin, a full term baby, because of a series of complications,
had a very short intestine. Although for a while it was thought that the
baby had enough intestine to eventually feed, after further damage, it
was decided that the baby unfortunately did not have enough intestine to
ever be able to digest food.

Although some babies have been kept alive

for as long as 2 years with hyperalimentation through a central venous
line (total IV feedings, also called TPN), no newborn had ever survived
longer than 2 years.

While he survived, most of the time, the baby

would probably be hospitalized, hooked up to machines, with frequent
infections, receiving a very expensive treatment.

The decision was made

to stop intravenous feedings.

I asked Sue, a nurse, who was caring for the baby about why Justin
was no longer getting "hyperal" (the intravenous nutritional fluid).
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She explained that it constituted heroic care for this baby and would
therefore only prolong the baby's suffering.

With it the baby might

live for weeks, months or maybe years, without it the baby was likely to
die within the next few days.

Then I asked, "Why don't you stop the

fluids?" which she was, at that point, attaching to an IV in his arm.
Stopping the fluids would have, in all likelihood, have shortened his
life span still further.

"We couldn't do that," she explained

emphatically, "that would be murder."

Whereas to someone not socialized in the clinical subculture, the
difference between the two IV fluids may not seem significant, to
clinicians socialized in the clinical subculture, there is a crucial
difference.

Even Surgeon General Koop, on of the nation's strongest

advocated of treatment for handicapped infants, approves the withholding
of hyperalimentation from infants with no hope of recovering adequate
intestinal function for feedings by mouth.

On the other hand, even the

strongest clinician advocates of withholding treatment from severely
impaired newborns, would probably not sanction the withholding of fluids
from such a baby.

To virtually all clinicians, the first treatment

choice, withholding hyperalimentation, constitutes passive euthanasia,
while withholding fluids constitutes active euthanasia.
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Summary

In the preceding chapter, a number of ways that clinicians
conceptualize treatment characteristics when making decisions about the
aggressiveness of treatment was discussed.

One of the most central to

the clinicians1 conceptual system, referred to here as the aggressiveness
of treatment, was identified.

The distinctions between ordinary and

extraordinary treatment, withholding and withdrawing treatment, and
passive and active euthanasia were also examined.

While each is often

presented as a clear dichotomous dimension, they were found to encompass
complex, cultural defined evaluations.

Together with conceptualization

of patient condition characteristics, conceptualization of treatment
characteristics provide the data used by clinicians in making treatment
decisions.

In the following chapter, the goals and principles of decision
making, used in making treatment choices for catastrophically ill
newborns, will be discussed in order to explicate the way that the
categorizations of characteristics of patient conditions and treatments
are translated into behavioral treatment choices.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

UP TO GOD OR MOTHER NATURE:
DECISION MAKING GOALS, NORMS AND BEHAVIOR

Goals and norms are crucial parts of the decision making process
leading to behavior.

As discussed in Chapter IV, goals provide the

purposes which orient the decision making process.

Norms are

prescriptive statements about how to relate categories to goals which
are used to guide behavior.

In the following chapter, the goals and

norms of decision making about the care of catastrophically ill newborns
will be presented and treatment choice will be discussed.

Goals

The goals of medical treatment, in general, and neonatal decision
making, in particular, are:

To Cure
To Care
To Preserve Life
To Do No Harm
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While these goals at first may seem unambiguous, their definitions, like
the characteristics of patients' condition and treatment, are culturally
determined.

In most cases, the same treatment choices will further all

four goals.

In some cases, however, they may be contradictory.

There

is variation in how clinicians operationalize each of them, and in how
important clinicians think each may be in a particular case.

In this

section, each of these goals will be examined and choosing among goals
will be discussed.

The role of conceptualizations about goals will be

considered in more detail and illustrative examples will be provided in
the section on norms and neonatal decision making.

To Cure

For most clinicians, the ideal goal in medical treatment is "to
cure" or to return a patient from an abnormal (pathological) state to a
"normal" one.

For example, the majority of infants admitted to ICU are

premature babies, in an abnormal state because they were born before the
end of the normal 40 weeks gestational period.

The major goal in their

treatment is to choose treatments which will maintain their vital
functions in such a way that they will be able to be discharged able to
function as any

"normal" infant born at full term.

In some cases, clinicians may disagree about whether cure is
possible.

Disagreement can take place in two respects.

First, there

can be disagreement about the ability to produce a given physiological
outcome.

For example, Cindy had a very complex heart condition.
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There

was disagreement about whether surgery could be successful in correcting
the defect.

Second, there was disagreement about whether a particular

outcome would comprise a cure.

Peter, one of the neonatologists feared

that the surgery would leave her a "cardiac cripple" with a limited
ability to function and would therefore not provide a cure.
questioned the benefits of treatment.

He

Christine, another neonatologist,

on the other hand, though recognizing the possibility of the same level
of impairment, believed that this surgery would be a cure for her
(presently more serious) condition and would consider her cured.

To Care

A second goal of medical treatment is to provide care.

Providing

care can involve supporting vital functions (by supplying warmth, food,
nutrition, etc.), relieving suffering (by removing unpleasant stimuli,
providing measures to mitigate an unpleasant experience or provide a
pleasant one), and providing means to maintain or increase other
functions (e.g.

preserving range of motion through physical therapy).

Karen, another attending, did not feel that the surgery would cure
Cindy, but she did think that doing it would be appropriate care.

Much of the care given to the babies in the NICU entails
monitoring and ministering to their vital functions through feeding,
monitoring and sometimes assisting respiration, monitoring the heart
beat and, if necessary, regulating it with drugs, etc.

Other care

involves performing procedures or giving medication (such as antiseizure
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medication) to control an abnormal condition which cannot be completely
cured.

One aspect of "caring" is to help the individual to function as
much as possible given the limits of his or her condition.
Sal had bleeding in the brain, leading to cerebral palsy.

For example,
His

caretakers will be unable to completely cure him, the main goal will be
to care for the baby by providing exercises and other physical therapies
so as to maximize functioning as much as possible.^

Another aspect of caring is to provide comfort - that is to remove
negative stimuli or mitigate an unpleasant experience and provide
pleasant ones.

For example, Sue, one of the nurses sometimes provides

comfort care by carrying a baby in a snugglie (baby carrying pouch).
She believes that it both is pleasant for the baby, and, may improve
future physiological or psychological functioning.

In other

circumstances, care is intended only for the current experience for the
child.

For example, Sue will often hold and rock a dying baby, she says

"at least it's something I can do for them."

Sometimes, there may be disagreements about what constitutes good
care.

For example, if an infant is going to have a painful procedure,

such as the insertion of chest tubes through the baby's chest wall and
into the lungs, some clinicians feel providing good care for such a baby
may involve giving drugs to reduce the pain.

Since such drugs may

1
Those clinicians who use a more functional definition of cure, may
consider such measures as intended for cure, rather than care.
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depress the infants respiratory status, however, which may result in a
higher risk of death, some clinicians do not feel that such medication
is appropriate.

In some cases, it is not clear how to provide the best care.

For

example, treatments that may be best for maximizing care in one respect
may cause problems in another.

For example, high levels of oxygen,

intended to preserve life and maximize future brain functioning may be
associated with unintended problems such as chronic lung damage or eye
disease.

To Preserve Life

A third basic goal of medicine is to preserve life.

Even in cases

where cure is not possible, the minimum goal is usually to enable
continuation of life.

Much has been written on how physicians see death

as the ultimate failure or defeat (see Chapter II).

The ability to

"defeat death" is the function most recognized as characterizing the
power which justifies status and power of physicians, in particular, and
the health care professions in general.

Mortality statistics are often

the measure used to judge success of health care programs.

While there

has been change regarding ideas about the definition of life, and
regarding the assumption of unquestioned benefit from postponing death
in all cases (see Chapter II), in general, a primary goal of medicine is
still the preservation of life.
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One doctor, commenting on why it was so hard not to treat, said:
"From the first day of medical school, we are taught how to save life.
It is very difficult not to save life."

(Levin, Palmer and Ross 1984).

The techniques that clinicians learn in their training are aimed at
maintaining physiological functioning; there is little training relating
to recognizing when efforts to continue life may not be appropriate.

Sometimes there may be conflicts between efforts to maintain life
in the short term and long term.

A procedure intended to promote long

range functioning, such as open heart surgery, may engender unintended
side effects such as risks to life from complications of surgery.

To Do No Harm

A final basic goal or tenet of medical practice is "to do no
harm."

Frequently, the maxim: Primum non nocere," above all, do no

harm, is attributed to Hippocrates, however, it does not appear in the
Hippocratic corpus.

Rather, the following appears in the Hippocratic

Oath: "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and
judgement, but never with a view to injury and wrong doing" (Reiser,
Dyck and Curran 1977:5), While intentionally causing harm by use of the
medical arts is clearly prohibited, there is variation among clinicians
as to how important they feel it is to avoid unintended harms as a
result of treatment.
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While some clinicians feel that avoiding harm is a primary goal,
others feel that a greater degree of risk can be tolerated in pursuit of
the primary goals of saving life.

These clinicians are more likely to

display an activist stance that dictates that doing something is better
than doing nothing.

For example, such clinicians are willing to try

highly experimental, invasive procedures, such as an infant heart
transplant, if they think that there is a chance that it might work.
Others feel that inflicting that sort of procedure on a baby now would
be doing harm.

What is meant by avoiding harm depends a great deal on how harm is
defined.

For some, harm is narrowly defined in terms of an assault

which lessens physiological functioning or decreases the probability of
survival.

For others, however, probably more often, a broader

definition of harm is used.

Such factors as pain and suffering

(physical or emotional) and loss of autonomy may be seen as harms to be
avoided in the practice of medicine.

Christine, one of the attendings,

believes it is better to save the life of a severely retarded child
while another attending, Ruth, believes that it is doing harm to save
such a life.

Iatrogenic harms, caused by the side effects of treatment, are
among those of most concern to clinicians.

Clinicians often seem to be

most upset by those mistakes which they see as their fault because they
occur as a result of treatment.
of a mistake (e.g.
(e.g.

When harm is done, either as a result

IV infiltrate), or as a side effect of treatment

RLF), or because the intentional effect of the treatment (e.g.
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prolonging life) is later seen as a harm, clinicians often feel that
they are responsible.

Often they feel worse than when an equivalent

condition occurs but is not felt to be a result of their actions.

For example, Harriet's mother's membranes had been ruptured for a
while before she gave birth.

In order to prevent infection, Harriet was

given an antibiotic immediately after birth but a lumbar puncture (test
of the spinal fluid) wasn't done to check for infection and drug
sensitivity.

A few days later she developed meningitis from a resistant

strain of bacteria; the clinicians felt especially bad because failing
to do the test had resulted in a serious condition which might have been
prevented.

Another related area of concern is that there is seen to be a
difference between "natural" events or "God's will" and "unnatural"
events, seen as the result of "interference with nature."

There is a

somewhat fatalistic acceptance of unfortunate events that are not seen
as directly caused by human actions.

On the other hand, there is a

feeling that those things that do occur as the result of human actions,
could have been prevented and should not have occurred.

There is

sometimes a sense that interfering with "what was meant to be," even if
it is bad, could be a harm.

Individual clinicians, however, differ in

their ideas about what was "meant to be."

The sense of it being wrong to try to treat what can't be helped
is reflected in the writings of Hippocrates (Reiser, Dyck and Curran
1977) and is also reflected in the modern discussion of the artificial
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and futile preservation of life (DHHS 1985).

On the other hand, to

bring about death, even when the patient would die soon anyway, is also
seen as doing harm.

Sometimes clinicians talk about "tragic choices"

and say they feel stuck "between a rock and a hard place."

Many

clinicians fear causing death even more than they fear prolonging dying;
therefore, in general, a choice is made to preserve life.

Other Goals

There are other types of goals, of a different order that also may
inform clinical decision making.

For example, other goals are to

discover more about the causes of disease and their cures, to educate
health care professionals or to gain status or prestige.

These may

influence clinical decision making in some circumstances.

In general,

these are satisfied by the same treatment choices as those made to meet
the first four goals.

While many decisions are made to try new techniques, procedures or
substances, these are virtually always done because of the belief that
they will promote cure, improve care, or preserve life.

When a

particular treatment is not given, because the patient is part of a
clinical trial, it is generally believed that the benefits of treatment
are uncertain.

At times, a procedure thought to have little chance of

success for a particular baby may be tried because it is believed that
it will help future babies with the same or a similar condition.
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In the popular conception, there is concern that a child may be
kept alive or given a treatment just for "experimentation" or for
"teaching material."

This is very rarely the case.

I did not observe

any decisions which would fall in this category, except to the degree
that the aggressive ethos generally guiding intensive care, led
clinicians to attempt to cure, care, or promote survival in cases which
probably had little chance of success.

One example of a case where clinicians performed an extremely
aggressive treatment, which was very experimental, occurred when
physicians in Loma Linda, California, transplanted a baboon heart into a
baby known as Baby Fae.

Although critics felt that far too little

previous experimental work had been done with animals to justify the
procedure, the clinicians who cared for her evidently thought that there
was a chance that she would survive; therefore, the procedure was
justified for this baby with a lethal heart defect.

In rare cases, aggressive treatment may be given for teaching
purposes, as in the case discussed before concerning a baby who was
resuscitated in the emergency room.

Although she was thought to be

dead, she was treated so that a resident could practice intubation
techniques.

In that case, the resuscitation was successful.

Presumably, in other cases, such acts have been performed and have been
of no benefit to the baby or have been judged to be harmful.

Such acts

are thought to be morally questionable, but many clinicians feel that
the gain, in terms of knowledge which can later be used to help other
babies, outweighs the possible harm.

I have heard of no cases, however,
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which resemble the cases of human experimentation at Willowbrook, in
which children were intentionally given a disease or risky procedure
purely for the purpose of research (Rothman and Rothman 1984).

By the

time I did my field work, there was consensus that such actions were
morally unacceptable.

Another situation in which one baby may be treated aggressively
for the benefit of another, is when the baby is a potential organ donor.
A recent issue of the Hastings Center Report presented commentaries
about using an anencephalic baby as an organ donor (1986).

While there

has been little demand for newborns organs so far, such a demand could
increase significantly if infant heart transplant became an accepted
procedure.

Other goals sometimes discussed in relation to clinician decision
making are to make money or to avoid malpractice suits and to achieve
professional status.

Although such practices have been documented in

other settings (e.g. P. Katz 1985), I don't know of any examples in
neonatology.

Such goals may help to form the context of decision

making, and may in fact help to inform the general standards of care
which guide decision making for all babies.

At least when I did my

field work in 1982, however, I don't think that it directly entered into
decision making about the aggressiveness of treatment for particular
babies.^

^
Pressures from rising malpractice suit rates, and economic
pressures from changes in reimbursement policies may create changes, at

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Variation in Goals

In general, in a neonatal unit, clinicians are able to orient
their behavior toward all of the primary medical goals at the same time
—

the best treatment serves to cure, to provide care, to preserve life,

and to do no harm.

At other times, however, behavior is not possible

which would maximize all of the goals at the same time.

In that

situation, clinicians may maximize one goal at the expense of others, or
may try to find a balancing point in an attempt to maximize a set of
goals.

In general, when cure is possible, it is seen as the primary goal
of treatment.

When cure is not possible, providing good care may become

the primary goal for many clinicians.

For example, articles are written

with such titles as "When you can't cure, care" (Thullen, 1977).^ For
least at some centers.
documented.

So far, none that I know of have been

It has been said that living, severely damaged babies bring higher
awards in malpractice suits than do dead babies. Under a DRG type plan,
shorter length of stay and less treatment could be less costly for the
hospital. Potential pressures from changes could theoretically operate
either to promote more aggressive treatment or lead to less aggressive
treatment.
J
While many of the treatments intended to promote cure fall under
the province of physicians and surgeons, many of the care oriented
treatments are under the province of nursing. The goals identified as
the reasons for behavior, may differ more than the actual behavior. In
the responses to the survey, there were no statistically significant
differences in the treatment recommendations between physicians and
nurses when other factors were controlled. There were, however,
differences in what nurses and physicians identified as factors which
should be considered as the most important in making treatment
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other clinicians, the preservation of life may be seen as the primary
goal.

Some of the differences observed in decision making between
individuals and institutions reflect differences in goals.

For example,

Tom usually recommends very aggressive treatment, such as maximum use of
a respirator, because he feels it is necessary, above all, to preserve
life.

Another physician, Ruth, may recommend discontinuing aggressive

treatments such as the respirator and also more ordinary treatments like
blood transfusions because she feels that preserving life is less
important than not doing harm.

She believes that continuing such

treatment for a baby who has almost no
doing harm.

chance of leaving the NICU is

Yet a third clinician, Mike, feels that such a baby should

remain at an intermediate level of respiratory support in an effort to
do what he sees as neither talking life nor doing harm.

The fact that there are conflicting goals between saving life and
doing harm is sometimes presented as a modern problem which results from
recent technological advances.

However, as discussed in Chapter II,

such clinicians have dealt with such potential conflicts in goals for a
long time.

Clinicians may also disagree in how they define a particular goal.
For example, some clinicians may feel that any prolongation of
decisions. More neonatal nurses thought that prolonged pain and
suffering should be an important factor. This may be because comfort
has traditionally been more of the professional concern of nursing than
of medicine.
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physiological life is worth striving for, while others may use a more
social definition of life and only feel that life should be prolonged
when there is some capacity for social functioning (Crane 1975).

Variation in interpretation and choosing among goals will be
illustrated in the following section on norms for decision making.

Norms for Decision Making

In choosing treatments for the care of catastrophically ill
infants, clinicians are guided by norms for relating goals to culturally
defined characteristics of patient condition and of treatments.

As

discussed in Chapter II, and as will be discussed further in Chapter
VIII, as technology has changed, and as other political, economic and
social changes have taken place, the norms guiding the care of the
critically ill have been changing.

Unlike some other situations, in

which human behavior in relation to a particular domain is guided by a
relatively clear, consistent set of norms, at the present time there is
a great deal of variation in the norms used to guide treatment choice.
In this section, I will discuss norms that appeared to be guiding
treatment choice.

I will illustrate the use of norms, including

normative variation both among clinicians, and for different clinical
situations.
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Proportionality

The overarching norm guiding clinical treatment choice is that
treatments should be provided which are proportionate to the patient's
condition in order to achieve treatment goals.

This is conceptualized

in terms of the characteristics of patient condition, treatments and
goals as discussed above.

In general, to summarize, if there is a high degree of certainty
that an infant will be severely impaired, and/or the infant has an
impairment that is seen to diminish quality of life and a very critical
condition, and/or there is little social value seen to treatment, it is
more likely that treatments will be not be given.

This is especially

true for those treatments which are very aggressive, andthose which are
seen as extraordinary, especially when treatments can be withheld and
that act can be thought of as passive euthanasia.

At one extreme, once diagnosed, an anencephalicbaby (who does not
have a brain), may not be given even relatively ordinary procedures,
such as blood transfusions or food.

On the other hand, if a baby is

likely to be able to enjoy a good quality of life, even if the baby has
a very critical condition, then very aggressive, some might say
extraordinary, treatments will be given.

For example, Ari, a baby with

a diaphragmatic hernia (a serious but usually correctable defect) was
put on ECMO (a new, experimental, high technology device, something like
a heart-lung pump) for a period of time in order to maximize his chances
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for recovery.

It required round the clock, one to one attention from a

pediatric surgeon and a neonatal nurse.

While the overarching norm of proportionality guides overall
treatment behavior, subsidiary norms are used to take care of various
combinations of conditions, and to specify more completely the details
of behavior.

I will outline norms used by clinicians for decision

making here, and discuss them further below.

NORMS FOR CLINICAL DECISION MAKING

General Principles:
Start with aggressive treatment in order to stabilize the baby and
assess the baby's condition. Determine if the baby might be cured. If
not, determine if the baby is terminally ill. If not, determine the
chances that the baby could have a decent quality of life.

In making treatment decisions, try to maximize all of the goals of
clinical decision making. If that is not possible, emphasize goals as
appropriate to the case.
In general, try to cure. If that is not possible, make treatment
choices to preserve life unless such treatment would constitute doing
harm.
In all cases, provide good care.
Active euthanasia (actions which cause death to occur) are not
acceptable, but, in certain situations, passive euthanasia (actions
which allow death to occur) may be chosen.
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If the Baby Could Have a Good Quality of Life:
If the baby can be cured or if future quality of life is not so poor as
to be unacceptable, give aggressive treatments to promote survival.
Even if the quality of life is not likely to be acceptable, if there is
a significant chance that the baby may be normal, treat aggressively to
maximize the chance that the baby will survive.

If the Baby is Terminally 111:
Give ordinary treatment to provide good care (keep the baby
comfortable), but do not treat aggressively by giving extraordinary
treatments.
If a terminally ill baby is expected to die within a fairly short period
of time, in general, do not start new treatments but continue treatments
already started. If new treatments would provide care, they may be
given. If already started treatments would prolong dying, they may be
withheld.

If the Baby Will Not be Normal and there is a High Probability that the
Infant Will Die or be Severely Impaired;

Withhold more aggressive treatments. Choose the level of aggressiveness
of treatments according to the followingconsiderations:

In most such situations, continue treatments which areordinary
and/or those which are already started (in order to continue
providing care and to allow death to occur).

If it is likely that the baby would survive for a significant
period of time, and the baby's life during that time would be of
poor quality, then a level of aggressiveness of treatment may be
chosen to make it likely that the baby will die relatively quickly
(in order to avoid doing harm by prolonging the dying process).
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If the infant is probably terminally ill or the quality of life is
likely to be very poor, but there is a fair amount of uncertainty,
then a level of treatment may be chosen in which the outcome is
uncertain (in order to avoid doing harm by either prolonging dying
or causing death; "Allow the baby to declare him/herself," or
"Allow God or nature to decide").

When Some Treatments would be Withheld:
Treat up to a certain level of aggressiveness, withhold other, more
aggressive, treatments.
If the baby's parents want the baby's life preserved despite little
chance of a good quality of life, treat aggressively.

For most cases, these norms provide clear guidelines for the the
provision of treatment.^

Frequently, clinicians follow these norms in a

^
Somewhat different rules apply in a situation which is clearly
considered experimental. In the early stages of development of a new,
possibly risky treatment, if a baby is thought to have no chance without
a treatment, but might have a chance with it, the baby may be given the
treatment in a effort to cure and to promote survival, realizing that it
might be likely to cause harm.
During a randomized or sequential trial, however, treatments that
might be thought to promote cure, or even survival might be withheld, at
least for a period of time, to test the protocol. (Babies not given the
treatment initially may be given the treatment later if the clinicians
have an option.)
In choosing subjects for testing a new experimental, very
aggressive procedure, with limited availability, only those babies who
are seen as the best candidates for successful treatment will be
selected. This may mean that infants with other known anomalies will be
excluded. Characteristics of the family, their ability to understand
the experimental nature of the procedure, and their ability to carry out
follow up care, may also be considered.
In 1986, such highly experimental aggressive procedures include
ECMO (an external oxygenation system similar to a heart/lung pump^ the
Norwood procedure for hypoplastic left heart surgery, and infant heart
transplants.
In making decisions about these modalities, other factors
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preattentive manner (see Chapter IV); treatment choices are made without
conscious reevaluation of categorizations in each case.

In other cases,

clinicians consciously evaluate how a particular baby's condition and
treatment options should be categorized and which norms should apply.

I

will illustrate treatment decisions below with a discussion of a number
of cases.

While this framework is generally accepted by clinicians providing
neonatal intensive care, there are many disagreements about what
constitutes appropriate care in particular situations.

This is largely

due to disagreements about how particular characteristics of patient
condition, treatments and goals are to be categorized in particular
cases.

There is also some disagreement about the appropriateness of

some norms to guide treatment choice.

For example, some clinicians feel

that a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatments is not
significant and that both can be withdrawn in some circumstances. Norms
and variation in decision making for babies when 1) the quality of life
is expected to be good, 2) they are terminally ill 3) and when the
quality of life is not expected to be acceptable, will be discussed.
Issues relating to change over time will be examined in more detail in
the following chapter.

may be considered beside those usually weighed in the decision making
process.
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Decisions When the Quality of Life is Expected to be Acceptable

As discussed earlier, in the vast majority of cases, it is felt
that the characteristics of the patient condition justify whatever
treatments are thought to be necessary to promote cure and survival;
aggressive treatments will be given.

For example, consider the case of

Wesley, a premature baby admitted to the NICU in respiratory distress.
By NICU standards she was not very small (1250 grams, a little under 3
lbs.) not very young (30 weeks, two and a half months premature) and
there were no other major problems (e.g.

no significant bleeding in the

brain), none of the clinicians would consciously consider the issue of
non-treatment at all in such a case.

Even if, in another case, for a baby who is critically ill, and it
is thought the probability is high that the baby will die, if there is
felt to be a significant chance of saving the baby, and the baby is not
likely to be severely impaired, the level of treatment will be
aggressive.

For example, Timmy was admitted to the unit in 1978 with a

diaphragmatic hernia, a condition in which a hole in the diaphragmduring fetal development led to the growth of the intestine in the chest
cavity, which interfered with the formation of the lung.

Even though it

was thought to be unlikely that the infant would survive, surgery was
performed.

The baby did very well and has no lasting problems.

The

most aggressive treatments, like ECMO, will often be used first for
babies like these, who, if they survive, are expected to be normal.
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Many of the critically ill infants with potentially correctable
defects have cardiac conditions.
a complex cardiac lesion.

For example, Roxanne was admitted with

Although, again, the feeling was

that

unlikely that the infant would survive, surgery was successful.
other cases, however, treatment is not so successful.

itwas

In many

For example,

although plans were made to use ECMO for Paul, another baby

with

diaphragmatic hernia, he died before he could be moved from

the

a

transitional nursery.

Many babies have conditions such as low level spina bifida
lesions, that cannot be completely ameliorated, however, the prospects
for an acceptable future quality of life are thought to be high enough
that aggressive treatments are given in order to do everything possible
to preserve life.

Even when clinicians would not recommend treatment

themselves, if parents want aggressive treatment such treatment will be
given.

This can be illustrated by discussion of the case of Gerald and

by discussion of the responses about the Baby with Down's syndrome on my
survey.

Gerald was born with Down's syndrome and also had a serious heart
lesion (AV canal complete and an interrupted aorta).

After discussion

with the baby's parents, plans were made to do a closed heart procedure
soon, to be followed by open heart surgery when the baby was a little
older and the risks from surgery would be less.

Although there now appears to be a consensus to treat an infant
with Down's syndrome and relatively easily correctable defects, there is
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less consensus about more aggressive treatments such as open heart
surgery for infants with Down's syndrome.

For example, in response to

the questions about the baby with Down's syndrome in the survey, almost
nine out of ten respondents replied that they would recommend relatively
simple intestinal surgery for such an infant, assuming that the parents'
views were the same as their own.

On the other hand, only about six out

of ten respondents would have recommended open heart surgery form an
infant with Down's syndrome.

(See the appendix for information on the

survey, and Chapter IV for some of the results.)

The clinicians in the

unit supported the decision about surgery for Gerald, especially because
the parents were very clear about the fact that they wanted surgery.

Unfortunately, Gerald had a very rocky post operative course
involving an episode with a severe lack of oxygen which led to renal
shut down, destruction of part of the intestine, and imbalance in the
acidity of the blood.

He was now in a very critical condition.

Many of

the clinicians now felt that it would be better to allow him to die
because of the likelihood of death and the small chance that he could
have a good quality of life.

It was probable that both the Down's

syndrome and his currently very critical condition which led the
clinicians to consider non-treatment.

Although few clinicians would probably have wanted to stop
relatively aggressive treatment with either the Down's syndrome alone,
or the baby's present condition alone, with the combination of
conditions a number of clinicians would have recommended treatment be
stopped if the parent's wishes were the same as their own.

When asked
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about kidney dialysis for a baby with Down's syndrome on the survey,
only a little more than a quarter of the respondents said they would
recommend kidney dialysis.

Gerald's parents, however, did want everything done to preserve
the baby's life.

When discussing plans for the baby's treatment,

Julian, one of the neonatal fellows, asked "Why dialyize?" indicating
that he thought it was a disproportionately aggressive treatment.

The

resident caring for the baby said "That's not a good question, the
mother wants it."

Because of the wishes of the parents, preservation of

life was the primary goal.

Because the baby had high social value for

the parents, aggressive treatments were not seen as disproportionately
aggressive.

The baby was given powerful drugs to maintain blood

pressure, antiseizure medications, a tube was surgically implanted in a
vein in the baby's chest, respiratory support was increased, drugs to
regulate the baby's heart rhythm were given, and the baby was put on
kidney dialysis.

Despite the fact that these very aggressive treatments were given,
it became clear that Gerald was going to die.

Lane, his attending

physician, was called; he called Gerald's parents.
were continued until his parents arrived.

All the treatments

Then the IV was stopped and

the respirator settings were turned down (leaving the baby still
attached to the respirator by a tube to the trachea).

The baby's

physician said that was continued so that there wasn't any sudden change
and it wouldn't be too uncomfortable psychologically for the family and
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clinicians.

Gerald died in his parents arms, despite all the aggressive

efforts to save him.

Decisions for Terminally 111 Infants

As illustrated by the case of Gerald, even when babies are
terminally ill, and it is known that no treatments will enable long term
survival, clinicians must still make decisions about care.

Although

some treatments were withdrawn, other treatments were still given even
when he was dying.

For terminally ill babies, the goals of cure and of

preserving life for a long time are clearly not applicable.

Sometimes,

however, clinicians may make decisions to prolong life for a period of
time or to try to ameliorate some particular condition if the baby will
survive for a while.

The other goals, of providing good care and doing

no harm, are usually the primary goal guiding treatment choice for the
terminally ill.

In some situations, clinicians will realize immediately upon
examination that a baby has a condition which is so severe and so
clearly recognizable as a particular condition, that it is immediately
known that the infant is terminally ill.

For example, some babies are

born anencephalic, sometimes indicated by lack of closure of the skull,
protrusion of cerebral tissue and lack of the forebrain.

Such a

condition is always fatal, usually within a few hours or days.

In such

an extreme case, clinicians may not do anything which they consider
treatment for the baby.

In the survey only about one out of eight of
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the respondents would have recommended resuscitation in the delivery
room and only a few respondents would recommend an arrest page for an
anencephalic baby.

While about three quarters of the respondents

recommended feedings by mouth if the baby could suck, only about half
would recommend tube feedings if the baby couldn't suck and only one
third would recommend antibiotics.

When I first started doing research in neonatology (1977), if an
infant was born so premature that the baby's eyes were fused shut
(indicating a gestational age of less than 24 or 25 weeks), it was taken
as a sign that the baby was not yet viable and no respiratory support or
other treatments were given.

When I returned in 1982 to observing care

delivered immediately after birth, because of the perceived improvement
in the technological capability, that was no longer a sign of lack of
viability.

Babies with fused eyes were sometimes treated very

aggressively.

In most cases, however, when infants are first found to have
problems, the nature of their condition is not certain.

Aggressive

treatment is given while their condition is stabilized and tests are
done to establish the diagnosis.

For example, Sarah was born in

respiratory distress with a number of congenital anomalies.

From the

initial exam, it seemed likely that she had a lethal condition, known as
trisomy 13, caused by having three of chromosome thirteen, instead of
the normal two.

Aggressive support was continued while tests of the

chromosomes were done to confirm the diagnosis.

After the diagnosis was

confirmed, additional aggressive treatments were not started when
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Sarah's condition deteriorated, but treatments which were already
started were continued.

For example, antibiotics were continued, even

though the usual reason for their use (control of infection to promote
long term survival), was no longer applicable.

In response to questions about a baby with trisomy 13 in the
survey, respondents answered that if a baby was diagnosed as having
trisomy 13, about six out of seven would continue nutrition and fluids,
and six out of ten would recommend continuing antibiotics.

However,

only about one fourth would put such a baby on a respirator, and only
one out of ten would do an arrest page if the baby's heart stopped.

Similar decisions used to be made for infants with hypoplastic
left heart, a condition which was considered uniformly fatal until
recently.

Now some clinicians believe in treating infants with a

hypoplastic left heart with a new surgical procedure or an infant heart
transplant.

Other clinicians feel that those treatments are not yet

advisable.

Gary, a full term baby, first appeared to have respiratory
problems and was put on a respirator and transferred to the unit.

Upon

examination, the neonatologists realized that he had a cardiac
condition, they gave him aggressive support and sent him for cardiac
catheterization for diagnosis.
hypoplastic left heart.

The tests showed that he had a

He remained on the respirator, but no

aggressive means were used when his condition started to deteriorate.
Sometimes such a baby may live days, sometimes weeks before dying.
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I think that when treatment is continued in such a situation it is
done because of the social value of treatment for the parents and/or
clinicians.

Some parents and/or clinicians feel that they are providing

better care by supporting the infant and they are not prolonging dying
because they are not starting new treatments.

They are able to feel

more comfortable than they might if they withdrew treatments, for they
feel that they are doing nothing to bring on death and, therefore, they
are "doing no harm."

In other cases, treatments are withdrawnwhen an infant is
diagnosed as having a lethal condition.

For example, in one case I

observed, after a baby was diagnosed as having trisomy 13, the settings
on the respirator were turned down; the baby died soon after.
Treatments can also be discontinued in a way that addresses the social
value of treatment and non-treatment for an infant.

Different

perspectives on management for social value are illustrated by the case
below.
Pedro was delivered in another hospital.
and was discharged home.

He seemed to be healthy

The next day he turned blue and his parents

rushed him to the emergency room.

After the doctors there resuscitated

him, they transferred him to the NICU.

He wassent for tests and was

diagnosed as having a hypoplastic left heart. Mike, the attending, told
Pedro's parents that he was dying.

He talked to them about the baby's

condition and asked if they would want to have the baby taken off the
respirator and hold him while he died.
to be baptized first.

They said that they wanted him

They were joined by the baby's aunt, uncle, and
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grand parents.

He was baptized.

A nurse set up a screen to allow the

family some privacy, and brought over a rocking chair which the mother
sat in, holding her baby.
IV was left in.
uncomfortable.

Although he was taken off the respirator, his

Mike said he did that so Pedro wouldn't be so
Mike believed the parents would feel better if they

didn't feel that Pedro had been on a machine when it would be of no
benefit and he felt that they would be able to adjust better to his
death if they had been able to hold him while he died.

Mike had thought

that he would die within an hour or two, but he lived for seven hours.
The nurses on the day shift, and those who came on in the evening were
very supportive.

Mike stayed with the family for a few hours but had to leave in
the evening.

Another attending, Rita, was covering for Mike and took

over the vigil when he left.
been managed.

She didn't agree with the way the case had

She would have continued the respirator for 12 to 18

hours to give the parents more time to adjust to the fact that their
baby was dying.

She said

I don't think it's a good idea to hand the baby to the parents to
die anyway. It's good for some people, but they are the
exception, not the rule. For Pedro's family, coming in from home
with a well baby, it was too much for the parents. For a baby who
was sick for a period of time it would be different.

She thought that Mike might have taken the baby off the respirator right
away out of frustration.
Not that he meant to be mean or anything, but he was so frustrated
at not being able to do anything and therefore, since he couldn't
do anything in a long term sense, he just stopped treating.
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Dorothy, one of the nurses who had been with the parents when the baby
died, disagreed with Rita.

She felt that it probably had been very

meaningful for the parents, and that adjusting to the death of their
baby, especially because they had brought him home, was going to be
difficult anyway.

A final situation in the care of a terminally ill infant occurs
when it has been thought that an infant might survive, but after the
baby's condition becomes very poor, clinicians feel that survival will
be impossible.

For example, when caring for a very premature baby, very

aggressive efforts may be made to treat the baby.

If, however, the

clinicians feel that treatment has become futile, aggressive efforts
will be stopped.

Sherry was born after only 27 weeks gestation.

She was a second

twin, born at 1300 grams with barely a heart beat (Apgars of 1 and A).
When the transport team arrived they felt that they had a chance to save
her and started aggressive treatment.

A few hours after they returned

to the NICU, the clinicians realized that the baby's prognosis was very
poor.

She had bad bleeding in the brain, her kidneys were not

functioning, she was seizing and she seemed to have heart, lung, and
intestinal problems.

They continued treating aggressively, awaiting a

meeting with the parents, but they felt that she would probably die.
Karen, the attending, said they could maintain blood pressure for a
while but not indefinitely.

Sue, the resident, was instructed to try to

put in another IV line, but Karen said, "if you can't, you can't."
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(For

another baby, with a good prognosis, a resident would keep trying to put
in a line, or would call someone else for assistance.)

In that type of

case, although no conscious decision is made to allow the baby to die,
further very aggressive treatment may be judged to be futile.

Decisions When the Quality of Life is
Not Expected to be Acceptable

Most discussions of ethics and values of decision making have been
about those cases in which an infant might live, with treatment, but
decision makers feel it is quite certain that the infant will have a
poor quality of life.5
should be withheld.

in those situations, some suggest that treatment

There is a wide range of variation in cases in

which the future quality of life is likely to be poor.

They vary along

all of the characteristics of patient's condition including the severity
of and the nature of the impairment, the degree of uncertainty, the
nature of the critical condition and the social value criteria.

In

addition, there is also variation in the characteristics of the
treatments which could be given.

In this section, I will discuss norms

for decision making when the quality of life is not expected to be good.

5
As was discussed previously in Chapter V, both conceptions about
quality of life and uncertainty depend on value considerations. There
is variation in how individuals evaluate particular outcomes. For the
purposes of this discussion, the assumptions made by the clinicians
making the choices in the cases examined, will be assumed for the
analysis and discussion of norms.
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As discussed above, an overarching norm guiding decision making is
that treatments should be given that are proportionate to the patient
condition.

When the outcome is expected tobe bad, the more aggressive,

extraordinary treatments may not be given. In general, treatments

are

provided up to a given level of aggressiveness, while more aggressive
treatments are withheld.

While clinicians vary in which specific

treatments they feel are appropriate, decisions generally cluster around
a given level of aggressiveness.^

A number of factors may influence the level which is chosen.

In

many situations, there is no specific decision about whether the baby
should live or die.

Rather, treatments aregiven which seem to be at an

appropriate level of aggressiveness for thecondition.

In other

situations, a level of aggressiveness may be chosen which it is felt
will insure death.

Finally, in some situations, a conscious decision

may be made to put the level of treatment at a point which will neither
insure death nor survival.

The decision making process is very similar to decision making for
terminally ill infants.

In fact, as was discussed in Chapter V, it is

often difficult to know if a baby is terminally ill, and, in many cases
the probability of death is high.

The difference here, however, is that

the assumption is that the baby would be able to live with treatment.
Whereas with the treatment of terminally ill babies, like Pedro, there

°
In the survey, treatment choices seemed to form a normal curve
around the most frequently recommended treatments when the treatments
were ranked by degree of aggressiveness.
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sometimes is a desire to avoid prolongation of the dying process, here
there is fear that treatment will lead to a long lifetime of suffering.
While there is fear of causing death to occur sooner for a terminally
ill child, here there is fear that treatment choice could lead to death
for a non-dying child.

In a particular situation, however, it may be

difficult to draw the line.

For example, in a single case, one clinician may feel that he is
choosing not to treat because the baby is dying anyway, while a second
clinician, involved in the care of the same baby, may feel that she is
choosing not to treat because even though it might be possible to save
the baby, the quality of life would be so poor.

The occurred in the

case of baby Vivian, a very premature baby.

Vivian's mother, a "DES daughter" (her own mother had taken DES
during pregnancy and, as a result, Vivian's mother had a malformed
uterus) went into labor after 23 weeks of pregnancy; everyone thought
that she was probably having another miscarriage.

When the baby was

born, however, she had a heart beat and spontaneous movements.
neonatal team had been called in case the baby was viable.

The

An

attending, a fellow, a resident and a nurse stabilized her immediately,
and rushed her to the transitional nursery.

She weighed about one and

one third pounds (560 grams).

At first she did all right, but then her respiratory condition
deteriorated.

I asked Mike, an attending who was caring for her, if he

would put her on a respirator if her condition got worse.

He said that
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he couldn't.

She was so premature and

big that it was not really feasible to

so small, and the tubes

were so

do it forababy that size.

Later, I talked to Mark, a fellow who along with Mike was caring for
her.

He said that she could be intubated (have tubes put in to attached

her to a respirator), but that it wouldn't make sense to do it in her
case because it was almost certain that if she did survive, she would be
severely impaired.

Both clinicians agreed that it was not appropriate

to use a respirator, but these two clinicians who were working together
on the same baby had different ideas about why they weren't doing it in
this case.

She died after 16 hours.

Decisions Where the Outcome is Known to

be Death

In many cases only the most aggressive treatments will be
withheld.

For example, one baby who had a severe heart lesion had

suffered severe brain damage with massive bleeding in the brain.

The

baby was having uncontrolled seizures and had a severely abnormal EEG
(test of brain activity).

The physicians decided not to do heart

surgery, but they continued other aggressive treatments because the
parents wanted the baby to be treated.

There was no explicit discussion

about the reasons for withholding the heart operation; it was obvious to
all the clinicians that it would not make sense to do heart surgery for
this baby who would surely die.

On the other hand, if parents wanted

aggressive treatment, the baby would not be taken off the respirator.
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Similarly, after the neonatal team stopped after trying
unsuccessfully to resuscitate (start breathing and heart beat) for

20

minutes after a baby's birth, there was no discussion about whether they
stopped because there was no chance that the baby could survive, or
because the outcome would be so bad even, on the unlikely chance, that
the baby could survive.

Although the level of aggressiveness may be set at a point at
which it is known that the baby will die with that level of care, it is
generally felt important that the level of care be one which can be
thought of as passive euthanasia, not active euthanasia.

For example,

consider the case discussed earlier (in Chapter VI, section on active
and passive euthanasia) about Justin, a baby who had intestinal problems
which had left him with too little intestine to ever be able to digest
food normally.

A decision was made to allow him to die.

nutrition was stopped but IV sugar water was continued.

IV hyperal for
One nurse who I

spoke to considered the hyperal to be "extraordinary treatment and would
only prolong his suffering" and that stopping it would be passive
euthanasia.

She felt that stopping the IV fluids, however, would be

murder or active euthanasia.

Even when decisions are made that are

known to bring about death, it is thought important that they are felt
to allow death to occur rather than cause it.

Two management regimes which were practiced in the past, involving
the withholding of food and sometimes fluid, have been much criticized.
While the clinicians who practiced them probably felt that they were
examples of passive euthanasia, some other clinicians considered them
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active euthanasia and therefore not acceptable.

One involved infants

with Down's syndrome, the second involved babies with spina bifida.

Although such decisions would probably not be made today (see
Chapter VIII, section on theBaby Doe Regulations) in a number of
instances, in the past, at a

number of institutions, decisions

havebeen

made to withhold surgery from infants born with Down's Syndrome and a
correctable intestinal defect.

With such a condition, the infants could

not be fed normally by mouth.

No IV feedings were given, although, in

at least some situations, IV

fluids were given.

of starvation over a period of days

or weeks.

The infants died slowly
Some clinicians

feltthat

withholding feedings, which would obviously lead to death, constituted
active euthanasia.

The clinicians who did it, however, probably felt

that it was allowing death to occur because of the intestinal defect.

I

know of no case in which a clinician sanctioned the withholding of
bottle feedings or tube feeding from an infant with Down's syndrome who
could take feedings by mouth.

I think that the presence of a life-

threatening defect allowed the withholding of food to be seen as passive
euthanasia while without the defect, withholding nutrition might be seen
as active euthanasia.

The less aggressive the treatment withheld, the more likely
clinicians are to see it as active euthanasia.

Some of the strong

reaction against the withholding of treatment from Baby Doe (the case of
the infant born in Indiana in 1982, see Chapter II) might have been
generated by the fact that not only nutrition but also fluids were
withheld, so he was not only starving to death, but was also dehydrated.
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Most clinically socialized individuals, such as physicians and nurses,
seem to hold death by dehydration with the total abhorrence.

Another situation in which a plan for the management of care was
chosen to decrease the chances for survival occurred in the care of
infants with spina bifida in England.

When a decision was made not to

do surgery to repair the primary lesion because it was thought that the
quality of life would be so poor that it would be better to allow the
infants to die, the infants were sedated.
demand.

Then, they were fed only on

Since they were sedated, they didn't demand feedings

frequently.

Babies cared for under this regime almost always died

fairly soon, while babies with unrepaired lesions, who were fed on
schedule at other centers, often survived for a long period of time
despite non-treatment decisions.

While some clinicians, such as Lorber,

who felt strongly that that active euthanasia was unacceptable, saw
sedation and demand feeding as an example of passive euthanasia, some
other clinicians considered such practices to constitute active
euthanasia, since a practice which led to withholding food would clearly
led to death.

In these cases, in which nutrition, and sometimes fluids were
withheld, the quality of life would not have been likely to be as poor
as for some other babies who were treated more aggressively.

In

examining why more ordinary treatments were withheld in these cases, it
appears that the answer may depend on the degree of certainty about the
babies' conditions.

Down's syndrome and spina bifida can be diagnosed

with a very high degree of certainty, and in all cases there are
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identifiable deviations from the norm.

Although the quality of life

would not be as poor as was likely in other cases, it appears that
clinicians felt that it would be all right to choose a management plan
where the outcome - death - was certain because there was equal
certainty about the diagnosis, and about the fact that the baby would
not be "normal."

Decisions with an Uncertain Outcome

In many cases, the level of aggressiveness of care which is chosen
leaves the outcome - survival or death - uncertain.
choice was made in the case of Sal

For example, such a

(Chapter V, section on

aggressiveness), the first baby I observed for whom a decision was made
to limit the aggressiveness of treatment.

In that case, the baby was

continued on CPAP, but a decision was made not to put him back on the
respirator if his condition deteriorated.

Also in the case of Ray, a

baby with spina bifida (discussed in IV;A the section on
withholding/withdrawing treatment), a decision was made not to operate
but to continue antibiotics for a full course of treatment.

One reason that treatment is sometimes put at an intermediate
level, where it is neither certain that the infant will live or will
die, is that it enables the clinicians who are caring for the infant to
avoid taking responsibility for determining life and death.

Sometimes,

it is rationalized that the intermediate level of treatment will "enable
the baby to declare himself."

In other words, the assumption is that if
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the baby would do well in the long run, he will get better but if he
gets worse and he needs more treatment, it indicates a poor long range
prognosis.

Frequently, it is an appropriate assumption.

For example, for a

small premature baby like Sal, who has had bleeding in the brain,
further respiratory problems may be associated with more serious brain
damage or with chronic lung problems which will lead to years of
dependence on the respirator and eventual death.

In other cases,

however, the development of problems needing additional treatment are
unrelated to the long range prognosis.

For example, in Sal's case, he could have developed problems
needing further respiratory support or cardiac resuscitation, yet had no
severe cognitive or motor impairments which would have compromised his
future quality of life.

Therefore, he could have died despite the fact

that he would not have been severely impaired.

On the other hand, he

could have had serious brain which damage that left him seriously
impaired, and which could have led to a very poor quality of life.

Yet,

if his respiratory or cardiac situation did not deteriorate, and he
didn't need the respirator, he would have survived despite the problems.
As it turned out, Sal's respiratory status did not deteriorate and he
never again needed the respirator or cardiac resuscitation.

At the age

of five, he had cerebral palsy which affected his lower limbs, but he
had no other physical or mental impairments.
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I think that in situations like this, where there is a high level
of uncertainty, clinicians are often uncomfortable with having to carry
the weight

of responsibility for survival with a poor quality of life or

for death.

By putting the levelof treatment at an intermediate level,

they can feel that they are not determining the outcome.

I once had a conversation with Peter, a senior neonatologist, who
was caring

for a very sick, verypremature baby who he felt was

terminallyill.

In discussing the care of the baby, I mentioned

that in

my sample of fifty cases (see appendix), there were no babies who
represented the "classic neonatal ethics case" of a baby who could
survive but who had died because treatments had been withheld.

Yet, I

said, a number of the cases, particularly those involving the care of
terminally ill babies, did present situations in which decisions had to
be made for care which involved ethical issues.

Peter agreed, and said,

beyond that, you could say there were ethical issues involved in the
care of every baby.

We continued to talk about the care of the terminally ill baby who
he was then caring for.

Peter said that he thought that it would be

best to take the baby off the respirator.

But, he said, the parents

wanted the baby kept on the respirator "so a miracle could happen."
This very devout Catholic physician said that he felt it was the
clinician's job to explain to the parents "that [being on the
respirator] is not how miracles happen."

He said that if there was

going to be a miracle, it would happen whether or not the respirator was
there.

However, he felt that this baby's situation represented an act
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of nature, and that the baby would die no matter what choice was made
about care.

A second neonatologist, Hal, had entered the room, and they
continued the conversation about ethics and neonatology.

Peter, who had

earlier said that all cases involve ethical questions, now said, "we
never really determine life or death for any of these babies."

He felt

that "God" or "Nature" really determined the fate of the babies, and the
clinician's role was to help bring about what had already been fated to
be.

Variants of both views, I believe, are very common among
clinicians in neonatology.

On the one hand, they feel that they

shoulder a huge responsibility knowing their actions can lead to life or
death for the babies.

On the other hand, they often feel that

ultimately the outcome is beyond their control.

Some clinicians

subscribe primarily to one view or the other, but it is not uncommon for
clinicians to express both views on different occasions.

Although outsiders often talk about "Playing God in the Nursery"
(e.g. there is a book by Lyons with that title about Neonatal Care),
clinicians who work in the nursery generally don't feel that they are
"playing God" a term usually used to indicate determining outcome
inappropriately.

Although they are proud to be able to save the lives

of infants who will have a good quality of life, they do not feel that
in doing so they have "played God."

The term "playing God" is almost

always used to refer to human actions which cause an outcome other than
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what the speaker feels was "meant to be."

But, clinicians who work in

the field of neonatology generally do not feel that they are going
against fate.

Rather, they have a well-developed world view which

provides norms for appropriate treatment behavior.

While in some

situations it is seen as dictating every possible effort to save life or
treatment choices which will surely lead to death, in other situations,
it dictates a management plan which leaves the outcome uncertain or in
the words of one mother of a child with spina bifida, "Up to God or
Mother Nature" (Levin, Palmer and Ross 1984).

Treating Up to a Given Level of Aggressiveness

Even after a decision is made to withhold some treatments above a
certain level of aggressiveness, other treatments up to that level of
aggressiveness are usually given.

For example, in the case of Sal, even

though a decision had been made to withhold treatment for a cardiac
arrest or the use of a respirator, all other, less aggressive treatments
were continued up to that level of aggressiveness.

For example, the

CPAP, blood transfusions, and anti- seizure medications were continued.

Similar decisions were made in virtually all other cases in which
treatments were withheld.

Although I never heard it explicitly

discussed, there seemed to be a strong clinical norm underlying
treatment decision making that dictates: Once a decision is made to
withhold a treatment of a given level of aggressiveness, all other less
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aggressive treatments are still given while more aggressive treatments
are withheld.

Although the relative aggressiveness of treatments were not
explicitly discussed, as explicated in Chapter VI (section on
aggressiveness), the sense of ranking of treatments on this dimension
seems to be widely shared by clinicians.

As was discussed in that

section, this ranking was reflected in the pattern of responses to the
questionnaire conducted on neonatal decision making in the Spring of
1983.

I think that this pattern of treatment choice enables clinicians
to feel that they are providing appropriate supportive care to infants,
even though they are not doing everything possible to preserve life.
Sometimes, however, maximizing the goal of providing supportive care may
be seen as having the unintended consequence of doing harm by sustaining
a baby with a poor quality of life after a decision has been made that
it

would be better to allow the baby to die.

For example,when antibiotics and regularly scheduled

feedings are

provided to infants with Spina Bifida they may die slowly or may survive
for a long period of time despite a non-treatment decision.
apparently what happened in the case of Jane Doe.

This is

Although I have no

personal knowledge of the details concerning the decision making in her
case, from reports in the media (New York Times 1983, 1984; Lyons 1985),
it is possible to infer a number of things about the decision making
process about the management of her care.

I think that this famous case
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is a good example of a treatment decision in neonatology where a
decision to treat up to a given level of aggressiveness, left the
outcome uncertain.

Jane Doe was the first child a young, affluent Catholic couple.
She was born in a community hospital on Long Island in the Fall of 1983.
Soon after birth she was transferred to Stony Brook Hospital.

She was

born with a spinal defect, L3 to L4 which would lead to substantial
paralysis of her legs and incontinence of bowel and bladder.

In

addition she had hydrocephalus and microcephaly, indicating a high
probability of severe mental retardation, a condition which prevented
her from completely closing her eyes or from using her tongue properly
to suck, spasticity of her arms, and a thumb abnormality that would
prevent her from having full use of her hand.

Shortly after birth she

developed meningitis.

When she was born, her parents, in consultation with her doctors,
decided against neurosurgery to close her spinal lesion or shunt the
excess fluid from her brain.

They believed that because of the multiple

anomalies, she could only have a poor quality of life.

Because of the

level of the spinal lesion, they knew she would definitely have
paralysis and incontinence.

In addition, the brain malformations led to

little uncertainty that there would be some developmental delays with a
high probability of severe retardation.

Without surgery her anomalies

would be likely to lead to more bouts with of meningitis, urinary tract
infections and uncontrolled hydrocephalus.

It was reported in the press
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that without surgery, she would probably live for two years, while with
treatment she could live for twenty.^

In addition to considerations about patient characteristics, Jane
Doe's parents and clinicians considered treatment characteristics in
making decisions about her care.

While neurosurgical procedures were

withheld to close her back lesion and shunt the excess fluid from her
brain, they did give antibiotics to treat her meningitis.

They also

presumably provided such "treatments" as a sterile environment by
putting her in an isolette and covering her lesion with a sterile
dressing.

It is likely that Jane Doe's caretakers considered

neurosurgery to be extraordinary treatment which could be withheld, but
felt that antibiotics constituted ordinary treatment and may have
believed it was mandatory (especially after the prospect of legal
intervention was raised).

It is also possible that the antibiotics had

been started soon after birth, and that her caretakers believed that
once started, the treatment had to be continued (see Chapter VI, section
on

withholding/withdrawing).

The decision to continue the antibiotics was probably crucial for
Jane Doe's survival.

Without the antibiotics, she probably would have

died quickly from meningitis.

She recovered from the meningitis and

remained in the hospital for about six months.

Her back lesion closed

'
Although these figures were repeated numerous times in the press,
some knowledgeable clinicians felt that the time estimates had no real
physiological basis. They said that without treatment she could
certainly die sooner and with treatment she could live longer than
predicted.)
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spontaneously, reducing the chance of a subsequent infection.

When her

hydrocephalus progressed and caused discomfort, her parents agreed to
neurosurgery to shunt fluid from her brain.
parents brought her home.

After the surgery her

Her neurosurgeon says that he sees no reason

to revise his original prognosis; he thinks she will be severely
O

retarded and will remain bedridden for her whole life.

In some situations, clinicians and parents may feel that they are
almost marking time waiting for an event to occur which will lead to
death.

If death does not occur, given the chosen treatment choices, new

choices may be made to change the level of treatment.

For example, in the case of George, a badly asphyxiated baby with
a serious heart lesion, clinicians continued all medications and kept
the baby on the respirator while waiting for the baby to die.

That way,

they did not have to stop ongoing treatments nor withhold more ordinary
treatments.

In that way it is easier to think of the management plan

allowing a natural death to occur than if decisions are made to withdraw
treatments.

After a few days, however, George, was still lying

unconscious in his isolette, insensitive to pain.
reevaluated.

The care plan was

Some of the more aggressive medications were now seen as

prolonging his death and were decreased, allowing death to occur sooner.

8
The latest report on her condition that I heard, on 60 Minutes in
the Spring of 1986, said that Jane Doe (now two and a half) doesn't walk
but can sit by herself and say a few words and attends a special nursery
program.
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Since clinicians may feel that only some treatments may be
withheld in a given situation, if a baby doesn't die after a decision is
made to limit a particular treatment, clinicians may feel that they have
no option to withhold other treatments at a later point in time.

For

example, Tony, a full term baby was born without a heart beat (Apgars
O/l) because of an abruption (separation of the placenta from the wall
of the uterus); some might have considered him stillborn.

Resuscitation

attempts were started immediately, After a long period of time without
oxygen he was resuscitated, but he was badly asphyxiated.

Very aggressive treatments were given in the beginning, when it
was hoped that the baby might be able to have an acceptable quality of
life.

By the time the severity of the condition was appreciated (which

left the baby unable to be conscious of his surroundings and having
periods of violent uncontrolled seizures) his condition had stabilized.
He was no longer on a respirator.

Although he had arrested (his heart

stopped a number of times) at the beginning, he no longer arrested.

Clinicians at the institution where he was being cared for felt
that they had no options to withhold other treatments which would lead
to his death.

He suffered with five bouts of pneumonia.

His attending

physician said that before the Baby Doe regulations she would have
withheld antibiotics but now she felt she had no choice but to give them
whenever he needed them.

He lived five months before finally succumbing

to pneumonia, even with antibiotics.

(See Chapter VIII, section on the

Baby Doe regulations).
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Translating from Cultural Category to Behavior

When decisions are made about the care of catastrophically ill
babies, they are generally made in terms of the culturally defined
categories of patient condition, treatments and goals.

As discussed

above, there is wide variation in how these are interpreted.

Not only

does this affect how information is categorized about the patients,
treatments, and goals to be used in the decision making process, but it
also affects how decisions are translated into behavior.

For example, if a baby is born with severe anomalies, the
attending physicians may meet with the parents and together they may
decide to give "no extraordinary treatments."

Those providing direct

care for the infant must translate that decision, made in terms of the
cultural category - extraordinary care - into choices about behavioral
acts.

There may be consensus that for such a baby "no extraordinary

treatments" means no surgery and no resuscitation.

There may be

variation, however, in how clinicians interpret less aggressive
treatments.

For example, some may consider tube feedings or antibiotics

as "extraordinary care" in such a situation, while others may not

(see

Chapter VI, section on extraordinary care). After the act of decision
making takes place at the cognitive level, the meaning of the decision
still must be translated in order for behavior, or the actual treatment
choice, to take place.
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The implications for treatment behavior may not even be clear when
decision making addresses a choice to give or withhold a particular
treatment option.

For example, in the case of George, the badly

asphyxiated baby with a cardiac lesion discussed above, a decision was
clearly made not to do open heart surgery.

A note about the decision

not to perform surgery was written in the chart.

The implications of the decision for other treatments however, was
not absolutely clear.

Although the attending physician, Hal, assumed

that the baby would arrest (his heart would stop) and he would not be
resuscitated, he had not written a DNR (do not resuscitate) order in the
chart.

One of the neonatal fellows said that if the baby had a cardiac

arrest, he would try to resuscitate.

Later, the attending wrote a note

on the chart, and clarified the choice in regard to arrest status.^

Caring for a catastrophically ill infant often involves management
choices about scores of possible medications, procedures, and tests for
a single baby each day.

While the major decisions, such as whether or

not to do surgery or an arrest page, may be discussed explicitly by the
parents and senior physicians in a unit, many of the seemingly more
minor treatment questions may never be specifically addressed.

While

many of the decisions are obvious, following the general norm of
treating only up to a given level of aggressiveness (e.g.

if the baby

has been taken off a respirator so that she may be allowed to die, no
one would put in chest tubes, a very invasive procedure), other

The relative aggressiveness of the two treatments is unclear.
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treatment behavior reflects preattentive decisions, sometimes made bymore junior clinicians.

In some cases, such decisions may reflect the goals which guided
the initial decision to withhold treatment.

For example, further

treatments may be withheld in an effort not to do harm by prolonging
suffering.

In other cases, the standard practices which guide treatment

for the vast majority of infants in the unit, for whom the goal is to
preserve life, are carried out for the infants for whom preserving life
has been seen as causing harm.

In some cases, such practices may be

reexamined, in others they go unquestioned.

One example

in which such standard practice was challenged only

by a bit of black humor

occurred in the case of an infant with a high

level myelomeningocele.

A decision had been made not to treat the baby

with the presumption that he would die of meningitis (an infection from
the open lesion).

A sign had been placed on his isolette "Wear gloves

for diaper changes!1 Someone had scribbled graffiti on the bottom of the
sign asking "Why?" The usual practice for caring for a baby with an open
lesion is to take measure to prevent infection.
was waiting for the baby to die of an infection.

In this case, everyone
Sometimes no one

questions the continuation of usual practices when the goals of
treatment change.
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Summary

This chapter discusses the way that the goals of medical treatment
- to cure, to care, to preserve life and to do no harm, are culturally
defined.

Material is also presented on how clinicians make decisions

about how to treat, guided by the norms of decision making which
indicate how one is to try to achieve the goals of treatment given the
characteristics of patient conditions and treatments.

Norms of decision

making about giving treatment to infants who could have a good quality
of life, who are terminal, and who would be expected to have a poor
quality of life are discussed.

Finally, the way in which decisions are

translated into treatment behavior is examined.

Numerous case examples

are provided.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

RAPIDLY MOVING HISTORY: CHANGE IN CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DECISION MAKING
FOR CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS

In Chapters V, VI, and VII, I have examined how clinicians
conceptualize the question of treatment choice for catastrophically ill
newborns, discussing some of the categories, goals and norms which guide
treatment behavior.

In this chapter, I will discuss change in the

context of decision making, and the effects of change on the
conceptualization of treatment choice and on treatment behavior.

I will

begin with a discussion of changes in the conceptualization of treatment
for infants with two conditions - spina bifida and extreme prematurity.
This will be followed by a discussion of the Baby Doe Directives and
clinicians' interpretation of their meaning for treatment choice.
Finally, this chapter concludes with a more general discussion of
changes in the conceptualization of categorization of patient condition,
treatments and goals, changes in norms, and changes in treatment
behavior.

Changes in Treatment for Infants with Spina Bifida

Prior to the late 1950s, medicine was unable to provide many
treatments which could be of benefit to most infants born with spina
bifida.

Most babies who had open lesions died from meningitis soon
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after birth; others whose spinal lesions closed spontaneously usually
developed hydrocephalus which led to death for some and severe mental
retardation for others.
complications.

Still others died from renal or other

Although some physicians attempted aggressive treatment

(Ingraham and Hamlin 1943; Bluestone and Deaver 1953), most did not
recommend surgery.

Most physicians were guided by the norm that

dictated that useless treatments should not be inflicted on hopelessly
ill infants.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, developments in neurosurgical
techniques, medical technology and antibiotic therapy enabled physicians
to close the open lesion, shunt for hydrocephalus, and better manage
renal complications.

This change led to changes in the way clinicians

thought about treatment for babies with spina bifida; they were no
longer considered "unsalvageable" but were now "treatable."

Most of the literature on the treatment of children with spina
bifida entailed debates about how to optimize medical management to
assure survival and to increase functioning.

Not all clinicians,

however, felt that infants with Spina Bifida should always be treated
aggressively.

For example, as early as 1960, a surgeon, Dr. Bucy, said of his
ideas about the management of children with spina bifida "The difference
of opinion between [himself and two other surgeons] is not one of
neurosurgical methods but one of philosophy" (1962:65).

He went on to
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give his view that

Modern methods have brought us new responsibilities. It is
not sufficient that we merely sustain life with expert surgery and
the use of blood transfusions, intravenous fluids, gastric
intubation, tracheotomy, antibiotics, and with expert nursing
care. We must sustain life with hope and human decency, not just
life under any circumstances. We must whenever possible sustain
life with a minimum of physical and mental suffering. The
decisions related to such problems are difficult ones to make, but
we cannot escape them nor solve them by falling back upon a rule
of "life at any cost and under any conditions." In these various
situations we must ask ourselves if we would want to live or see
our children, relatives, or friends live under those
circumstances.
(pp. 69-70)

for the next few years, however, there was little written questioning
the benefits of aggressive treatment.

In general, there was great

optimism about the promise of the newly developed treatments.

At many

centers, such as Sheffield in England, babies with spina bifida were
aggressively treated with the newly developed techniques (Sharrard,
Zachary and Lorber, 1967).

Although some centers did practice selective

non-treatment during this period there was relatively little mention
about such practices in the literature.

The first published exchange^ on withholding treatment from
newborns that became part of a debate that developed in the clinical

^
There were a few articles and letters questioning the benefits of
aggressive treatment for all infants with spina bifida (See Chapter III,
section on withholding treatment).
2
This article, which does not cite any earlier articles discussing
a position of selective non-treatment for "ethical" reasons, is the
earliest article revealed by numerous computer searches on the topic.
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literature in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was written by R.B.
Zachary, a pediatric surgeon at Sheffield England.

The article, entitle

"Ethical and Social Aspects of Treatment of Spina Bifida" appeared in
The Lancet (Aug. 3, 1968, pp. 274-76).

It some ways it is a strange

first article, for it is an argument for aggressive treatment which
presumably was the norm at the time.

It reflects the fact, however,

that the value of always treating aggressively was contemporaneously
being questioned by a number of clinicians.

In fact, at Zachary's own

center, John Lorber, the first widely recognized advocate of selective
non-treatment, was probably already discussing the criteria for decision
making which he proposed in print three years later (see Chapter II and
below). ■

In that first article, Zachary wrote that there are three
alternative courses of treatment available following the birth of a baby
with spina bifida:

(1 ) he should be killed. (2 ) he should be encouraged to die;
whether by giving no treatment at all (e.g. no feeding) or by not
treating complications (e.g. no treatment of infection by
antibiotics; or (3) he should be encouraged to live.
(p. 274)
He goes on to state:
The ethical principle that direct and deliberate killing of a
human being is wrong is widely accepted on a religious and
philosophical basis, and has been the basis of medical practice
since the time of Hippocrates, and even earlier. ... The second
alternative has no better justification. To leave a child without
food is to kill it as deliberately and directly as if one was
cutting its throat. Even the prescription of antibiotics for
infection, such as pneumonia, must now be considered as ordinary
care of patients.
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Once the principle has been established that the child
should be encouraged to live, we are in a position to consider
which method of management gives the child the best chance to
live, and secondly, which method of treatment will reduce the
handicap to a minimum.
(p. 274)

In the next few pages, I will use the concepts developed in
Chapters IV through VII to discuss the debate that followed Zachary's
article.

At the time that Zachary published his article, John Lorber was
conducting a follow up study, on the basis of which he was to propose
criteria for selective non-treatment of some infants with spina bifida
(1971).

As in other fields of medicine (see Chapter II) physicians and

others challenged the norm that a physician should always try to
preserve life and that doing otherwise was to "do harm."

This was

evidenced in letters following Zachary's article in the Lancet.

R.C. Sanders called Zachary's ethical justification for treatment
"shallow and cruel" and wrote:
...It is no longer acceptable that the preservation of life as
such is the doctor's most important task. We have now considered
the patients well being and happiness to be equally at stake. ...
If long term survival entails many operations, much pain and
disfigurement, no ability to lead a normal life because of
incontinence and paraplegia and mental strain and distress to
parents, should we always attempt it?

He was thus asserting that there is now acceptance of a new norm which
allows physicians not to attempt to prolong life (Sanders 1968, p. 457).
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Zachary responded that Dr. Sanders missed the point of his paper.
He reasserted that babies should not be "killed" (in his framework, the
only alternative to treatment) and states that "the main purpose of
treatment is not to save the child's life but to improve his function"
which, he writes, the child with spina bifida "deserves."

He also

challenges Sanders negative evaluation of the "well being and happiness"
of children with spina bifida by inviting him to see the children at the
follow-up clinic (Zachary 1968a).

That exchange was followed by a subsequent letter by Ian G. Wickes
in The Lancet (1968) which stated that there is another alternative
beside "killing" and "treating" which he identifies as "to let nature
take it's course."

In terms of our analysis of cultural categories and

norms, Wickes here asserted the existence of another category beside
"killing" and "treating" He stated that without active intervention,
over 90% of the untreated babies die within the first year.

He ends the

letter by stating:
One can argue that [surgery] is the baby's fundamental right, but
have we forgotten that parents and their living children also have
rights? Should they not also be considered and consulted?

Wickes not only proposed a new category, but also addressed another goal
beside treatment for the good of the child in suggesting attention to
the interests of other family members.

In a letter in the Oct. 12, 1968 issue of The Lancet, A. A.
Fernandez-Serrats, A.N. Guthkelch and S.A. Parker criticized Wickes for
not defining the phrase "letting nature take its course" which they
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characterize as highly ambiguous.

By doing this they questioned the

validity of the category, or, at least its applicability in some cases.
They went on to challenge the benefit of Wilkes 90% mortality.

They

stated that even among the most severely affected, those with open
thoracolumbar myelocele, with adequate surgical treatment 35% survive to
the age of 16 and 70% of the survivors are of normal intelligence.

Here

they challenged the evaluation of Wilkes in placing patients in a
category of having a poor outcome, and assert that the outcome is better
than he suggests.

In the same issue, another letter, by P.F. Ellison Nash,
criticized Wilkes for denying the neonates the right to a surgical
opinion challenging the ability of individuals like Wilkes to make the
evaluation of prognosis.

He also stated that with treatment, the

survivors would have been spared brain damage and paralysis which they
did suffer without surgery.

Pointing out that a decision not to treat

may cause harm, not only by killing, he wrote that denying surgery
causes those who do survive to have avoidable impairments.

Finally, he

tied this ideological dispute to another debated social issue by
writing: "Dr. Wickes is extending the principles of social abortion into
the neonatal period.

This influence is unhealthy in the nurseries of

maternity units.11

Already, in this first exchange on the issue of selective non
treatment in the clinical literature, the range of responses in terms of
changes in categories and norms have been illustrated.

The participants

in the exchange have debated about the appropriateness of
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classifications, proposed and questioned new categories, and justify
their behavior on the basis of different goals and norms.

Since then, an extensive literature has developed in which
clinicians, lawyers, philosophers, and others have continued the debate
about social and ethical issues in the treatment of infants born with
spina bifida (see Chapter III).

As discussed on Chapters V, VI, and

VII, there continues to be debate about the meaning of categories such
as "a good quality of life" and about the importance of distinctions
between such categories as "withholding care" and "killing" and whether
or not quality of life considerations should be important in decision
making about care.

Treatment decisions for infants born with spina bifida have varied
widely in their level of aggressiveness.

Some babies have received very

aggressive treatment while for others, some treatments have been
withheld.

The ideological foundations of treatment decisions have been

diverse as well.

It is difficult to say exactly what changes have taken place in
the conceptualization of treatment choice for infants with spina bifida.
There are no statistical data on treatment in large numbers of actual
cases through time, nor even comparable surveys of attitudes.

From

talking to clinicians and discussions in the clinical literature, it
seems that there have been some changes over the past two decade.

This

may be due to changes in attitudes about the possibilities for an
acceptable quality of life with disabilities, partly as a result of the
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disabilities rights movement.

It also may be due to changing

conceptions of the acceptability of passive euthanasia in some
circumstances.

Although similar arguments still take place about the definitions
of categories, and the applicable norms, it seems clinicians are less
likely to advocate the most extreme positions.

Clinicians now seem more

likely to think that it is possible for an infant to have a decent
quality of life with a low level impairment.

It also seems that

clinicians are less likely to take a position arguing for everything
possible to be done to preserve life in all cases.

In the late 1960s,

it seemed that many infants with low level lesions were not receiving
surgery, while many with high level lesions and hydrocephalus were
receiving surgery.

It now appears that most infants with low level

lesions are treated aggressively, while those with high level lesions
and other serious impairments are less likely to receive treatment.
Although there isn't consensus about treatment, there seems to be
somewhat more agreement about treatment choice than in the years
immediately after the new treatments were developed.

Treatment of Very Low Birthweight Premature Infants

Unlike the situation for treatment of infants with spina bifida,
there have been very clear changes in the treatment of very low
birthweight premature infants.

Rapid improvements in the technology for
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the treatment of small premature infants have been followed by more
aggressive treatment for smaller and smaller babies.

Whereas infants under 1500 or 1000 grams (450 grams = 1 pound)
were rarely treated in the past, the lower weight limit thought to
indicate the threshold for viability has dropped lower and lower.

Now,

aggressive treatment is routine even for infants of 700 or 800 grams,
and is becoming more common for still smaller infants at many
institutions.

A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine (Hack, and
Fanaroff 1986) documented changes in treatment practices during the
period, July, 1982 to June, 1984 for infants at one neonatal unit.

The

study showed that during the first year of the study, no infants under
700 grams were put on a respirator, during the second year, smaller
infants, weighing as little as 400 grams were put on respirators.

This

change in treatment practice reflected a change in the categorizations
of the infants' conditions.

During the first year, the deaths of

infants tended to be attributed to "immature lung development considered
to be incompatible with extrauterine survival" (p. 662).

Later, after

such infants were treated and some survived, the infants were seen as
viable; the deaths of infants in the same weight category came to be
seen as due to disease related or treatment related causes.

Another change that took place during the past two decades has
been changes in the conceptualizations about treatments.

Such

treatments choices as the use of respirators and heart surgery for
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newborns were fairly new and experimental at the beginning of neonatal
intensive care.

Since they are very invasive and costly, and were new

and experimental, they were seen as very aggressive treatments and their
use was considered fairly extraordinary when they were first used.

As

their use proved to be successful in preventing mortality and morbidity,
and as they have come to be used routinely, their use has come to be
seen as fairly ordinary.

For example, while the use of respirators and

intravenous feedings at first seemed extraordinary for small premature
babies, their use now seems ordinary.

While such treatments might have

only been used in special circumstances at first, now they are used most
of the time unless a conscious decision is made not to use them.

There also appear to have been other changes in the
conceptualization of treatment choice for premature infants.

While in

the 1960s and early 1970s, the salvageability of the infant seemed to be
the key factor guiding treatment choice, following the questioning of
the aggressiveness of treatment for infants with well defined lesions
such as spina bifida, clinicians came to question the benefits of very
aggressive treatments for some premature infants.

One of the important

differences between premature infants, and many other infants for whom
the benefits of treatment have been questioned is the degree of
uncertainty about patient condition.

While the range of impairments is

more predictable for infants with conditions such as spina bifida, the
range of possible defects are generally much broader for a premature
infant.

Some of the differences in treatment over time for premature

infants, seems to have been associated with changes in beliefs about the
predictability of impairment.
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One of the major problems for premature infants is that they are
at high risk for having bleeds in their brains.

Depending on a number

of factors, including how extensive the bleeding is, and where in the
brain it occurs, such bleeding is associated with mental retardation
and/or cerebral palsy and other impairments.

In the late 1970s, when I

started my field work, such bleeding could only be detected at Columbia
through the use of a spinal tap.

If blood was detected in the fluid, it

was inferred that there had been bleeding in the brain.
bleeding and the location was not known.

The amount of

It was a neither a very

reliable nor specific test.

The development of CAT scans and ultrasound equipment enabled the
visualization of the bleeds in the brain, and the clinicians then had
more knowledge about the extent and location of bleeding in the brain.
A system for scoring the severity of the bleeds was devised.

Early

follow-up studies indicated that infants with grade I or grade II bleeds
had little impairment, but that infants with grade IV bleeds invariably
had serious impairments if they survived.

With more certainty about the level of impairments, some
clinicians now felt that they had more reliable information which could
be used to predict future quality of life for some infants.

With less

uncertainty, they felt more comfortable recommending more aggressive
treatment for infants who did not have serious bleeds, and for
recommending the withholding of aggressive treatments from those who had
grade IV bleeds.

Later studies revealed that the association between
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the grade of the bleed and the level of impairment was not as strong as
had previously been thought.

In fact, some of the infants who had grade

IV bleeds only had mild impairments.

Again, with increased uncertainty,

many clinicians have been more reluctant to withhold treatment.

Changes in the ability to treat very low birthweight infants, as
well as changes in the ability to diagnose and treat second trimester
fetuses before birth, are currently leading to changes in the way that
infants/fetuses born before 28 weeks are conceptualized.

Before the

modern era of neonatal intensive care, babies born before 28 weeks of
gestational age used to be classified as miscarriages and were not even
thought to have lived.

Now technological developments enable survival

of many babies born after 25 to 28 weeks gestational age, and of some
babies who are born even earlier.

Currently, use of sophisticated

technology, has brought the ability to sustain the life of prematurely
born infants to very close to the 24 week threshold frequently used as
an upper limit for legal abortions.

Refinement of the use of respirators will not lower the current
threshold, because the use of a respirator depends on a level of lung
development which rarely occurs before 24 weeks.

There are, however,

other types of technology which may enable the survival after even less
time in utero.

ECMO, an external oxygenation system is currently only

used for infants over about 1500 grams.

At the present time, technical

problems prevent the use of ECMO for smaller infants.

It is expected,

however, that these technological problems will be overcome within the
next decade (Weil, personal communication, 1986).

Then, with the use of
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this very aggressive treatment, it will probably be possible to sustain
the life of infants born before 24 weeks; it would probably be very
costly in terms of economic costs and staff time and equipment, and the
risk of death and of severe impairment would probably be very high.

This will lead to questions which are ethically difficult and
complex concerning the management of both "wanted" and "unwanted"
pregnancies/babies.
"viability."

Many will revolve around the conceptions of

Viability is generally seen as occurring when a fetus is

able to survive on its own.

Viability has been seen as an important

category in norms pertaining to abortion and refusal of fetal therapy.
Technological developments which would lead to viability for the second
trimester fetus would present problems with the use of current norms.

Viability is usually taken to mean the ability to survive outside
of the mother.

Currently, the type of support necessary to enable

survival is not considered.

Like old definitions of death, this

definition of viability may prove problematic for treatment choice
decisions.

As there was a change in the conceptualization of death to

include social as well as physiological criteria, a change in the
conceptualization of viability may be necessary for the development of
clinical norms to guide the management of the fetus/infant.
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The Baby Doe Regulations and Clinical Decision Making

Although widely discuss by clinicians and bioethicists, decision
making for catastrophically ill newborns received little public
attention until the early 1980s.

It was, however, of concern to two

political interest groups: The Right-to-Life movement and Disability
Rights groups.

One staunch right-to-life activist, who had a special interest in
the care of newborns, and who played a major role in bringing the issues
wider public attention, was Surgeon General Koop.

Before appointment to

public office, Dr. Koop was a well known pediatric surgeon.

Speaking

against abortion in 1979 he stated:

The first domino to fall was abortion on demand, and it has split
this country as no other social issue since the practice of
slavery. The second domino to fall was infanticide. It fell
silently because unlike abortion, which is a public issue,
infanticide is practiced behind the shielding facade of the
hospital. The third domino is euthanasia: it has been struck and
is falling.
(Brozan 1979)

After publicity about Baby Doe (see Chapter III), a child with
Down's syndrome who died in 1982 because relatively routine surgery had
been withheld, at the urging of Dr. Koop and others concerned with the
care of newborns, the Reagan administration issued a directive stating
that "Discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants
...is prohibited by

federal law [in institutions receiving "federal

financial assistance"] (Department of Health and Human Services 1982).
The regulation was based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
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1973, civil right legislation designed to protect the right of the
handicapped to education and employment.

For this regulation, the administration took a broad view of
federal law in order to deal with an issue usually considered to be
either under the jurisdiction of state governments or not subject to
government interference (see Chapter III), by defining Medicaid and
Medicare funds to hospitals as "federal financial assistance" and
withholding treatment as "discrimination" (a position which had been
advocated by some Disability Rights activists).

During the first year, this regulation received relatively little
notice from clinicians, bioethicists, and other who had been concerned
with the treatment of newborns.

It did however, receive much support

from some people involved in the disability rights and the right-to-life
movements.

In 1983, the President's support from many in the Right

Wing, especially those concerned with the abortion issues, had fallen.
He had been elected to office with a promise to outlaw abortion.

As the

tenth anniversary of the Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision approached,
he had made little progress on the issue.

In March of 1983, at a

national meeting of Evangelicals, President announced that he planned to
enforce rules to prevent the withholding treatment from handicapped
newborns.

He announced that a "Baby Doe Hotline" would be set up to

facilitate the reporting of cases in which treatment was withheld.

All

hospitals would be required to post signs informing people about the
Baby Doe Hotline (New York Times 3/9/83:A18).
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Political alliances surrounding the regulations have cut across
traditional political boundaries.

Not only were these "Baby Doe

Directives" applauded by Right to Life and Disability Rights advocates,
but also by some members of Civil Liberties organizations.

They felt

that this interpretation of the law would oblige hospitals to abide by
all other civil rights statutes as well.

Most health care

professionals, bioethicists, people active in the women's health
movement and some civil liberties activists, however, opposed the
Directives.

They were seen as an infringement on the privacy of the

physician/patient relationship, on the right to refuse treatment, and on
the ability of parents to make decisions for their children.
to the Directives also came from some conservatives.

Opposition

They feared that

the broad interpretation of the law would require the federal government
to become involved in investigating other alleged instances of
discrimination in other institutions (Russell and Barringer 1983), and
also feared further encroachment on the State on the private decision
making of its citizens.

Later in March, the administration issued regulations
establishing the Baby Doe hotline, requiring signs, and authorizing the
federal investigation of instances of possible non-compliance.

The

regulations included the following requirement:
Under section 504 it is unlawful for a recipient of federal
financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant
nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required
to correct a life-threatening condition if: (1 ) the withholding is
based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; (2 ) the handicap
does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically
contraindicated.
(DHHS 1983)
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Many commentators believed that the regulations required the
provision of all possible treatments to sustain life without regard to
the baby's condition, including very aggressive treatments for very
seriously impaired babies and terminally ill infants (Murray and Caplan
1985), Many clinicians, however, interpreted the directives differently.
Because of the conceptual model they used to understand treatment
choice, they did not interpret the regulations as meaning that all
treatments had to be given without regard to the baby's condition.
Rather, many believed that the regulations would require giving more
treatments than they would recommend, but that even under the
directives, it would be possible to withhold the most extraordinary
treatments.

They used both characteristics of patient condition and

characteristics of treatments in making decisions about which treatments
they felt it would be permissible to withhold under the Baby Doe
directives.

The influence of the clinicians' conceptual model on their
interpretations of Baby Doe Directives was evidenced on the responses to
the survey which I distributed in the Spring of 1983, soon after plans
to enforce the directives were first announced.

For every treatment

choice, respondents were more likely to think it would be required by
the directives than they were to feel it would be best for the baby.^

Paired t-tests between treatments recommended and thought required
were significant for every treatment option; p < 0.05, for most
treatment options, p < 0 .0 1 .
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TABLE V I I I

-

1

TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS WOULD RECOMMEND
AND TREATMENTS RESPONDENTS THOUGHT WERE REQUIRED
BY THE BABY DOE DIRECTIVES - SPRING 1983
n = 2A94
CONDITION AND TREATMENT

WOULD
RECOMMEND

THOUGHT
REQUIRED

%

%

76
56
32
13
3
2
2

90
82
75
63
31
A7
26

90
81
76
65

97
96
95
91

85
60
2A
1A
13
10
8

93
83
68
57
A9
51
A6

BABY WHO IS ANENCEPHALIC
Feedings by mouth
Tube feeding
Antibiotics
Resuscitation in the delivery room
Cardiac catheterization
Arrest page
Open heart surgery
BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES
(BEFORE CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS)
Nutrition and fluids
Antibiotics
Resuscitation
Respirator

BABY WHO HAS MULTIPLE ANOMALIES
(AFTER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS
INDICATES TRISOMY 13)
Nutrition and fluids
Antibiotics
Respirator
Surgery for cleft palate
Cardiac catheterization
Arrest page
Open heart surgery

For the Baby with trisomy 13, and for questions on resuscitation
in the delivery room and an arrest page for the anencephalic baby, n =
119; actual base varies slightly depending on the number of ineligible
answers (in all cases, ineligible answers less than 5% of total n).
4
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TABLE

VIII - 2

CONDITION AND TREATMENT

(continued)
WOULD
RECOMMEND
%

THOUGHT
REQUIRED
%

93
92
64
53
39
26
13

98
96
78
88
66
55
42

91

98
95
90
76
69
57

A SMALL PREMATURE BABY WITH
AN IVH
Nutrition and fluids
Suctioning
resuscitation in delivery room
Increased respiratory settings
Pressors
Arrest page
Kidney dialysis
A BABY WITH DOWN'S SYNDROME
AND DUODENAL ATRESIA
Intravenous feedings
Antibiotics
Surgery for intestinal defect
Cardiac catheterization
Open heart surgery
Kidney dialysis

88

87
71
59
28
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This disparity ranged from 3 to 45% (see Chapter VIII, Figure 1).
Twenty-one percent of the respondents felt that every treatment would be
required in every case.

However, most respondents thought that even

under the directives, some treatments would not be required.

In

general, there was consensus (more than 75% agreement) that the
treatments rated most ordinary would be required but there was
controversy (less than 75% agreement) about the treatments rated more
extraordinary.

For no treatment was there consensus (more that 75%

agreement) that it would not be required by the directives.

However, in

all cases except that of the baby with Down's syndrome, more than half
of the respondents felt that some treatments could be withheld.
Opinions about which treatments would not be required varied from case
to case.

Almost three quarters of the respondents did not think that

cardiac surgery would be required for an anencephalic baby, and only

11 %

thought that it was definitely required.

Many respondents indicated that they were confused about the
proper interpretation of the directives by circling that many treatments
were "probably" as opposed to "definitely" required or not required.
Not only were they unsure whether the Baby Doe Directives would require
treatments that they would not recommend, but, in addition, some
respondents were not sure about whether they would be required to give
treatments that they would personally recommend.

For example, about

half of the respondents were not sure that cardiac surgery would be
required for a baby with Down's syndrome.^

This included 24 respondents

5
Includes respondents who circled "probably" required, "probably
not" required and "definitely not" required.
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who thought that surgery would not be required, even though they would
recommend it as best for the baby.

In general, respondents were likely to think that all treatments
that they themselves would recommend would also be required by the
directives.

In addition, most felt that some of the more aggressive

treatments, which they would not personally recommend, would also be
required.

The pattern of responses reflected the same ranking of

treatments according to aggressiveness as discuss above in Chapter VI.^

Later versions of Baby Doe Regulations

The original Doe Regulations were over turned by a Court decision
in April of 1983.

Since then, there have been a number of revisions of

the Baby Doe directives based on antidiscrimination statutes (Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
rejected by the Courts.

Each revision, in turn, has been

Most recently, in June 1986, the Supreme upheld

a lower Court decision, rejecting the regulations (Bowen v American
Hospital Association 1986).

At the same time as regulations were developed based on Section
504, proponents of federal involvement in neonatal decision making also
were attempting to have regulations passed in Congress specifically

®
The Guttman scores for the treatments thought required in each
case were all above 0.95. The correlation of the aggressiveness of
recommended treatments and aggressiveness of treatments thought required
was significant (p < .0 0 1 ).
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aimed at regulating the withholding of treatment from newborns.

Efforts

to tie requirements for treatment directly to health care legislation
failed.

As part of a compromise, most supporters and opponents

of the

original Section 504 regulations agreed to support anAmendment

to the

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act defining the withholding of
medically indicated treatment as child abuse.

The act stated:

The term 'withholding of medically indicated treatment1
means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening
conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, inthe treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be
most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such
condition, except that the term does not include the failure to
provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or
medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or
physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is
chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such
treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in
ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening
conditions, or (iii) otherwise would be futile in terms of the
survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment
would be virtually futile in terms of the survival [sic.] of the
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane.
(U.S. Congress 1984:4)

The amendment also stated that the Department of Health and Human
Services should publish guidelines
to encourage the establishment within health-care facilities of
committees which would serve the purposes of educating hospital
personnel and families of disabled infants with life-threatening
conditions, recommending institutional policies and guideline
concerning the withholding of medically indicated treatment ...
from such infants, and offering counsel and review in cases
involving disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.
(U.S. Congress 1984:6)
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While the language of the new Amendment is fairly strong, the
enforcement mechanism is quite weak.

The harshest penalty is that

states that fail to comply will lose relatively small amount of Federal
money targeted for Child Abuse agencies.

These already overburdened

agencies are unlikely to take a very active role in seeking to expand
their responsibilities into an area which many feel ill-equipped to
handle.

The comprise was acceptable to almost all parties because it
addressed many of the concerns of each faction.

One objective of the

Reagan administration was to accomplishment something that could be seen
as a positive step by the Right-to-Life movement.

The Baby Doe

regulations enabled him to take a strong ideological stance on a Right
to Life issue and to claim victory.

Many of the Right to Life and Disability Rights advocates were
pleased.

The issue of discriminatory non-treatment of newborns had

gained national prominence.

Much of their concern had always been non

treatment of newborns with mild to moderate impairments, specifically
treatment for infants with Downs' syndrome and surgically correctable
intestinal defects.

There is evidence to suggest that at least the

public positions of many bioethicists and clinicians had shifted; many
now state that, of course non-treatment of such newborns would be
unacceptable.

I think that it would probably be difficult for such

treatment decisions to be made today.
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The associations of health care professionals and many civil
liberties advocates could also accept the revised regulations.

Their

main concern was that the original Baby Doe Regulation would have made
it difficult to withhold aggressive treatments from critically ill
infants with complex medical conditions.

The ambiguous language of the

current regulations which permit the withholding of "virtually futile
treatments" are seen by many as allowing the withholding of
inappropriate treatments.

Finally, opponents were also pleased that the new regulations
situated review and enforcement of decisions at a more local level.
While in the past, many clinicians had opposed defining the withholding
of treatments as child abuse, many now saw such a vehicle as a better
alternative than direct federal intervention.

The concept of hospital

based review committees, also previously opposed by many clinicians, was
now endorsed as a means for keeping review within the institution.
Since the committees are established by hospitals, and are usually run
by physicians from the neonatal intensive care units who appoint the
members, in many ways they reinforce rather than challenge the clinical
model of decision making.

The implications of the recent Supreme Court decision for the
political struggles around Baby Doe Regulations are unclear.

The Court

affirmed the right of parents stating, "In broad outline, state law
vests decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first instance,
subject to review in exceptional cases by the State acting as parens
patriae ,n Although the Court did not specifically review the child abuse
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amendments, in reviewing the regulations based on section 504, the Court
did use strong language in stating "State child protective services
agencies are not field offices of the HHS bureaucracy, and they many not
be conscripted against their will as the foot soldiers in a federal
crusade" (Bowen v American Hospital Association 1986:30).

Following the

Supreme Court decision, there will likely be renewed efforts by
supporters of federal involvement to develop a clear federal
justification for intervention; opponents to government intervention
will continue efforts to limit the government role.

Effects of the Baby Doe Regulation on Clinical Decision Making

It is difficult to document the effects of the Baby Doe directives on
both the conceptualization of treatment choice and treatment behavior.
Some clinicians claim that adhering to the Regulations would involve
practicing bad medicine and claim that the regulations have affected
neither their thinking nor their behavior.

Numerous reports, however,

of very aggressive treatment for infants who previously probably would
not have received such treatment suggest that the regulations did affect
treatment in many cases.

It appears that the both the regulations themselves, and the media
coverage surrounding them and some of the non-treatment cases, have led
to some changes in the way that some clinicians conceptualize treatment
choice for catastrophically ill infants.

There appears to have been

some shifts, so that at least some clinicians, who might have supported
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withholding relatively non- aggressive treatments from infants with mild
to moderate impairments a few years ago, no longer will do so.

For

example, although some had previous thought that parents should be able
to withhold intestinal surgery from infants with Down's syndrome, now
virtually no clinicians publicly advocate such a position.

In addition

to the fact that many clinicians now feel that it would not be politic
to advocate such a position, it appears that many have truly changed
their opinions about the quality of life for infants with Down's
syndrome and some other disabilities.

Another change that seems to have occurred during the past few
years has been a change in some of language used to discuss treatment
decisions.

The term "best interest of the baby," which was used in the

President's Commission Report (1983), seems to have replaced "quality of
life" as the term most often used in discussing the rationale for
treatment decisions (Arras, forthcoming).

In part, this may be due to

the fact that some versions of the directives specifically state that
decisions based on "quality of life" criteria are not acceptable.

It

also seems to reiterate the importance of considering the value of
treatment from the perspective of the infant rather than the value of
treatment to others.

It appears that some clinicians who always felt uncomfortable
withholding treatment are using the directives as an excuse to justify
aggressive treatment in some circumstances.

Sometimes, clinicians have

used the directives as a means to compel parents and other clinicians to
accept their definition of the boundaries of acceptable choices.
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There has been a definite trend towards more aggressive treatment
since the announcement of the Baby Doe directives (NEJM editorial
3/6/86) but it is hard tell to what extent, if any, that represents an
acceleration of the trend toward more and more aggressive treatment of
infants which has characterized neonatology since it's inception.
Commenting on the New England Journal of Medicine editorial, a prominent
pediatrician said that the "Neonatology imperative" has always been to
"Do more and more of what you don't know how to do until you get better
at it."

He felt that the fact that almost all centers would now try to

rescue a 500 gram,

baby had less to do with the regulations than with

the generally aggressive attitude.

He claimed that directives do not

force such treatment; he believed that if people thought they were
treating because of the directives, they were over reacting (Bill Weil,
comments made a Hastings Center meeting 3/17/86).

It is clear that both because of the directives themselves, and
the general increased public awareness of the issue of decision making
for catastrophically ill infants, clinicians felt that they were more
likely to be prosecuted if they withhold treatment from infants.
Although some said that they do not let the possibility of prosecution
change the way they practice medicine, there were clinicians who were
clearly recommending treatments they would not have recommended a few
years before.

Although the Supreme Court decision does not actually change the
law, since the Baby Doe regulations had already been overturned, it
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seems likely to led to changes in clinicians conceptualization and
treatment practice.

Many clinicians had continued to believe that they

had to provide aggressive treatments as a requirement of federal law.
Now, some clinicians seem to feel that as a result of the Supreme Court
decision, such treatment is not longer required.

One might speculate

that many clinicians will be more likely to withhold treatment than
during the previous three years.

The increased public awareness and

widespread discussion of decision making in neonatology, however, will
probably make clinicians more somewhat more cautious in their decision
making than in the pre-Baby Doe era.

The affects of increased parental

awareness of the issues involved in neonatal decision making, if any,
are not yet know nor are the affects of the presence of ethics
committees.

General Changes in Conceptualization and Treatment Behavior

Since the late 1960s, when the issue of withholding life saving
treatment from catastrophically ill newborns was first discussed, there
seem to have been a number of changes in the way that relevant factors
have been conceptualized and some changes in norms and treatment
behavior.
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Changes in Categorization of Patient Condition

There have been some changes in the conceptualization of patient
condition characteristics.

Many clinicians seem to have changed their

view concerning the implications of some impairments on future quality
of life.

This probably reflects at least two factors.

First, there

appears to be both a general change in attitudes about the capacity of
people with impairments and of knowledge of programs and opportunities
for independent living, for employment for people with disabilities.

In

the early literature, the assumption was often made that people born
with spina bifida would not be able to marry or find employment.

One

rarely hears clinicians making such statements in discussions of
decisions for non-treatment today.

There also have been changes in

views of the capacity of people with Down's syndrome and other
conditions causing mild to moderate retardation.

With

deinstitutionalization and special education, and the resultant increase
in capabilities of people with developmental delays, the view of their
quality of life has changed as well.

In addition, I think that there has been a shift in what
capacities many clinicians see as necessary to permit a acceptable
quality of life.

In the beginning of the debate, the standard of

comparison was often the "normal" individual, and impairments which
caused limitations in particular functions were all seen to detract from
a good quality of life.

It was a type of deficit model, each deficit

took away from the capability to have a good quality of life.

Now,

clinicians seem more likely to focus on what the infant will be able to
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do which will enable the infant to have life satisfactions.

The focus

is now more on the capacities that the baby will have that will enable
the infant to derive benefit from continued life.

There is greater

realization that quality of life is more than a sum total ADLs
(measurement of function based on "activities of daily living") or of
the ability to perform specific functions.

I don't think that there has been a clear trend in either the
amount of uncertainty or how clinicians feel about uncertainty.

While

increased diagnostic capability and better treatments has increased
knowledge about diagnosis and prognosis with some conditions, new
treatments for which there has not yet been much follow-up, and greater
awareness of the range of outcomes with particular conditions, has
increased uncertainty about others.

Clinicians are still uncomfortable

about making decisions in the face of uncertainty, yet such decisions
continue to be unavoidable.

As clinicians have increased experience and better outcomes
treating particular conditions, these conditions have come to be
categorized as less critical.

For example, while the condition of a 800

gram premature baby may have seemed very critical 15 years ago, and
giving certain very aggressive treatments may have seemed to be
optional, the condition of such a baby no longer seems so critical and
many treatment would now be felt to be mandatory.

On the other hand,

there may now be more willingness to recognize babies with some
conditions as terminally ill, such as infant with trisomy 13 and 18, and
there is therefore more willingness to withhold some treatments.
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Changes in the Categorization of Treatments

There have also been shifts in how clinicians feel about a number
of characteristics of treatments.

In general, there has been a trend to

see many treatments as less aggressive than they would have been
considered in the past.

When treatments were new and were still

somewhat experimental, they were more likely to be seen as aggressive
than now when they have become accepted as part of standard practice.
For example, such treatments as respirators for small premature babies,
TPN (total IV feeding) and some forms of surgery, such as a PDA
ligation, are considered to be less aggressive now than they were in the
past.

Also, treatments have come to be seen as less aggressive relative

to newer treatments which are considered more aggressive.

For example,

now, after the development of ECMO, the respirator seems less aggressive
because it is no longer the most aggressive life support device for
respiratory functioning.

Some of the new treatments, however, such as

ECMO and infant heart transplants, are considered to be more aggressive
than any previous treatments.

There have also been changes in how clinicians categorize
treatments as ordinary or extraordinary.

Because some treatments are no

longer seen as being as aggressive as they had previously been thought
to be, there is a greater tendency to think of those treatment as more
ordinary.

On the other hand, clinicians appear to be more likely to

categorize treatments as ordinary or extraordinary on the basis of the
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presumed benefit to a patient rather than because of the aggressiveness
of the treatments.

Therefore, clinicians may be more likely to

characterize even less aggressive treatments as extraordinary in some
cases.

Although there is still disagreement among clinicians about how

to categorize many treatments, there appears to be consensus among
clinicians about categorizing the most aggressive treatments as
extraordinary for some patients who are terminally ill or severely
impaired, and those that are not very aggressive as ordinary, especially
for patients with a chance at a good prognosis.

It appears that they has been a shift in the way that many
clinicians feel about the distinction between withholding and
withdrawing treatment.

Clinicians seem more likely to see some changes

in management, such as increases in respirator settings, or restoring
treatments after diagnostic tests, as "new treatments," than previously.
Therefore, not giving such treatments may be more likely to be
categorized as withholding rather than withdrawing treatments.

There also appears to have been shifts in clinicians
conceptualization of active and passive euthanasia.

Most important,

clinicians seem to be more aware that many decisions they make affect
the nature and timing of death for their critically ill patients.
Therefore, they are more likely to see treatment choices as instances of
passive or active euthanasia that would have previously been thought of
as patient management decisions.

Also,, many clinicians are now more

conscious of the criteria they use to distinguish between active and
passive euthanasia.
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Clinicians are more often now aware of decisions as affecting the
course of life and death for their patients.
reasons.

This occurs for two

First, with more powerful medical technology, clinicians are

more able to postpone the moment of death, either by providing
treatments that will reverse a physiological process (e.g. performing
surgery to close an open lesions and prevent infection), substitute for
a physiological process by providing life support (such as a respirator
or dialysis), or by resuscitating the patient and restarting a vital
function which ceased.

In addition, however, clinicians now appear to

be aware that the use of biomedical means to prolong life, or the
withholding of such means, reflects a decisions.

In the past,

clinicians frequently omitted providing possible treatments which they
felt were inappropriate for patients with a given condition.

Such

decisions were usually seen as based on physiological criteria alone and
death was seen as due to the "natural history" of the disease.

Now

clinicians are more likely to see such decisions as reflecting value
criteria as well as physiological criteria.

They are less likely to see

the course of many diseases as reflecting the "natural history" of the
disease, but rather, as having a course in part determined by treatment
decisions.

When clinicians first became more conscious about the fact that
their decisions were causally associated with death for their patients,
many were disturbed.

Although some clinicians felt that any decision

which led to death was unacceptable, other clinicians wanted ways to
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable decisions associated with
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death.

Some clinicians came to see decisions which allowed death to

occur (passive euthanasia) as acceptable, while decisions which caused
death (active euthanasia) as unacceptable.

At first many clinicians

felt confused about whether particular treatment choices constituted
active or passive euthanasia.
clinicians.

There was much disagreement between

There continues to be disagreement between clinicians, and

many clinicians still feel conflicted about some particular decisions.
It appears that now, however, many clinicians feel more able to
categorize treatment choices for themselves as passive or active
euthanasia.

Within the medical community, consensus seems to be

developing that some treatment choices constitute passive euthanasia for
patients with some conditions, while other choices would constitute
active euthanasia.

Changes in Goals

Clinicians primary goal is still to cure their patients when ever
that is a possible outcome.

It appears that for some conditions,

clinicians may now be more willing to acknowledge that cure is not
possible.

In other cases, however, clinicians may be more likely to use

a wider definition of "normal," using functional rather than
physiological criteria.

It appears clinicians are less likely to have solely the
preservation of life as a primary goal for infants who are terminally
ill and or so severely impaired that they will not have an acceptable
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quality of life.

Clinicians are more likely to use a social rather than

only a physiological definition of life (Crane 1975).
continue to try to "do no harm."

Clinicians

Increasingly, allowing death to occur

is less likely to be seen as a harm, and the use of very aggressive
medical technology without compensating benefit is more likely to be
seen as harmful.

Changes in Norms

Over the past two decades, there have been some shifts in the
norms guiding neonatal decision making.

Although some clinicians are

guided by similar norms, others have made major shifts in the norms used
to guide treatment choices.

Almost all clinicians now agree that passive euthanasia is
acceptable in some circumstances.

In cases in which infants are

terminally ill, or will have a very poor quality of life, most
clinicians are probably now willing to withhold at least some aggressive
treatments.

Some clinicians may limit treatment only for patients who

are probably unsalvageable.

Other clinicians choose to withhold

treatment from infants who would be salvageable, but who have extremely
limited capacities.

It appears that fewer clinicians now feel that life

with certain severe conditions or dying should be prolonged in order to
uphold a principle of sanctity of life.
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At the same time, however, many clinicians seemed to have shifted
their attitudes about the role of quality of life considerations.

In

the past, many clinicians were willing to accept a non-treatment
decisions if they felt that the infant would have a moderate degree of
impairment that would be thought to compromise quality of life.

Now few

clinicians are willing to consider non-treatment unless that they feel
that the infant will probably have a very poor quality of life.

Rather

than comparing the quality of life of the patient to the quality of life
of a child without impairments, clinicians now seem more likely to
consider what they feel will be the "best interests" of the patient in
making treatment decisions.

During the past two decades, there appears to have been a trend
away from both giving and withholding treatment for the presumed benefit
of others, and more focus on the "best interests of the baby!1 It seems
that clinicians may be less willing to consider the possible problems
which the life of the infant might cause for the family or costs for
society; at the same time they seem to be less likely to feel that
making choices to limit treatment would be harmful for families, health
care professionals or to society.

Clinicians now seem more willing to give even more aggressive
treatments than they previously did, especially if they feel that it
will lead to a good or acceptable outcome.

Some clinicians, however,

seem more willing to withhold less aggressive treatments if they feel
that they would be no benefit.

An exception to this may occur in cases

where the parents want very aggressive treatment that the clinicians do
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not believe will be

in

the best interests of the baby.Cliniciansmay

now be more willingto agree to aggressive treatment if the parents want
it to be given.

Clinicians also now seem more willing to withdraw treatments which
are already startedas well as withhold new treatments. Although
psychologically it still seems very difficult for clinicians to stop
ongoing treatments, fewer clinicians seem to feel that there is a
morally significant distinction between stopping and not starting a
particular treatment.

While the majority of clinicians seem to feel that a distinctions
between active and passive euthanasia is important, some clinicians now
question the distinction.

Some feel that when death is the desired

outcome, it is all right to make decisions which lead to death and that
proscribing actions which lead to more immediate death in critically ill
patients is not useful.

Although some philosophers have advocated

active euthanasia using lethal drug injections, virtually no clinicians
have advocated such means for infants.

In saying that there should be

no distinction between active and passive euthanasia, clinicians usually
mean it should be possible to omit any treatment which would not be in
an infant's best interest.

They do not advocate using more active means

to cause death.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Changes in Treatment Behavior

It is clear that many more infants are receiving more aggressive
treatments now than twenty years ago.

It is, however, very difficult to

judge the changes which may have taken place in the treatment of
catastrophically ill infants during the past two decades.

A major reason for the more aggressive treatment of infants during
the past twenty years have been the rapid development of medical
technologies.

This has involved the refinement and proliferation of

some treatments, such as respirators and open heart surgical procedures
for newborns, which were in use on a limited scale at first, as well as
the development of new technologies such as ECMO and heart transplants.
Improved outcome statistics with existing treatments has supported the
spread of those treatments and fostered the development of yet more
aggressive ones.

In addition, economic, political and social factors have also lead
to more aggressive treatments.

Changes in law which required third-

party payers to finance the care of newborns, and the availability of
government funds for the care of newborns, has fostered more aggressive
newborn care.

The fact that Neonatal Intensive Care Units have become

show cases for the power of American Medicine have also promoted the
development of still more aggressive treatments.

Aggressive treatment

was further encouraged by biomedical equipment and supply companies;
with government supported research leading to the development of new
products, and a ready market interested and able to buy continually
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updated equipment, companies selling biomedical supplies and equipment
have promoted the acquisition of sophisticated biomedical technology by
NICUs.

Regionalization, involving the upgrading of facilities in both

tertiary centers and outlying regional hospitals, and the transfer of
infants with serious problems to regional centers, also led to more
aggressive treatment.

Other factors which have promoted aggressive treatment include the
growing involvement of the Right-to-Life movement, which has been
advocating for the aggressive treatment of newborn infants as well as
preventing abortion.

The disabilities rights movement has had an effect

both by helping to change conceptions of people with disabilities, and
by advocating for aggressive treatment for the disabled.
these groups helped promote the Baby Doe Regulations.

Together,

Many clinicians

have felt compelled to give more aggressive treatment than they formerly
would have either because they feel it is required by the regulations,
or because they fear that Right to Life advocates will come and bring
cases of non- treatment to the Courts or to the Media.

Finally,

professional and parent organizations that advocate for services for
those with mental and physical disabilities have also encouraged
treatment for newborns.

These groups, with their political clout at the

government level, as well as advocacy work in the health and social
services sector, have promoted more aggressive treatment.

At the same time, however, there have been factors which have
increased the ability for clinicians and caretakers to make decisions to
withhold treatment in some circumstances.

In addition to the conceptual
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changes in the clinical decision making model discussed above, these
include other changes in laws and bioethical standards in society and
increases in the awareness of parents and non- clinicians about the
issue of withholding treatment.

Over the past two decades, there has been much public discussion
of the issue of withholding treatments from critically ill patients.

As

discussed in Chapter II, there has been growing awareness and acceptance
of the idea of withholding treatments in some circumstances. In part,
this results from changes in attitudes about the use of technology, so
that the use of technology is less likely to be seen as necessarily
associated with progress, and more likely to be seen as involving
serious risks.

There also seem to be less adherence to a notion that

human decision making to withdraw life saving treatment involves
"playing god," and more of a sense that withholding treatment allows a
"natural death" to occur.

Bioethicists have written much in support of patient's rights to
refuse life saving treatment, and the right of surrogates to refuse such
treatment for critically ill incompetent patients in some circumstances,
(see President's Commission 1983) There have been a number of Court
decisions, including those involving the care of adults such as Quinlan,
Conroy, and Fox, as well as the case involving Jane Doe which have ruled
that the withholding of life saving treatment is a legal option in some
circumstances.

There have been countless TV programs and articles in

popular media dealing with withholding treatment.

There have been

changes in ideas about death and dying; a "Right-to-Die" movement has
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emerged with such advocacy groups as Concern for Dying.

With public

discussion of these issues, parents have become more aware of non
treatment options and may be better able to choose or accept a non
treatment decision.

Many clinicians feel more able to openly discuss

non-treatment decisions.

It is difficult to say exactly what effects these two sets of
factors have had on the treatment of catastrophically ill newborns.

It

appears that open discussion of the issues and advocacy by supporters of
various positions may have lead to the reductions of decisions that fall
at either extreme.

In general, it seems, that aggressive treatment is

more likely to be given to infants with moderate impairments; infants
with devastating conditions are less likely to be treated very
aggressively.

Summary

Social, political, economic, ideological and technological changes
in the context of decision making have led to changes in clinicians'
conceptualization of treatment choice for catastrophically ill newborns.
From the first published debate on selective non-treatment for infants
with spina bifida, clinicians have demonstrated variation not only in
the categorizations of patient conditions and treatments, but also
variation in norms and goals.

This chapter examines changes in the

treatment of infants with spina bifida and very premature newborns.
These are seen to reflect both technological and social changes.
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The

ability to sustain infants formally though to be non-viable are show to
have implications that may effect other social issues, such as laws
pertaining to abortion.

The history of federal efforts to regulate the treatment of
newborns is examined.

Political and ideological factors were shown to

have contributed toward to promulgation of the Baby Doe Directives.

The

clinicians conceptualization of treatment choice were shown to have
influenced the way that clinicians interpreted the regulations.
Political and social issues relating to the recent amendment to the
federal child abuse act and the Supreme Court decision on the Baby Doe
regulations are discussed.

Finally, general changes in the categorization of patient
conditions and treatments, of goals and of norms are discussed.

Some of

the major changes appear to be higher expectations of an acceptable
quality of life with mild and moderate impairments, and less importance
vested in distinctions between ordinary care and extraordinary care and
a distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment.

Clinicians

may now be more willing to acknowledge that cure or preserving life is
not possible in some cases.

In those cases, clinicians may be more

willing to accept passive euthanasia.

In other cases, when clinicians

feel that a baby may be able to have an acceptable quality of life, with
more advanced technology available, clinicians may be more aggressive in
treatment.
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CHAPTER NINE

TO TREAT OR NOT TO TREAT?

THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION:

CONCLUSIONS OF A STUDY ON DECISION MAKING
FOR CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS

This chapter starts with a summary of the study including
research findings.

Next, conclusions of the study are presented.

This

is followed by a discussion of implications of the study for future
research on decision making about the care of the critically ill and for
questions of public policy.

Summary of the Study

The research question addressed in this dissertation is: How do
clinicians conceptualize choices about limiting care in a Neonatal
Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and what factors affect these
conceptualizations.

More specifically, how do clinicians choose which

treatments to give and which to withhold from the range of possible
treatments? How do material and social factors affect the way that
clinicians think about treatment choices? The focus of the dissertation
is the development of a model for use in elucidating treatment choice.
It was derived from observation of clinicians' behavior, including
treatment choices and explanations of why those choices were made.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This dissertation is based on data collected by a variety of
methods.

The principle source of data has been participant observation,

mostly in the NICU at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center.

In

addition, a survey of attitudes about neonatal decision making was
conducted and documents were examined from the clinical, bioethics,
legal and popular literature.

Chapter II presents a general introduction to the issue of
decision making about the withholding of treatment from the critically
ill.

It demonstrates that questions about the aggressiveness of medical

treatment are not

new phenomena brought about by mid-twentieth century

developments in medical technology.

On the contrary, healers in other

cultures and in our culture through history have made choices about
care, including decisions to withhold some treatments that would have
been intended to prolong life.

Scientific advances and changes in practice in the 20th century
did lead to an aggressive ethos in medicine.

The development of life

support technology, with the ability to prolong physiological life of
questionable quality in some cases, along with concern about other
bioethical issues, led to a questioning of the benefits of some medical
treatments and a social concern with "the right to die."

Clinicians,

bioethicists, lawyers, and policy makers have addressed such issues.
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As

a result, the definition of death, and norms for the delivery of medical
care have been changing.

Decisions in a number of legal cases have begun to delineate
conditions under which it may be acceptable to withhold treatments.
Research on clinical behavior shows that treatments are sometimes
withheld, but that, in general, many aggressive medical treatments are
given, even to terminally ill patents.

Decision making about the care

of the critically ill had been a major concern of bioethics.
Distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care, omission and
commission, and withholding and withdrawing treatment have been used by
ethicists to differentiate acceptable and unacceptable choices.
Clinicians have established guidelines for decision making about the
limitation of care; prominent have been guidelines concerning DNR
(decisions not to resuscitate following a cardiac arrest).

Surveys have

revealed that most clinicians believe that decisions to withhold
treatment are acceptable in some circumstances.
focused on which patients receive treatment (e.g.

While discussion has
Crane 1975 ), there

has been little investigation about which treatments are given and which
are withheld.

The history of the care of newborns is discussed in Chapter III.
It presents a brief cross cultural and historical survey which suggests
that other cultures have devised means to promote the survival of most
infants, but that, through direct or indirect means, many cultures
practice infanticide for some infants who are not socially acceptable
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for a number of different reasons,

m e presence of impairment has been

a reason for infanticide in some cultures, but not others.

Tne history of modern western care for newborns is traced showing
the importance of social, economic, political, and technological factors
from the earlier development of incubators and special care nurseries to
the recent, very rapid, development of neonatal intensive care.

During

the first half of the twentieth century, improvements in the standard of
living, preventative medicine, and the development of antibiotics led to
dramatic reductions in the rate of post neonatal (more than 28 days)
infant mortality but did little to improve the survival of newborns.
Early post-war efforts to improve infant mortality led to the
development of special centers for infant care.

Aggressive experimental

techniques were used in efforts to treat critically ill newborns; this
prevented some mortality and morbidity but also caused iatrogenic
problems.

Since the 1960s, efforts at prevention have done little to reduce
the rate of infants born at risk.

There has, however, been a dramatic

reduction in the infant mortality rate.

This is a result not only of

rapid development of increasingly sophisticated medical technology, but
also social changes.

These include government and other third party

payments for increasingly expensive care, regionalization, and special
training for physicians, nurses and other health professionals.

During

the last few decades, survival rates have increased and impairment rates
have decreased for smaller and smaller premature babies and infants with
cardiac and other anomalies.
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While parents and caretakers have always made private decisions
about the aggressiveness of care for some catastrophically ill infants,
decision making about the care for newborns has only recently become a
social issue.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when many babies with

similar problems were brought together in regional centers, and
technological developments had enabled dramatic increases in the ability
to prolong the lives of critically ill newborns, decision making for
newborns emerged as an issues of concern to clinicians and bioethicists.

Since the early 1970s, ethical issues relating to the treatment of
newborns have been examined extensively in relation to such issues as
the rights of children, the rights of parents, and the use of
technology.

While there have been a number of legal cases involving the

withholding of treatments from newborns, the legality of many practices
remains unclear.

Clinicians, lawyers, philosophers and others have

debated how decisions should be made; they have focused on such
questions as Which babies should be treated? and Who should decide?

There have been a number of studies concerning the withholding of
treatments from some newborns.

Surveys have investigated attitudes,

background characteristics, and recommendations and behavior pertaining
to the treatment of newborns.

A few studies based on qualitative

research also document aspects of decision making practices.

These

studies show agreement to withhold treatment in some circumstances, but
controversy about other treatment practices.

As with the studies of the
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treatment of critically ill adults, they have focused more on decisions
about which patients to treat, rather than on which treatments to give.

My research in a neonatal intensive care unit shows that decision
making about the treatment of newborns rarely involves a single clear
cut decision "to treat" or "not to treat" but rather reflects a complex
process in which clinicians, and sometimes parents, make decisions about
which treatments are appropriate to give at a particular point in time.
The clinician's conceptualization of treatment choice is very important
in determining how decisions are made.

Such decisions reflect

consideration of characteristics of treatments, as well as
characteristics of patient condition, goals and norms for treatment
behavior.

These are discussed in more detail in Chapters IV through

VII.

Decision making for newborns was not a salient public issue until
the 1980s when there was much media coverage of an alleged decision to
withhold feedings and treatment from Siamese Twins in Danville, Illinois
in 1981, the death of an infant with Down's syndrome, know as Baby Doe
in 1982, after his parents refused consent for corrective surgery, the
announcement of the Baby Doe Directives and a decision to withhold
surgery from a child with spina bifida, known as Jane Doe in 1983.

In Chapter IV, after a brief review of the literature on medical
decision making, a general model for examining decision making was
outlined.

The importance of culture in determining aspects of

perception and categorization was discussed, with an examination of
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types of categories and sources of variation.

Then the roles of goals,

norms, and context in the process of decision making were examined.

Chapter IV includes an introduction to the use of the model for
the analysis of decisions about the aggressiveness of treatment for
newborns.

It outlines steps starting with the perception of data about

the infant and possible treatments, the categorization of information
into culturally defined categories pertaining to patient condition and
treatment characteristics.

Decisions are made by considering these

characteristics in relation to goals and norms for treatment behavior.
Then the decisions about treatment are translated into treatment
behavior.

The entire process occurs in the context of the

technological, ideological, political, economic and social environment
of the unit and of the society at large.

Chapters V, VI, and VII present the categories of patient
condition, treatments and goals and the norms for decision making and
explores their cultural construction.

Although all are based, in part,

on objective data, all are also determined by culturally defined
evaluations.

Examples are drawn primarily from participant observation

and are supplemented by data from the literature and from the results of
a survey.

Areas of consensus and of controversy are discussed.

Chapter V discusses characteristics of patient condition.
Clinicians consider a number of issues in relation to quality of life
(benefits and burdens to the patient) including the degree of physical
and mental impairment, the capacity to give and receive love, and the
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amount of pain and suffering.

Such factors as concepts about the

"normal," discrimination against people with disabilities and the social
class of parents affect clinicians' categorizations about quality of
life.

Clinicians also consider the risk (known probabilities) and

uncertainty (what is unknowable) about the chances that the baby will be
normal, about the severity of impairment, and about the chances that the
baby will die.

Clinicians also consider the nature of the critical

condition - what the infant needs to stay alive, whether the infant's
condition meets traditional definitions of death, and whether or not the
infant is terminally ill.

Finally, social value (the benefits and

burdens of treatment for others) for the family, for health care
professionals and the health care system, and for society are discussed.

Quality of life was found to be one of the most important factors
determining the aggressiveness of treatment.

Uncertainty about the

future condition of the infant, especially if the baby could be
"normal," was also found to be important.

While salvageability was also

important, decisions are still made about the aggressiveness of
treatment even for infants who are not salvageable.

While the social

value of treatment or non-treatment is frequently discussed, it was
found to have a less important role in the decision making process about
particular babies, except in those cases in which parents wanted
aggressive treatment despite clinicians recommendations for less
aggressive treatment.

Social value, was seen as having a more important

role in setting the parameters for acceptable treatment for all babies,
than for decisions in individual cases.
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In Chapter VI, I present data on clinicians' conceptualization of
characteristics of treatments.

Even when clinicians withhold some

treatments likely to prolong life, they provide other treatments which
would also prolong life.

Therefore they are distinguishing between

characteristics of treatments as well as characteristics of patients, in
making treatment decisions.

This fact has received relatively little

attention in the literature on clinical decision making.

One of the main ways in which clinicians categorize treatments is
in terms of their aggressiveness. Treatments which have such attributes
as a large physiological effect, which are experimental, which are not
frequently done, which are invasive, involve the use of high technology,
and/or which are costly in terms of staff time or monetary costs, and/or
which are risky are ranked as more aggressive than other treatments
which do not have those attributes to the same degree.

Categorizations

about the degree of aggressiveness are usually not explicit, and the
dimension is not referred to by clinicians by a single consistent term.
It does, however, appear to be a core concept shared by clinicians, who
show a high degree of consistency in their conceptions about the
relative ranking of treatments in making choices about which treatments
to give and which to withhold.

Clinicians also categorize treatments as being ordinary or
extraordinary. According to the original definitions of the terms,
which evolved out of Catholic moral theology, the treatments were to be
categorized on the basis of the potential benefit of the treatment for
the patient.

As the terms are currently used in the clinical setting,
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however, their use also encompasses notions dependent on the
aggressiveness of the treatment.

Clinicians also categorize choices not

to give treatments as being instances of withholding or of withdrawing
treatment.

Although the difference may seem clear cut, this

distinction, as the other characteristics of patient condition and
treatments, is culturally defined.

The final characteristic found to be important in the
conceptualization of treatment choice was a distinction between active
and passive euthanasia.

In some situations it has become acceptable to

practice "passive euthanasia" or allow death to occur, but it is not
acceptable to practice "active euthanasia" or cause death to occur.
Some clinicians consider withholding new extraordinary treatments as
passive euthanasia, and the withdrawing of ordinary treatments as active
euthanasia.

There is not, however, either agreement about the

definitions of these categories, nor about this definition.

In Chapter VII, I examine goals, norms, and treatment behavior.
The chapter starts with a discussion of the goals of medical treatment
identified as to cure, to care, to preserve life and to do no harm.

As

with the characteristics of patient condition and treatment, there is
disagreement among clinicians about the meaning of these concepts.
While for most infants admitted to NICUs, it is possible to choose
treatments which will further all of these goals simultaneously, in some
cases these goals are seen to as coming into conflict.

In such

situations, clinicians may try to maximize the attainment of a single
goal or may try to choose behaviors which will balance a set of goals.
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Behavioral norms, which guide the choice of treatment for
catastrophically ill infants, are discussed.

In those situations in

which the quality of life is expected to be acceptable, whatever
treatments are necessary to preserve life are usually given.

In those

situations in which infants are terminally ill, as well as those in
which the quality of life is not expected to be acceptable, choices are
made about which treatments to give and which to withhold.

Such

principles as notions of proportionality, and a desire to neither
prolong suffering nor to cause death are discussed.

In some situations,

decisions are made which are certain to lead to death; in other
situations, choices are made which leave the outcome uncertain.

In

general, decisions about care can be characterized as decisions to treat
up to a given level of aggressiveness, and then to withhold more
aggressive treatments.

Finally, the translation of decisions about treatment choice in
terms of culturally defined categories into treatment behavior is
discussed.

Since clinicians differ in how they interpret

characteristics of patient condition, treatments, and goals, they differ
in how they translate decisions into behavior.

Therefore, clinicians

who claim to share the same norms may differ in treatment behavior, and
clinicians who claim to adhere to different norms may, in practice, make
similar treatment choices.

In Chapter VIII changes in the conceptualization of decision
making are discussed.

The first published debate about selective non
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353
treatment of newborns (Zachary 1968 and letters) are examined in detail.
Variation in norms and goals as well as variation in categorization are
found from the beginning of the debate.

Next, changes in technology and attitudes are shown to lead to a
variety of changes in the conceptualization of treatment choice for
infants with spina bifida.

Advances in the technical ability to treat

very premature infants are shown to lead to a clear trend toward
treating very premature infants more aggressively.

Further

technological changes, which would enable the treatment of still more
premature infants/fetuses, would create problems for the use of current
norms for abortion and fetal therapy.

In part this is due to a

definition of "viability" as the ability to survive outside of the
uterus.

It is suggested that changes in the definition of viability,

similar to changes in the definition of death, to incorporate social as
well as physiological criteria, would be one way to handle the dilemmas.

Next, the Baby Doe regulations are discussed.

Starting in 1983,

the Federal Government, with the support of disability, Right-to-Life
and some civil liberties groups, issued a series of directives designed
to prevent the withholding of treatment on the basis of legislation
designed to prevent discrimination against the handicapped.

After

objections from health care professions and others led to court
decisions overturning the regulations, both sides agreed to compromise
legislation defining the withholding of treatment from some newborns as
child abuse, and recommending the establishment of hospital review
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committees.

This Spring, the Supreme Court issued decisions supporting

the lower Courts decision.

Data from the survey are presented on clinicians interpretation of
the directives in 1983, very soon after plans to enforce the directives
were first announced.

The clinicians conceptualization of the problem

of treatment choice was found to influence their interpretation of the
directives.

Clinicians did not feel that the regulation required the

provision of all possible treatments.

They did, however, feel that the

regulations would require giving more treatments then they felt were in
the best interest of some babies.

Finally, general changes in the categorization of patient
conditions and treatments, in goals and norms are discussed.

Some of

the major changes appear to be higher expectations of an acceptable
quality of life with mild and moderate impairments, and less importance
vested in distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary care and in a
distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatments.

There were also changes in the conceptualization of goals.

In

some cases, clinicians may now be more willing to acknowledge that cure
is not possible, and they may be less likely to treat only to preserve
life.

In general, clinicians may now be more likely to give aggressive

treatment when they feel that a baby could have a good quality of life,
but, if not, they may be more likely to accept passive euthanasia.
Clinicians also appear to be more likely to make their decisions based
on the presumed best interests of the baby and less likely to consider
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the interests of other family members.

Changes in treatment were seen

to be associated with changes in treatment technology, attitude toward
withholding treatment from older patients, attitude toward disability,
and as a result of the public attention brought to the issue as a result
of the Baby Doe Directives.

Major Conclusions of the Study

To summarize, the major conclusions of this study are:

- Decision making to limit the aggressiveness of treatment is not a new
phenomena of mid-twentieth century medicine, but rather reflects
clinical practices which pre-date the recent technological
developments.

- The modern debate about the treatment of newborns began to emerge in
the late 1960s (at least five years before the publication of Duff
and Campbell 1973), starting with clinician attempts to devise
standards for appropriate treatment.

-The treatment of catastrophically ill newborns is heavily influenced by
the way that clinicians conceptualize the issues involved in
treatment choice.

Rather than an all or nothing decision "to

treat" or "not to treat," the clinical model of decision making
involves choices about which treatments to give and which to
withhold from the range of possibilities.

This is conceptualized
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in terms of making a decision about the "aggressiveness" of
treatment.^

- In making treatment choices, clinicians make categorizations of
characteristics of patient condition, treatments, and goals, along
a number of culturally defined dimensions:
Patient condition characteristics
Quality of life
Uncertainty
Critical Condition
Social Value
Treatment characteristics
Aggressiveness
Ord inary/Extraord inary
Withholding/Withdrawing
Passive/Active Euthanasia

Goals
To Cure
To Care
To Preserve Life
To Do No Harm

Clinicians are guided by behavioral norms that prescribe the choice of
treatments seen as commensurate with the characteristics of the
patient's condition in order to achieve clinical goals.

1
This is an analytic model devised to account for clinicians'
treatment decisions. It is not a model consciously used by clinicians,
nor the only possible model which could be used to explicate such
decisions. Likewise, the dimension of aggressiveness is not always
consciously addressed in clinical decision making; the ranking of
treatments on this dimension can be used to explicate treatment choice.
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- Although the categorizations on the dimensions of patient condition,
treatments and goals, are often considered dichotomous, the
dimensions are, in fact, used as continua.

For example, although

clinicians often talk about treatments as "ordinary" or
"extraordinary," they use the concepts as ranked entities; they
rate some treatments as "more extraordinary" than others
"extraordinary" treatments.

- Most clinicians use all of the dimensions discussed above in making
some treatment decisions.

There is much variation, however, among

clinicians in how particular conditions, treatments and goals are
to be characterized, and in how important they believe each
dimension should be, for individual cases.

- Over the past few decades, treatment for newborns has become more
aggressive.

This primarily reflects the development of more

sophisticated technology and practice which has enabled better
outcomes for catastrophically ill newborns.

There appears to be

growing clinical consensus about norms to guide the limitation of
treatment in some cases where treatment would prolong dying or
would lead to a very poor quality of life.

There is also growing

consensus to provide certain treatments to infants with moderate
impairments.

Controversy remains about other treatment practices.
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- The clinical model of decision making affected clinicians'
interpretations of the Baby Doe Directives.

Most clinicians have

felt that the directives required more treatments than they would
recommend, but believed that the regulations permit the
withholding of some treatments that would promote survival.

While

some clinicians have not changed treatment practice, many
clinicians have become more aggressive in treatment as a result of
the Baby Doe Directives.

Issues for Future Research

This study raises many questions for future research on decision
making about the care of critically ill in general and about the care of
catastrophically ill infants in particular.

Some of the questions

involve ways to gain better understanding of the components of the
cognitive model.

Others involve questions pertaining to how the

cognitive understanding is developed and used in the social context.
Finally, questions are raised pertaining to the relevance of the model
for understanding decision making in other settings.

Research on Components of the Model

In this research, the components of the conceptual system were
derived primarily from observation of ongoing behavior and articles in
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the literature.

The only categorizations studied directly using

quantitative methods were categorizations of treatments as ordinary or
extraordinary on the survey.

Evidence for other categories, including

quality of life and aggressiveness was inferred from the survey
responses.

Many questions remain about categorizations about patient

conditions, treatments and goals which could fruitfully be studied by
qualitative methods.

For example: What are the components used in

making categorizations on each dimension? What happens when a
characteristic is categorized as high on one component but low on
another? Is there much variation in the importance given to the various
components.

What happens with change over time? How much consistency is

there in categorizations? Is there more consistency about some
dimensions than other? I think that it would be particularly interesting
to investigate categorizations on the dimensions of "aggressiveness" and
"quality of life."

To what extent do such factors as cost, invasiveness, risk, or the
fact that a treatment is still experimental affect the categorization of
the treatments on the dimension of "aggressiveness".

It would be

fruitful to have informants rate treatments on each of these components
and also on the overall dimension of aggressiveness in order to study
the relationship of the various components.

What happens when a

treatment is experimental and expensive in cost and staff time but not
very invasive (for example, a new monitoring device)? To what extent
does the context matter? Is a drug which replaces an invasive surgical
procedure seen as more aggressive than one which replaces another drug?
How do conceptualizations change over time as a treatment is no longer
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experimental, as cost go up or down, or as people think of the condition
as a medical rather than a surgical problem?

It would also be interesting to systematically investigate
categorization about the components of quality of life.

How do people

rate various components such as such as particular mental or physical
impairments, or functional deficits.

To what extent do clinicians

change their categorizations for a particular case according to the
presence of other conditions or as mediated by the perceived level of
support or services available from families or institutions? To what
extent is there agreements among clinicians about the categorizations on
various components, and overall on the implications of different
conditions for future quality of life? Do clinicians feel fairly certain
about the quality of life implications of most conditions? Is there a
sharp threshold for most clinicians between those conditions that
justify very aggressive treatments and a gray area where in which non
treatment would be an option? Between the gray area and those conditions
where prolonging life would not be seen as a benefit? Is the gray area
small or wide?

It would also be interesting to use formal means to compare
categorizations on different dimensions.

For example, are those

clinicians who perceive less uncertainty about patient condition, also
more likely to be more or less aggressive in their treatments than those
who perceive more uncertainty? Would there be more agreement among
clinicians in their categorizations about "aggressiveness" and "quality
of life" than about "ordinary/extraordinary care."

Although one might
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think that there would be, because aggressiveness and quality of life
are components of ordinary/extraordinary, it appears that there may no
more variation, in fact, there may be less.

Rather than being formed

only by a summation of the component parts, categorizations such as
those on the ordinary/extraordinary dimension, may serve an important
role in providing means for the organization of diversity (discussed
more below).

Research on the Development and Use of the Cognitive Model

A major area for research concerns how characteristics from
clinicians' backgrounds and personalities affect their attitudes about
factors which contribute toward the use of the model.

Another major

area for research concerns socialized into the clinical subculture of
neonatal intensive care.

Finally, one could look at many research

questions concerning how clinicians use the conceptual model in social
interaction with other clinicians, with parents, and others.

There are many questions about how characteristics of clinicians
background affect categorization on the dimensions of patient condition,
treatments, and goals.

For example, are those clinicians who have had

more contact with people with disabilities more likely to see the
possibility of a good quality of life even with major impairments? Does
education in biomedical ethics result in clinicians feeling that a
distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment is less
important.

What role do experiential factors play in the degree to
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which clinicians are invested in prolonging life or accepting death.
How does social background characteristics such as religion, ethnicity
and social class, and personality characteristics such as
authoritarianism or the capacity for empathy, effect categorizations on
each dimension.

Much has been written about the socialization of medical and
nursing students but relatively little has addressed socialization about
many of the specific issues addressed in this dissertation.

One issue

that I find of interest concerns the development of the overall clinical
model for approaching treatment decisions not as choices to treat or not
treat, but as decisions about which treatments to give and which to
withhold.

From work with second year medical students who had not yet

begun clinical work, it appears that their conceptualization of the
issues is similar to that of people who are not clinicians.
expected babies to be treated and or not treated.

They

They were surprised

by decisions to give some treatments and not others.

I distributed an

early version of the questionnaire to pediatric residents on their first
day of training.

The pattern of their answers were very similar to

those of more experienced clinicians - they recommended giving some
treatments but not others depending on patient condition and treatment
characteristics.

Medical students must be socialized about the use of

the model during their clinical years of training.

It would be

interesting to study the process of acquisition of this aspect of the
subculture.

Is the socialization process similar for nurses, and other

health science students?
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Older clinicians tend to be less aggressive in their treatment
recommendations (Levin 1985).

What factors affect the conceptual system

later in training and in practice? What role does first hand experience
actually play? To what extent is there socialization from the
institutional subculture where clinicians train or work? What learning
is specific to neonatology and what reflects experience with other
services (including pediatric follow-up)? What roles do lectures or
reading in bioethics play? How does maturation and general life
experience affect the conceptualization of treatment choice.

Although physicians and nurses did not differ significantly in
their overall recommendations about treatment when other background
characteristics were controlled (Levin 1985), they do differ in
predictions about prognosis (Anspach forthcoming), and in the factors
identified as the most important for making choices about treatment
(Levin 1985).

What contributions do differences in background,

professional socialization, and work role make to inter- professional
differences in the conceptualization of treatment choice.

The treatment of newborns in the NICU is not only determined by
the cognitive system of the individual clinicians but is also a result
of the social processes that take place among the infants' caretakers
and the constraints of the larger social system.

In addition to other

types of research one could conduct, it would be interesting to examine
how clinicians use the clinical model of decision making in negotiations
about patient care.
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Parents usually know little about the conditions of their infants
or about the options for treatment prior to the time that their infants
are admitted to the NICU.

They typically learn about their baby's

condition and about the options for treatment from the clinicians caring
for their baby.

The condition and options are defined by the clinicians

in terms of the clinical conceptual system.

In presenting information

to the parents, the clinicians present most treatments choices as
mandatory, but may present some treatment choices as optional.

It would be interesting to study how parents develop an
understanding of their baby's condition and of treatment options as
these are presented by clinicians.

To what extent do they accept the

clinicians' presentation of the situation? To what extent do try to
challenge these assumptions? One could examine the interaction between
clinicians and parents who do not accept the clinicians framework
according to the components of the model? Do they present alternate
categorizations of they characteristics of patient condition, treatments
or goals? Do they weight the importance of characteristics differently
(for example, weighing more heavily the implications of a treatment
choice for themselves or their other children)? Do they introduce new
dimensions for consideration? Do they make decisions according to the
norms guiding treatment choice for clinicians?

What happens when they use an different cognitive system.

What

happens when parents want to use different norms for decision making:
what happens when they espouse norms which support an absolute sanctity
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of life position demanding all life saving treatment? What happens if
they feel that the level of aggressiveness of treatment is irrelevant,
believing instead that decisions should be made solely on the basis of
the future quality of life for the child? One could examine how
negotiations between the parents and the clinicians are affected by the
nature of the differences in their cognitive models.

Are clinicians

more willing to accept alternate definitions of some categories, such as
quality of life, more easily than others.

For example, the nature of

the critical condition? Are clinicians (or parents) able to manipulate
the system to achieve the choice desired; for example, will clinicians
stress uncertainty when parents are unwilling to accept recommendation
for treatment choice based on predicted quality of life?

The conceptual system could also be used to study interactions and
negotiations between members of the staff.

One could examine the

variations in the conceptualization of the case among clinicians caring
for a baby? Are there differences in categorization of characteristics
or goals, or in the norms used to guide treatment choice? What
characteristics of clinicians (e.g. profession, status, age, location of
training, religion, etc.) are associated with various positions? Are the
clinicians aware of the differences? My research suggests that there are
often striking differences among clinicians who are caring for a single
baby in how they categorize patient condition and treatment options.
Yet, despite these differences, they will often agree on treatment
choices.
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It would be interesting to investigate how and why the diversity
in conceptualization exists, along with agreement on treatment choice.
It may be that through the experience of working together and observing
choices made, clinicians develop expectations about treatment choice in
particular situations.

Most of the discussion in the unit focuses on

the medical management of the infants, rather than on the value
considerations underlying treatment choice; There is much more emphasis
on learning and agreeing on what treatments are to be given.

The

"shared culture" of the unit may be primarily in terms of behavior
because there could be strong sanctions against individuals who made
inappropriate treatment choices.

Yet, individuals rarely share the

value defined reasoning behind treatment choice.

In addition, even when

views are shared, there is probably tolerance for divergent views as
long as they don't result in behavior that is considered inappropriate.
In this situation, in which there is diversity of ethical standards
within the medical community and in society at large, variant
definitions of a particular case may be tolerated as long as the
behavior seems acceptable.

It would be important to gain an understanding of what takes place
when divergent definitions of the situation would lead to different
treatment choices.

In those situations, how do clinicians negotiate

with each other to make treatment choices.

Do clinicians negotiate with

each other to redefine the situation so that they can reach consensus.
If so when and how does that take place? Do senior clinicians exert
power to force acceptance of choices that they feel are appropriate? If
so, when and how? Are less senior clinician's able to appeal to outside
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standards or authorities to promote their choices? In particular, how
does the possibility of appeal to outside authorities play a role in the
decision making process?

It would also be important to investigate how, and to what extent,
decision makers are limited by outside constraints, particularly by the
threat of enforcement of hospital policies and of state or federal laws?
Are parents and clinicians generally able to make the treatment choices
that they feel are appropriate for the infants, or do they feel that the
law compels them to provide treatments which they would not choose? If
so, is this due to their desire to obey the law or does it reflect
threat of action by hospital administrators, people who might inform the
authorities, actual intervention from child welfare workers, district
attorneys or others who might intervene to determine treatment choice?
Do clinicians, parents, or others use the threat of hospital sanctions
or legal interventions in their negotiation about treatment choice? If
so, how?

One could also investigate how the conceptual system of clinicians
plays a role in the resolution of potential conflicts in such forums as
ethics committees and the Courts.

To what extent does the conceptual

system, as defined by clinicians, determine the options considered in
these forums? It appears that in most case the courts accept the options
as defined by the clinicians.

It would be interesting to study how the

clinicians' conceptual system is communicated to judges, committee
members and other non-clinicians, non-family participants in the
decision making process.

Are members of ethics committees able to
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maintain critical perspectives on decision making? How do their
backgrounds affect their participation in the decision making process?
Are they able to alter the way that clinicians define some situations?
If so, how?

Although the general clinician model seems to be used in virtually
all intensive care units, there seems to be a lot of variation in how
patient conditions and treatments are classified and in how important
various characteristics and goals are considered in the decision making
process.

There also appears to be much variation in the degree to which

diversity in the degree of aggressiveness of treatment is tolerated in
the units, and the degree to which parents, nurses, the hospital
administration, ethics committee members and others are able to
participate in the decision making process.

It would be interesting to

investigate the factors associated with various practices.

Research could also be conducted on the communication process
between individuals at different institutions.

How and to what extent

are clinician conceptualizations influenced by those of clinicians at
other institutions? To what extent do changes in conceptualization take
place because of direct communication between clinicians working at
different institutions, through articles and/or editorials in
professional journals, or as a result of positions established by
professional organizations (e.g. positions taken by the American Academy
of Pediatrics)? How are positions influenced by the movement of
clinicians from institution to institution? To what extent do changes in
conceptualization and practice at different institutions reflect
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independent adaptations to similar changes in technology and political,
economic and social conditions as opposed to the diffusions of ideas
from institution to institutions? Under what conditions is variation in
practice tolerated and when is there pressure toward hegemony?

Perhaps the most interesting issues for future research involve
investigation of ongoing effects of changes in the political, economic
and social factors in the wider social context on the conceptualization
of treatment decisions.

For example, will changes in law or

organization (e.g. HMOs) and/or financing of care (e.g. DRGs affect
treatment decisions? How will changes in the conceptualization of
treatment choice for catastrophically ill newborns be affected by other
social issues such as those relating the disability, abortion, civil
liberties, the use of technology, and the decision making about older
children and adults who are critically ill?

Much of the recent debate on decision making for newborns has been
a reflection of struggles around the abortion issue and disability
rights.

What factors lead to the linking of issues and the choice of

positions by parties involved in these wider conflicts? What happens
when alliances around one issue entail parties adopting positions which
violate their usual stance on other issues? For example, what position
will civil liberties organizations adopt on the parents role in neonatal
decision making? What factors enable individuals or organizations to
isolate issues and maintain positions which have implications which seem
to conflict? How does debate about broader social issues affect the
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definition of characteristics of patient condition, treatments or goals
and the norms of neonatal decision making?

Use of the Model for Research in Other Settings

The final topic I will discuss in this section on research
implications is the use of the model developed for looking at decision
making in neonatology for the study of decision making about other
issues.

First, I will discuss decision making for the care of other

critically ill patients.

Then I will discuss the use of the model for

examining decision making about the care of other types ofpatients and
for additional questions concerning the use of technology.Finally, I
will discuss some general issues relating to the use of a decision
making model for social science research.

It appears that the model of decision

making developed for

elucidating the care of newborns has applicability for the study of
decision making for the care of other critically ill patients.
Clinicians seem to consider the same characteristics of patient
condition and of treatments in making decisions about the care of
critically ill older children and adults.

They appear to be trying to

achieve the same goals and are guided by norms which prescribe
treatments which are proportionate to patient condition characteristics.

It would be interesting to investigate whether clinician
categorizations on the various dimensions and norms are similar or
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different when considering the care of older patients.

For example, are

the same criteria used for evaluating the future quality of life with
similar impairments? Are similar standards used concerning the
uncertainty? Are some treatments seen as more aggressive for either
infants or older patients?

In some circumstances, it appears that clinicians would be more
likely to conceptualize similar aggressive treatments as justified for a
child or young adult who had an accident, than for an infant with a
similar prognosis.

Does this reflect a higher social value placed on

the value of continued life for an individual who has formed more social
attachments? In other circumstances, however, it appears that clinicians
will be more aggressive in the treatment of infants.

Do such decisions

reflect the fact that even a very impaired newborn can perform the
social role of being an infant, while an older person who suffers an
accident might be unable to perform their accustomed social role?
Clinicians sometimes withhold even very non-aggressive treatments from
very elderly patients, especially those with limited mental capacity
(Brown and Thompson 1979).

To what extent does the

length of time of expected survival and/or the certainty of prognosis
affect such decisions?

It would also be interesting to examine other factors affecting
such decisions.

For example, how does specialty training in internal

medicine, geriatrics or pediatrics affect the aggressiveness of
treatment? How does the setting affect the aggressiveness of care? What,
if any, are the systematic differences in care provided in intensive
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care units, in other acute care settings, and in chronic care facilities
such as residential treatment centers and nursing homes?

It might be useful to try to adapt the model for the study of
other types of clinical decision making, beside the care of the
critically ill.

While the characteristics related to active and passive

euthanasia would not be applicable, and the dimension of "critical
condition" would have to be modified to something like the "potential
for diminishing quality of life," the other dimensions would be
considered in making other types of treatment decisions.

Other

characteristics might be added, or the existing categories might be
elaborated.

The components of the goal of "care" - functional

improvement and relief of suffering - might be considered as separate
goals.

For example, the model could be used to study decision making
about the extent of rehabilitation services to offer a head trauma
patient.

One could examine the future quality of life possible with

various physical and occupational therapy interventions, the uncertainty
surrounding the effectiveness of those interventions, the potential
fourth condition leading to diminished quality of life if the
interventions are not given, and the social value of treatment for the
patient's family, care givers and society.

One could also look at the

aggressiveness of the interventions, whether the interventions would be
ordinary or extraordinary considering the aggressiveness and potential
benefits for the patient, and whether the interventions had already been
started.

These could be considered in terms of the goals of improving
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functioning, relieving pain and suffering, and "doing no harm."

Even

for interventions which would not directly be related to preserving
life, one could consider the potential of the intervention for
preserving life under certain conditions (such as increased dexterity
for a patient which could be advantageous for preventing accidents).
One could then try to identify the norms used by clinicians in making
decisions about treatment choices.

One could examine how clinicians

behaved according to the patient condition and treatment characteristics
and goals.

In addition, one could study the relative importance of

various dimensions.

The model could also be used for the study of other issues
concerning the use of technology.

One would have to identify the

relevant characteristics of both the problems being addressed by the use
of the technology and characteristics of the technology itself in
relation to the goals of the actors.

One could then identify the norms

which guided the use of the technology.

For example, the model could be used for studying the introduction
of computers to assist in performing various tasks in departments of
hospitals.

One might find it useful to consider such characteristics of

the tasks as the nature of the changes in the tasks (e.g. speed or
accuracy of task performance), the degree of uncertainty about the
expected changes, the complexity of the tasks, the importance of changes
in performance of the tasks for the functioning of the department, and
the importance of changes in the provision of the tasks for other
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specific departments, for the hospital as an institution, or for the
community served by the hospital.

The characteristics of the technology's use in the setting would
also have to be considered.

For example, one would want to look at

costs, both financial and others.

One would want to examine initial

capital outlay and the costs of continued use.

One would also want to

look at costs in terms of training of personnel and perhaps other types
of changes such as transformations in the nature of the work and/or the
loss of information that might result from standardization.

These could

be considered in terms of the goals of the institution - such as patient
care, teaching, research, and financial solvency.

One could use such an

analytic model in analyzing the norms prescribing the importance of
various dimensions and the resultant guides for behavior.

It could be

used to explain, for example, why patient billing has often been the
first department to rely heavily on computers.

A focus on decision making, like a focus on other analytic
constructs, such as exchange or status and role, can orient research in
many aspects of human behavior.

It is particularly useful for it

enables the researcher to integrate a dynamic aspect in studies of
cognition and also allows consideration of cognitive aspects in studies
of resource allocation.

A major limitation, however, of a decision

making approach is that it focus attention on the conceptualizations and
behavior of individual and/or groups.

A decision making perspective

alone doesn't provide information on the factors which account for the
larger context in which decision making takes place.

The opportunities
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and constraints from the larger context are taken as given in studies
focused on decision making.

Research on decision making needs to be

coupled with investigations using other theoretical perspectives to
provide information on the larger social context.

Implications of the Study for Improving the Process of Decision
Making and Devising Social Policy

The care of catastrophically ill infants presents difficult
decisions for parents, clinicians, and others involved directly in the
care of newborns and those involved in devising social policy.

It is

hoped that this dissertation will provide information and an approach
for looking at decision making that will be useful both for case by case
decision making and for the formation of social policy.

In this

section, I will discuss how the model developed in this dissertation can
be used by decision makers in evaluating elements - categories and norms
- used in the decision process.

Finally, I will discuss the roles of

ethics committees and the government in fostering better decision
making.

A proposition underlying this discussion is that parents should,
in general, be the primary decision makers about the medical care their
children, including treatment for critically ill infants.

At the

present time, there is a diversity of opinion about the appropriate care
of catastrophically ill infants in our society.

Decision making about

the aggressiveness of treatment for infants necessarily involves
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decisions based on value considerations.

Parents generally are the

people who care most deeply about the well-being of their children.
They may also be seen as best able to articulate the values that the
infant would be likely to espouse if the infant had been raised and
socialized by that family.

Therefore, I believe that parents should be

able to determine the course of treatment for their infants, except in
those situations where their decisions clearly violate widely shared
social values.

The important issues therefore become devising means to

enable parents to make decisions in accord with their own values, and
developing criteria to identify poor decisions and develop processes to
prevent poor treatment choices from being made.

Use of the Model for Clinical Decision Making

Since parents typically know little about many factors relevant
for making decisions about the care of newborns prior to the birth of
their child, they are very dependent on communication with clinicians.
Clinicians, themselves, sometimes have little awareness of the
assumptions and values that underlie decisions.

The model of decision

making developed in this dissertation can be used in making decisions
about the care of individual newborns by facilitating discussions among
clinicians, between parents and clinicians, and with other participants
in the decision making process such as members of ethics committees.
can be used to critically evaluate the categorizations made on some or
all of the dimensions and the norms used in making decisions.

More

awareness of the values and assumptions underlying decision making on
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It

the part of both clinicians and parents could help improve the quality
of decisions.^

Frequently issues are discussed in terms that are too general.
This sometimes leads to problems in communication.

For example, an

indirect evaluation of physician/parent communication (using
hypothetical cases) indicated that parents believed prognosis to be
poorer than physicians though it would be based on the physicians'
statements (Clyman 1979).

Discussions of the specifics on each of the

dimensions used in making decisions may be useful for ensuring an
adequate information base for decision making.

The model may be used in focusing attention on issues involving
quality of life considerations.

In deciding the care of an individual

baby, clinicians and parents should talk specifically about the
likelihood of particular impairments and the possibility of specific
causes of pain and suffering.

Rather than saying that a child will

probably be severely retarded, they should endeavor to be as specific as
possible.

For example, rather than saying an infant will have brain

damage, clinicians should tell parents if they think the child will be
able to perform simple activities but will not be able to read, or will
never be able to recognize his/her caretakers.

^
This discussion is not meant to imply that decision makers don't
often critically evaluate these categories and norms, nor that they
don't frequently communicate well with parents. Rather, it is intended
to focus attention on some problems that sometimes impede good decision
making.
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Parents should be provided with as much good information as
possible and be helped to evaluate the implications of various
conditions for their infant's potential quality of life.

Since so many

people, including clinicians, have so little knowledge about the
potential for people with impairments and many share general stereotypes
and prejudices about life with disabilities, particular attention needs
to be paid to providing information about the potentials for
satisfactions for individuals with impairments.

It is also important,

however, to provide information on the negative consequences of
particular conditions.

Clinicians who are used to feeding tubes,

chronic respiratory support, frequent operations, etc. may sometimes
underestimate the effects of such interventions for the quality of life
of the patient.

Parents should be provided with as much information as

possible on both negative and positive consequences of specific
conditions.

One of the major problems, of course, is the degree of uncertainty
about future prognosis.

Currently there is much diversity among

clinicians in predictions they would make for a given condition.
Clinicians should be encouraged to share their uncertainty about
prognosis with each other and with parents as fully as possible.
Efforts should be made to collect information on the likelihood of
various outcomes with various conditions.

While clinicians may want to put the greatest emphasis on the
chances for cure, or for a good outcome, other aspects of uncertainty
should also be considered.

Clinicians should be concerned about the
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best outcomes that treatment could offer.

In making decisions about

care, however, it is also important to consider the most likely, and the
worst possible, outcomes.

Following their values, some parents may

choose to forego treatments in order to avoid a very poor outcome,
rather than believing that they should necessarily treat if there is a
possibility of a good outcome.

Similarly, parents and/or clinicians can discuss categorizations
on other dimensions of the model.

These discussions can focus on both

the data and the criteria used to make evaluations.

In addition to

examining patient condition characteristics, they can examine treatment
characteristics.

For example, they can explore the criteria used to

classify a treatment choice as passive or active euthanasia.

They can

also discuss whether a particular treatment choice will help to achieve
a given goal.

They can ask if an intervention which temporarily

relieves acute suffering, but prolongs life which is characterized by
chronic suffering truly furthers the goal of providing "care."

Decision makers may also want to use the framework to help
identify the importance that is given to various criteria in making
treatment decisions so that priorities about the relative importance of
various dimensions can be evaluated.

For example, some people feel that

the best interests of the child, usually understood to be determined
primarily by quality of life, should be the only criteria used in making
a treatment decision [see In the matter of Claire Conroy (1985), for an
example concerning the choice of treatment for an adult].

In some

cases, however, when the potential benefit of treatment for the child
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may be very small, and the social costs of treatment are very high,
decisions makers may want to consider social value considerations.

If

an infant is so severely brain damaged that the infant could only have
minimal awareness of his or her surroundings, and the continued life of
the infant would cause distress for the family and be very expensive,
then it might be reasonable to consider withholding some treatments.

Identification of the norms used in clinical decision making may
also be useful for challenging the way that decisions are made.

For

example, this dissertation has demonstrated that clinicians consider not
only characteristics of patient condition, but also characteristics of
treatments in making treatment decisions.

Parents, policy makers, and

others may want to question the moral relevance of treatment
characteristics for decision making.

While looking at the history of decisions to withhold treatment
and the evolution of medical ethics, it is understandable that
clinicians make differentiations between treatments.

It is not clear,

however, that such considerations should be used to justify the
provisions of treatment on the basis of any criteria other than those
related to patient condition characteristics.

It could be argued that

the consideration of treatment characteristics is necessary to uphold
certain traditional standards of medical ethics, or that certain
treatments, such as the provision of warmth, nutrition or fluids must
always be provided to show respect for human life.

One could also

argue, however, that such arguments are inadequate to justify the
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provision of treatments that are not warranted on the basis of patient
condition characteristics.

The Role of the Ethics Committee for Improving Decision Making

One mechanism which has been suggested for improving decision
making in neonatal intensive care has been the ethics committee (Pres.
Comm. 1983, Fleischman 1986).

It has been suggested that it can be a

useful vehicle in four primary ways.

First it can provide education

about issues relating to neonatal decisions, usually to the staff of a
neonatal unit, and sometimes to others such as members of the community.
Second, the members of the ethics committee can work toward devising
general principles to guide the decision making process and/or the
substance of decisions.

Third, it can serve as a forum for the

discussion of difficult cases where perspectives can be presented by
people with varied ideas.

Finally, ethics committees can review the

appropriateness of decision making in actual cases.

(Typically, ethics

committees do not themselves play a decision making function).

I will

say a little here about what my research suggests about the functioning
of ethics committees.

One of the most important functions that an ethics committee can
play is to be involved in educating the staff.

As discussed in this

dissertation, decisions about the aggressiveness of treatment are not
only comprised of the major life and death decisions commonly identified
as "ethical issue" but components play a role in many of the seemingly
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more minor decisions about the management of care.

In the day to day

work of treating infants, clinicians frequently choose treatments
without consciously considering the basis of those decisions (see
Chapters IV through VIII).

Time set apart for consideration of ethical issues, both in
committee meetings, and sometimes in more widely attended ethics rounds
or others forums, can increase the opportunity to examine assumptions
underlying both the routine and major decisions.

Hopefully, this

education will increase the awareness of clinicians as to a value base
for a wide variety of decisions.

Together, members of the ethics committee and other staff members
can begin to develop more general principles which can help guide the
decision making process and substance of decisions.

These principle

should help to clarify the basis of many decisions which can continue to
be made without individual reconsideration in each case.

They should

also help to identify decisions to be individually considered on a case
by case basis.

The committees could help to develop mechanisms to

insure that certain types of decisions are discussed among members of
the staff, with parents, and with members of the ethics committees.

The ethics committee can serve as a forum for the discussion of
difficult cases.

The perspectives brought to bear on these cases, of

course, is dependent on the make up of the committees.

A potential

problem is that committee members are almost invariably chosen by the
senior physicians and/or the hospital administration.

In order to widen
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the breadth of perspectives presented about cases, it is important that
members with a range of views serve on the committee and that the
committee members are able to function independently rather than
primarily as protectors of the physicians or hospital.

Mechanisms

should be developed to insure representation of individuals with varied
views and to insure independence in committee function.

Review of difficult cases depends on identification of these
cases, and depends on presentation of the cases for review.

Frequently,

only those cases which physicians recognize as difficult are brought for
review.

Mechanisms should be developed to alert parents and other staff

members to the existence and role of the committee and to encourage them
to present cases.

It may be difficult for the entire ethics committee to review all
of the potentially difficult cases.

Smaller multidisciplinary

subcommittees of the larger ethics committee should be established which
could quickly be called to help in the decision making process.

Even a

subcommittee, however, will not always be able to spend an adequate
amount of time learning about the details of each case, discussing them
with the parents and clinicians and exploring the complexity of cases.
It could be beneficial to identify one or two individuals in each unit
who could serve as resource persons on decision making.

Such a person

could be a neonatal nurse, social worker or ombudsman with knowledge of
the clinical and ethical complexities of such cases.

Typically, the

clinicians, social workers, and others working in a neonatal unit are
too busy with their other responsibilities to be able to spend prolonged
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periods of time and be available to explore the value issues in all
cases.

If part of such a person's time was freed from other duties,

that person could serve as a valuable resource to the parents and
clinicians deciding the care in individual cases.

Another issue to be considered concerns the identification of
cases for mandatory review.

Frequently, the guidelines for ethics

committees mandate that all cases should be reviewed in which life
prolonging treatments are withheld.

As discussed in this dissertation,

life prolonging treatments are frequently withheld, most often from
infants who are considered to be terminally ill.

The categorization of

infants as terminally ill, however, is not always clear cut, and, often
depends on treatment choices.

In other situations, in which infants are

certainly or probably terminally ill but not immediately dying, there
can be serious ethical questions about care.

In some cases, with

aggressive treatment, these infants could live for a substantial period
of time, especially if very aggressive treatments are given (see Chapter
V, section on the critical condition, and Chapter VII, section on
decisions for terminally ill infants).

It seems impractical for the

ethics committee to try to directly review decision making in all of
these cases.

Mechanisms should be established, however, to monitor the

process of decision making in such cases and identify problems which
might arise.

While most of the attention has been paid to cases in which life
saving treatments are being inappropriately withheld, situations also
arise in which parents wish to provide treatments which are seen as too
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aggressive.

(A number of cases brought to the attention of at least

three ethics committees have been of this type.)

Ethics committees can

serve an important role in such cases by providing a forum where the
problems concerning over-treatment can be presented and discussed.

In

some situations, the committee may be able to provide education and
support to help parents make decisions to withhold overly aggressive
treatments.

In other cases, the committee may help the clinicians

accept the parents' decision to continue treatment.

Finally, ethics committees can serve as forums for review to
prevent the occurrence of clearly inappropriate treatment decisions.

As

I stated before, there is great diversity of opinion about what
constitutes appropriate treatment choice.

In general, I believe that

parents ought to be able to make health care decisions for their
children.

In rare instances, however, parents make decisions which seem

to clearly violate widely accepted standards for treatment.

In such

cases, if after discussion with the ethics committee no satisfactory
resolution can be achieved, cases can be referred to the state
authorities.

The Role of Government

There are a number of roles that the government can play in
fostering better care for catastrophically ill newborns.

Most

important, the government should take measures to prevent the birth of
so many high-risk infants.

The government should play an important role

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in improving the quality of life of infants with disabilities and for
their families.

The government could also take a number of steps to

promote good decision making.

Most of the infants admitted to NICUs, and many of the infants for
whom decisions are made to withhold treatment are low birthweight
infants who are born prematurely.

As discussed in Chapter III, there is

a strong correlation between the rate of birth of low birthweight babies
and socioeconomic factors.

The government could do much by establishing

programs to eliminate the factors which lead to the birth of low
birthweight infants by providing birth control programs for teenagers,
better nutrition for low income children and particularly for low income
pregnant women, and programs for better prenatal care.

In addition, the

government should increase funding for programs to identify and
eliminate risk factors for the birth of children with congenital
impairments.

The government should also increase funding to improve the quality
of life for infants with disabilities and their families.

One of the

reasons that both parents and clinicians give for deciding not to treat
some catastrophically ill infants aggressively, is that there are
inadequate services to provide a decent quality of life for many
children with impairments (Gliedman and Roth 1980).

If clinicians and

families felt that there would be adequate financial and social supports
for these children and their families, they would feel that infants with
disabilities would have a better quality of life and more would decide
to treat.
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The government could also provide better information about
treatment and prognosis for infants with impairments.

The most recent

version of the Baby Doe regulations called for the
establishment and operation of national and regional information
and resource clearinghouses for the purpose of providing the most
current and complete information regarding medical treatment
procedures and resources and community resources for the provision
of services and treatment for disabled infants with life
threatening conditions.
(DHHS 1985)

So far, funds have not been allocated for these centers.

The government

could provide an important service by providing such information.

It

would also be valuable if the government sponsored more, and better
coordinated, collaborative research studies to follow-up infants who
have been cared for in the NICU and provide information on the medical
and social outcome of care.

I believe that "Baby Doe" type regulations (see Chapter VII,
section on the Baby Doe Regulations) are an inappropriate mechanism for
a number of reasons.

Here I will discuss two of the most important.

First, the definition of cases in which treatment may be withheld is too
restrictive.

The latest revision of the regulations only allows

lifesaving treatments to be withheld when an infant is chronically and
irreversibly comatose, treatment is futile, or virtually futile in terms
of survival.

Many parents, clinicians, ethicists and others believe

that there are other situations as well when aggressive medical
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treatment is not in the best interests of an infant, and that parents
have a legal and a moral right to make decisions to withhold treatment.

Second, federal enforcement is neither an appropriate nor
effective mechanism for regulating the care of the critically ill.
Health care law has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of
localities and the States (see Chapters II and III, sections on the law
and withholding treatment). I believe that no compelling argument has
been made to support federal involvement.
has not been effective.

Second, federal involvement

While the Baby Doe Regulations were in effect,

is was not demonstrated that federal involvement led to even a single
case in which an infant who would not otherwise have been treated
received life saving treatment (Bowen v. American Hospital Association)
as the result of a federal investigation.

There is, however, much

anecdotal information suggesting that fear of federal intrusion did lead
to inappropriate aggressive treatment for some infants (Shapiro and
Rosenberg 1984).

Despite the fact that no physicians or parents have been been
found guilty of a criminal offense as a result of withholding treatment
from a catastrophically ill newborns, clinicians and parents sometimes
feel compelled to provide more aggressive treatment

than they believe

is in the best interests of a baby because they fear criminal
prosecution.

Changes in law which would make "good faith decisions" to

withhold treatment, with the approval of an ethics committee, exempt
from criminal prosecution could free parents and clinicians to make what
they consider to be appropriate decisions.

State laws dealing with
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child abuse and with the conduct of medical practice should provide
adequate enforcement to prevent inappropriate decision making.

Increased Awareness and Critical Examination of the Criteria for
Neonatal Decision Making

Decision making about treatment for catastrophically ill newborns
is very complex.

Ultimately, I believe that better decision making for

catastrophically ill infants depends on more awareness and critical
evaluation of the factors involved.

During the past two decades,

clinicians, bioethicists and members of our society at large have become
more concerned about both the power and the limits of medicine.

There

needs to be more awareness and discussion both about the basis for
decision making for individual newborns and

about the issues involvedin

the care of the critically ill in general.

In gaining an understanding of the care of the critically ill,
members of our culture are grappling with issues involving the role of
families, professionals and the state, issues concerning the nature of
human life, dependency and autonomy, the power and limits of science and
medicine and the role of human action and of fate.

Allof these crucial

areas of concern for members of our culture are part of the debate on
treatment for catastrophically ill newborns.
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APPENDIX I

METHODOLOGY

This appendix describes some of methodology of the research in
more detail and supplements material in the introductory chapter.

It

starts with a discussion of preliminary research in the unit, discusses
the systematic review of cases, other research activities, and document
review.

Preliminary Research in the NICU

During the academic years 1977-78 and 78-79, while I was working
for the Task Eorce on Ethics and Values in Neonatology, I observed in
the unit, usually half a day a week; when there was an especially
interesting case, I would spend more time.

I concentrated on learning

as much as I could about the general operations of the unit and about
the care of cases identified by the clinicians as raising "ethical
issues."

After the task force ended, I continued to do informal

observations in the unit, following cases of interest.

In the Spring of

1981, I presented "Treatment Decisions in Neonatology: Issues for
Anthropological Research" at research rounds at the Division of
Neonatology, formally announcing my intentions to do my dissertation
research in the unit.

At that time, I administered a pilot

questionnaire to the eleven people present.

That year, I also
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administrated a questionnaire to the twelve incoming pediatric
residents, new fellows and new NICU nurses.

Project on Ethics and Values in Health Care

From 1978-1983, I worked for the Project on Ethics and Values in
health care.

The project was designed to developed curriculum materials

for health science students and develop a short course in Ethics and
Values in Health Care, which we taught at the College of Physicians and
Surgeons for four years.

Along with other projects, including a study

in the adult medical ICU, I worked on an interdisciplinary task force on
spina bifida.

We conducted an in depth case study of a child with spina

bifida, interviewed the child (then

6-8

teachers, her nurses and her doctors.

years), her parents, her
We explored issues about the

decision that was made not to treat her when she was born, about
subsequent care decisions, and about her life beyond the medical context
for a written report and video tape (Aranow, et al. 1981-82; 1984;
Levin, Palmer and Ross 1984).

Systematic Case Review

In order to do a more systematic observation of decision making in
neonatology, I followed the care of 50 babies admitted consecutively to
the acute section of the NICU in the Fall of 1982.
somewhat atypical of the

668

That series was

babies admitted to the unit that year for
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it included almost forty percent of the smallest premature infants.
Infants with lethal heart defects were probably also over represented.
There was only one baby with a serious neural tube defect.

Hissing from

the sample were any babies who became chronic NICU patients, unable to
be discharged from the unit for more than one year.

(Babies have been

in the NICU at Columbia for more than three years.)

The range of

conditions represented, however, was fairly typical of infants admitted
to the unit.

Thirty four of the fifty babies in the sample were premature (born
before 37 weeks of the normal 40 weeks of gestation) and thirty eight
were "low birth weight" (under 2500 grams or about five and one half
pounds).

Twenty seven of the babies were "very low birth weight" (under

1500 grams or about 3 and a third pounds), most born before thirty
weeks.

All of the premature babies above 1500 grams survived.

under 1500 grams, nine died, all born before 30 weeks.

Of those

The smallest

only weighed 540 grams (about one pound, three ounces) and was only 23
weeks.

In addition to prematurity, one of the premature babies hao( a

serious heart defect, one had intercerebral bleeding, another had
pulmonary and vascular abnormalities, one had hydrocephalus, and
another's mother tested positive for syphilis.

Some of the babies

suffered complications of prematurity including RDS (respiratory
distress), IVHs (bleeding in the brain), NEC (destruction of part of the
intestine), and BPD (chronic lung disease), infections including
meningitis, and some needed closed heart surgery for a PDA (a problem
with cardiac circulation).
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The other large category was infants with heart conditions.
Columbia probably attracts an unusual number of cardiac infants because
it is a major center for cardiac surgery.

Eight babies, including one

who was premature, had serious cardiac conditions.

Five died; one was

the premature baby, two had hypoplastic left hearts (the then lethal
condition later to be made famous by "Baby Fae" and "Baby Jesse"), one
had complex heart disease and had also suffered a long period of time
without oxygen, one had an AV canal, complete, and one, in addition to
the heart defect, also had Down's Syndrome.

Two of the babies who

survived had transposition of the great vessel, another had complex
heart disease associated with a number of other congenital anomalies.

The other babies, who all survived, had a variety of conditions.
Five had respiratory problems, one had a fractured skull, one had
myelomeningocele, one had an abdominal pseudocyst with perforation and
peritonitis, a final baby who had a low fetal heart rate spent a few
hours in the acute section, waiting for space on the semi-acute side.

In each of these cases, I followed decision making about major and
minor decisions closely.

The possibility of non-treatment was raised in

a number of these cases, however, none led to the "paradigmatic ethics
case" in which treatment was withheld, and an infant died who otherwise
would have survived.

Nevertheless, the series was crucial to the

research for through it I realized the importance of many minor
decisions, and the extent of decision making about the care of
terminally ill newborns.
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Questionnaire on Neonatal Decision Making

I had intended to distribute a questionnaire to the staff of the
NICU in the Spring of 1983 in order to use quantitative methods to test
some of the hypotheses I had developed about neonatal decision making.
When the Baby Doe Regulations were announced (see Chapter VIII), I was
concerned about collecting data on withholding treatment from
respondents who worked in a single unit.

Fortunately, I had the

opportunity to distribute the questionnaire at a Conference, ’’Which
Babies Shall Live: Humanistic Dimensions of the Care of Imperiled
Newborns" presented by the Hastings Center and Montefiore Medical
Center.

This conference, held in New York City on April

6,

1983,

attracted people who worked at NICUs throughout the Metropolitan area
and some from other places.

It was also attended by non-clinicians

interested in neonatal decision making.

Questionnaires were distributed

to the 251 people who attended the conference.

(For a copy of the

questionnaire, see below.)

At the conference, I was invited to distribute the questionnaire
at a Columbia Department of Obstetrics Retreat.

Having collected data

from staff at other centers, as well as Columbia, I agreed to distribute
a slightly modified version of the questionnaire to the 52 participants
at the retreat, and also obtained permission to distributed it to the
129 physicians, nurses, and other professional staff who worked in the
NICU at Columbia.
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The first portion of the questionnaire, based on the work of Diana
Crane (1975), presented hypothetical vignettes of cases of newborns with
four critical conditions — Down's syndrome with duodenal atresia,
anencephaly, trisomy-13, and extreme prematurity (25 weeks gestational
age).

For each case, respondents were presented with a list of

treatment choices, each of which they were asked to assume would
increase the baby's chance of survival if given and they were asked to
assume that the parents' views were the same as their own.

Next respondents were asked to indicate: if they thought it would
be best to give or to withhold a number of treatment options for each
baby by circling whether they would either definitely, probably,
probably not, or definitely not recommend each treatment, (2 ) whether
they thought the treatments would be required by the Baby Doe
Directives, and (3) how they would rate each of the treatments on a
scale from one (ordinary) to five (extraordinary).

Another portion of the questionnaire consisted of multiple choice
questions concerning how decisions should be made for individual
newborns, how policies should be set, and which factors should be
important in making such decisions.

In addition, there were questions

requesting background demographic and other information on respondents.
The questionnaires maintained the respondents' anonymity.

In total, 249 of the 432 questionnaires distributed were returned:
130 from the Conference, 97 from the NICU, and 22 from the Obstetrics
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and Gynecology Department Retreat.

The return rates from the response

groups were 52, 75, and 42% respectively.*

Although

this is not a sample of a defined population, it does provide a set of
responses from a number of people, most of whom are very knowledgeable
about treatment decisions for catastrophically ill newborns.
subsample does provide a survey of an entire population.

The NICU

The responses

of the conference and Columbia respondents were similar when responses
of members of each occupational

group were

compared.Unless

otherwise

noted, all responses are combined and reported together.

Of the respondents to the questionnaire, 30% were neonatal nurses,
18% were other nurses, 13% were neonatologists, 14% were other
physicians, 18% worked in other occupations or settings related to the
delivery of health care (medical social work, hospital clergy, hospital
administration and so on) and

6%

worked in law or journalism (most with

a special interest in health) and special education.

Three percent

worked at other occupations or their occupations were unknown.

Seventy-

six percent of the respondents had professional experience working with
catastrophically ill newborns.

Respondents ranged in age from 21 to 73 years,
of

37.

Seventy-four percent of

with an average age

the respondents werefemale,

26% male.

Only the Columbia respondents were asked about religion and religiosity.
Of these, 28% identified themselves as Protestant, 41% as Catholic, 17%

*
In addition, four respondents returned questionnaires in both the
first and third response groups; their responses were tallied only in
the second subsample.
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as Jewish, 7% as other, and 7% as none.

Eleven percent characterized

themselves as deeply religious, 60% as moderately religious, 26% as
indifferent to religion, and 3% as opposed to religion.
rate per item was generally high.

The response

Reported percentages are based on

answers from at least 240 responses, unless otherwise noted.

Following Crane (1978), there is said to be "consensus" when
there is agreement of at least 75% of the respondents to "’yes' or
'probably yes'" or to '"no1 or 'probably no'."

Controversy or lack of

consensus is said to exist when less than 75% of the respondents were in
agreement.

Some of the results from the survey are reported in the body

of the dissertation.

(For a more complete and concise report, see Levin

1985.)

Other participant observation research activities

I also visited four other NICUs in New York, units in three other
cities in the Northeastern United States and one unit in Canada.

I

interviewed clinicians who worked in at least eight other units across
the country.

In order to maintain anonymity, cases discussed in this

thesis are draw from these other locations as well as Columbia.

In this complex process of studying a subculture of my own
culture, where the "natives" are themselves interested in analysis, and
I am to some extent being socialized into the subculture* the lines
between the object of study and the process of study are often hard to
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draw.

Over the years, I have attended numerous conferences on neonatal

decision making.

Typically, these were helpful both because they

presented an academic analysis of decision making (that helped to inform
my own analysis), and were, themselves, occasions to research the
perspectives developing on decision making both by clinicians and
others.

Similarly, I have been very fortunate to have been able to be a
participant in the Hastings Center Research Group on Ethics and the Care
of Newborns.

This group, with participation of some of the nation's

leading and most knowledgeable philosophers, lawyers, physicians, nurses
and others concerned with neonatal decision making, has been exploring
the complexities of the issues and working toward developing a social
policy statement.

In addition to providing colleagues who are also

studying this issue, it has presented an extraordinary opportunity both
for observation and informal interviews of some of the actors who are
involved in making individual care decisions and in establishing
national policy.

The same type of merging of research and observation has occurred
as I have presented papers on my own work.

In the Spring of 1983, at

research rounds in the Division of Neonatology, I presented my "research
subjects" with the preliminary version of my analysis including the
conceptual framework I had developed to understand neonatal decision
making.

Their acceptance of the model affirmed its ability to mesh with

their understanding of decision making.

I have heard that my

observations have even been referred to in the process of discussing the
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management of cases.

Numerous times, when I have presented at other

forums, clinicians have come up to me afterwards and told me that they
had never thought of it in quite the same way, but that what I presented
described what happens in their clinical setting and would often provide
case illustrations.

This, of course, itself, is research material.

Since 1983, I have followed occasional cases in the NICU but have
not done systematic field work.

In the Winter of 1983-4, I was invited

to be one of the founding members of the Neonatal Bioethics Review
Committee for the NICU at Columbia.

Initially I tried to be both a

researcher and a participant on the committee; finding too much role
strain, I have opted to be primarily a participant.

Nevertheless, the

committee meetings have provided some additional data used in this
dissertation.

Document Review

In addition to participant review, I tried to learn as much as I
could about neonatal decision making from a review of the clinical,
legal, bioethics, and popular literature.

When I began this research in

1977 there was relatively little written on neonatal decision making and
social issues in neonatology.

I was able to obtain most of the books

and articles I had heard about, not only on ethical issues in neonatal
intensive care but on the experience of parents and staff in the NICU.
I conducted a number of computer searches of the literature.
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In the past few years there has been an explosion in the number of
books and articles on the topic, especially in the three years since the
announcement of enforcement of the Baby Doe Directives.

Since then I

have tried to concentrate on articles of particular relevance to my
research interests.

I was especially interested in books and articles describing
clinical cases, in order to see if I could find any which indicated that
other clinicians made treatment choices in ways that were very different
than the clinicians I was studying.

I was particularly interested in

books and articles by clinicians, social scientists and others such as
Anspach (forthcoming), Bell (1975), Bogden, Brown and Foster (1982),
Colon (1981), Crane (1975), Duff and Campbell (1973), Guillemin and
Holmstrom (1983), Gustaitis and Young (1986), Lorber (1973), Lyon
(1985), Magnet and Kluge (1985), Marshall, Kasman and Cape (1982), Shaw
(1972), Shelp (1986), Stinson and Stinson (1983) and Weir (1984), among
others that described clinical practice.

Although, clearly some

clinicians made decisions which differed dramatically in substance and
process from those made by the clinicians I was studying, they all "made
sense" in my analytic framework.

I also systematically sought articles on a few particular
categories.

These included those which discussed differentiations

between treatments (see Chapter VI), articles published before Duff and
Campbell (1973) (frequently mentioned as the first major article on this
topic), and articles written by social scientists (see Chapter III).
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I also read the literature with a desire to understand the larger
context in which decision making about newborns was taking place.

I

followed the popular media on decision making in neonatology,
particularly the coverage of "The Baby Doe" issue.

I read articles on

legal issues pertaining to neonatology and closely read the Baby Doe
regulations and many of the related legal decisions.

I examined follow-

up studies on the graduates of neonatal intensive care and on the costs
and structure of NICUs.

Although not

. able to survey other topics as comprehensively, I

also examined the literature on withholding treatment from older
patients, medical decision making, reproductive decision making
(especially prenatal diagnosis), decision making about the care of
children, the use of medical technology, and general issues in
biomedical ethics.

As with the "other research activities," the literature provided
both analytic background and was, itself, research material.
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QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED IN THE

NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT

SPRING 1983

See description of the survey methods, Appendix, pages 434 - 437.
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PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH CORRESPONDS TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION (CIRCLE TWO IF APPLICABLE)
1
2
3

Attending Neonatologist
Fellow in Neonatology
Pediatric Resident

7 Other

4 NICU Nurse
5 Perinatal Nursing Student
6 Midwifery Student

pleese specify
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING FOUR VIGNETTES.

FOR EACH ONE ASSUME THAT:

—
—

THE PARENTS’ VIEWS ARE THE SAME AS YOURS.
EACH TREATMENT, IF GIVEN, WOULD INCREASE THE BABY’S CHANCE OF SURVIVAL.

—

YOU ARE ASKED TO RECOMMEND WHAT YOU THINK WOULD BE THE BEST TREATMENT DECISIONS FOR EACH
BABY.

PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER WHICH MOST CLOSELY RESPONDS TO YOUR -OPINION FOR EACH TREATMENT.
(Please disregard numbers at the far right margin which are for coding purposes only.)
QUESTION ONE— THE CASE OF BABY "A”
Baby "A" is born with Downs syndrome (Mongolism). Soon after birth, the baby is also found to
have duodenal atresia, an intestinal defect which can be corrected by routine surgery. Without
surgery, the baby cannot drink milk or other fluids by mouth.
WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
DEFINITELY
YES
1.
2.
3.

Intravenous feedings? ..................
Surgery to correct the intestinal defect? .
Antibiotics, if it is suspected that the
baby also had an infection? ...........

Suppose the baby w b s also f o u n d
defect, WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
4.
5.
6.

to

PROBABLY
YES

PROBABLY
NO

~~T ~

DEFINITELY
NO

—y

T

3
3

4
4

have a heart

Cardiac catheterization— -an invasive
diagnostic procedure? .................
Open heart surgery (for VSD)?......... .
After heart surgery, suppose the baby
developed chronic kidney failure, would
you recommend maintenance dialysis? . . .

The Department of Health and Human Services recently issued a directive stating that hospitals
must post signs saying 'discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this
facility is prohibited by Federal law." No specific guidelines were issued to aid in interpreting
the directive. A decision by a Federal district judge struck down the new rule. The Department
of Health and Human Services has appealed the decision.
B.

IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TREATMENTS WOULD BE
REQUIRED OR NOT FOR BABY "A"?
DEFINITELY
YES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

PROBABLY
YES

PROBABLY
NO

T

Intravenous feedings.................
Surgery to correct the intestinal defect
Antibiotics..........................
Cardiac catheterization .............
Open heart surgery ..................
Kidney dialysis ......................

2

2
2
2

2

DEFINITELY
NO
4
4
4
4
4
4

ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREATMENTS LISTED
ABOVE FOR BABY "A"?
1.
2.
3.
4.
3.
6.

ORDINARY
Intravenous feedings...................
1
Surgery to correct theintestinal defect . 1
Antibiotics..........................
1
Cardiac catheterization...............
1
Open heart surgery.....................
1
Kidney d i a lysis ......................
T

EXTRAORDINARY
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
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QUESTION TWO; THE CASE OF BABY "B"
At birth, Baby "B" is found to be anencephalic (lacking the cerebrum, cerebellum, and the flat
bones of the skull), which indicates that the baby could have no upper brain function. Most
anencephalic babies die within the first few days of life; all die within the first few weeks.
WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
1. resuscitation— trying to start respiration
if the baby isn't breathing— in the delivery
r o o m ? ............................... ..
2. feeding by mouth if the baby can suck? . . .
3. gavage (tube) feeding if the baby can't
suck?
4. antibiotics if it is suspected that the
baby also has an infection?........ ..

DEFINITELY
YES

PROBABLY
YES

PROBABLY
NO

DEFINITELY
NO

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

1

2

3

4

Suppose the baby was also found to have a heart
defect, WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
5

cardiac catheterization— an invasive
diagnostic procedure?
6. open heart surgery (for V S D ) ?
7. an arrest page— restarting the heart if it
stops beating
B.

IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TREATMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED
OR NOT FOR BABY "B"?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY
NO
NO
YES
YES
5
3--— z—
1. resuscitation in the delivery room
4
3
2
2. feedings by mouth . . . . . . . .
4
2
3
3. tube feedings . . . . . . . . . .
4
3
2
4. antibiotics ...................
4
3
2
3. cardiac catheterization .......
4
2
3
6. open heart surgery ............
4
3
2
7. an arrest page . . . . .........

C.

ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREATMENTS LISTED
ABOVE FOR BABY "B"?
EXTRAORDINARY
ORDINARY
4
5
1. resuscitation in the delivery room
4
5
2. feedings by mouth . . .........
4
5
3. tube feedings . . . . .........
4
5
4.
a n t i b i o t ic s
...............................................
4
5
5. cardiac catheterization .......
4
5
6. open heart surgery . . . . . . . .
4
5
7. an arrest page . . . . .........

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

QUESTION THREE; THE CASE OF BABY "C"
Baby "C" was born with multiple congenital anomalies— low set ears, 8kin folds around the neck, a
cleft palate, and cardiac enomolies— suggestive of trisomy 13, a chromosomal anomaly which is
always associated with severe mental retardation and severe physical impairments. Host of these
babies die within the first few months, almost all die within the first year. If Baby
doesn't have trisomy 13, he may have only correctable physical defects or he nay have uncorrec
table physical and/or neurological defects.
A.

WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:

.
3.
4.

2

resuscitation— trying to start respiration
— in the delivery room?.................
nutrition and fluids? ....................
putting the baby bn a respirator if he can't
breathe for himself? ....................
antibiotics, if it is suspected that the baby
has an infection?
............... .

DEFINITELY
YES

PROBABLY
YES

1

2
2

1

PROBABLY
NO
3
3

DEFINITELY
NO

4

4

Now suppose that after resuscitation in the delivery room Baby "C" was breathing on his own and
was admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit for evaluation. Two days later, chromosomal
analysis indicated that he does indeed have trisomy 13.
WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
DEFINITELY
YES

PROBABLY
YES

PROBABLY
NO

4
4

.......

5.

nutrition and fluids?

7.

antibiotics, if it is suspected tha1 the
baby has an infection?.......
a
•
•
•
putting the baby on a respirator if he can't
breathe for himself? .........
cardiac catheterization? ........
open heart surgery (for VSD)? . .
an arrest page— restarting the heart if
it stops beat i n g ? ...............

6. surgery to correct the cleft palate?
8.

9.
10
11

.
.

DEFINITELY
NO

2

2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TREATMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED
OR NOT FOR BABY "B"?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY
NO
YES_______ YES_______ NO
1
2
>
1. resuscitation
inthe delivery r o o m ....
Before chromosomal analysis
4
2. nutrition and
fluids..............
1
2
3
4
3. respirator...................
1
2
3
4
...........................
1
2
3
4. antibiotics
After chromosomal analysis
4
3
5. nutrition and fluids
2
4
3
2
6. surgery to correct the cleft palate
4
3
7. antibiotics ....................
2
4
3
2
B. respirator ......................
4
3
2
9. cardiac catheterization .........
4
3
10. open heart surgery ...............
2
4
2
3
11. an arrest page ...................
C.

ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREATMENTS LISTED
ABOVE FOR BABY "C"?
EXTRAORDINARY
ORDINARY
5
1. resuscitation in the delivery room .
1
Before chromosomal analysis
4
3
5
2
2. nutrition and fluids .............
4
5
3
2
3. respirator ......................
4
5
3
2
4. antibiotics....................
After chromosomal analysis
3
4
5
5. nutrition and fluids .............
2
3
4
5
2
6. surgery to correct the cleft palate
3
4
5
2
7. antibiotics....... ............
4
5
3
2
8. respirator ......................
4
5
3
2
9. cardiac catheterization .........
4
2
3
5
10. open heart surgery...............
3
4
5
11. an arrest page ...................
2

...
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QUESTION FOUR: THE CASE OF BABY "D"
Baby "D" was born at a gestational age of 25 weeks (15 weeks before the end of a full tern
pregnancy) weighing 560 gins. (1 lb. 3 oz.). He was born-vaginally. His apgar score at birth was
1— a score which indicated that he had probably suffered from lack of oxygen, his eyes were
fused— indicating that he was very premature. He wasn't breathing on his own but did have a alow
heart beat.
A.

WOULD YOU RECOMMEND:
DEFINITELY
YES
1.

PROBABLY
YES

PROBABLY
NO

DEFINITELY
NO

Resuscitation— trying to start
respiration— in the delivery room?

Suppose Baby D " was resuscitated and put on a respirator? The following day, ultrasound— a .
diagnostic test— revealed that he had a grade III— IV IVH— a large amount of bleeding in the
brain. He therefore has approximately a 50% chance of survival. If he survives, he probably has
less than a 50% chance of being normal. Deficits could range from moderate to severe mental
retardation and/or neurological impairments (such as cerebral palsy).
DEFINITELY
YES

PROBABLY
YES

PROBABLY
NO

DEFINITELY
NO

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3
3
3

4
4
4

WOULD YOU RECOMfCND:
increasing respirator settings— giving
the baby more oxygen? .............
IF NOT, WOULD YOU:
(a) leave the baby on the respirator?
or
(b) take the baby off the respirator?
3.

A
B

nutrition and fluids? ...............

4. auctioning to remove excess fluid from
5.

6.
7.
B.

2

2

IN INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL DIRECTIVE, DO YOU THINK THAT THE FOLLOWING TREATtCNTS WOULD BE
REQUIRED OR NOT FOR BABY "D"?
DEFINITELY PROBABLY PROBABLY DEFINITELY
YES_______ YES_______ NO_______ NO
1. resuscitation in the delivery room
. 1
2
3
4
2. increased respirator settings
1
2
3
4
3. nutrition and fluids
1
2
3
4
4. auctioning
1
2
3
4
5.
6.
7.

C.

airways? ........................
pressors— powerful drugs to maintain
blood pressure? ...................
an arrest page to restart the heart? .
kidney dialysis if the kidneys failed?

pressors
an arrest page
kidney dialysis

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

ON A SCALE FROM 1 (ORDINARY) TO 5 (EXTRAORDINARY), HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE TREAT1CNTS LISTED
ABOVE FOR BABY "D"?
1.
2.
3.
4.

resuscitation in thedelivery room
increased respirator settings
nutrition and fluids
auctioning

5.
6.
7.

pressors
an arrest page
kidney dialysis

ORDINARY
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4
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EXTRAORDINARY
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

QUESTION TIVE
A.

HOW DO YOU THINK THAT DECISIONS ABOUT TREATMENT FOR IfOIVIDUAL CATASTROPHICALLY ILLMEt®ORNS
SHOULD BE HADE? Assume that disagreements could be referred to the Courts.(Please
circle
the one statement which best describes your view.)
By
By
By
By

the physicians caring for the baby . ; ........................................
physicians, nurses, and other professionals caring for the baby ................
the baby's parents with the advice of professionals caring for the b a b y .........
a joint decision by parents and professionals with disagreements referred to a
Hospital Ethics Committee ...................................................
By a Court in all cases..............
No decisions should be made on a case by case basis, all should reflect specific
policies .............................. . . . . .
___________
Other
iplease specify)

B.

1
2
3
4
5
6
1

HOW DO YOU THINK THAT POLICIES SHOULD BE SET REGARDING TREATMENT FOR CATASTROPHICALLY ILL
NEWBORNS? (Please circle the one statement which best describes your view.)
Specific guidelines set by hospital ethics committees .............................
Broad guidelines set by hospital Ethics Committee. . . . . .........................
Specific guidelines set by State legislatures ................................. . .
Broad guidelines set by State legislatures ......................................
Specific guidelines set by the Federal Government... ...............................
.................................
Broad guidelines set by the Federal Government
No policies should beset, all decisions should be made on a case by case basis . . . .
No policies should beset, all newborns should always receive all treatments ........
Other
®
(please specify!

1
2
3
4
3
6
7
8

QUESTION SIX
A.

WHICH FACTORS DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE IMPORTANT IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WITHHOLDING CARE
FROM CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS? (A) Please circle the number corresponding to each
factor which you think is important.

severity of physical impairment . . .
severity of intellectual impairment .
amount of prolonged pain and
suffering......................
capacity to give and receive love .’.
uncertainty about the extent of
impairment ....................
impact, on parents.................
impact on siblings ...............
ability of parents to have other
healthy children ...............
financial burden to family .......
parents' wishes ..................
if treatments are heroic .........
if chance of successful treatment
is small ......................

B.

.
.

1
2

.

4

.

7

.

B

.

11

feelings of ataff caring for baby .
if treatments are already started .
if non-treatment would be active
euthanasia . . . . . . . . . . . .
cost of neonatal intensive care . .
long term costs of caring for
disabled child and adult.......
availability of resourses for
other sick children ...........
availability of resources for
other medical care .............
danger of lessening the "value of
life" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
availability of resources for other,
non-medical, social needs . . . .
Other (please specify) ...........

13
14
15
16
17
1B
19
20
21
22

Please list the numbers of the three factors (listed above) which you think are most important
number;
(most important!

number:
Und most important)

number;
(3rd most important)
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QUESTION SEVEN
UNDER CURRENT LAWS. AN ABORTION MAY BE PERFORMED FOR ANY IIOICATION
GESTATION. AFTER THE 24TH WEEK, ABORTION IS ILLEGAL. DO YOU THINK
FOR THE FOLLOWING INDICATIONS? If so, circle "YES" end indicate up
last menstrual period an induced termination of pregnancy should be
Please give an answer for each indication.

UNTIL THE 24TH WEEK OF
THAT ABORTION SHOULD BE LEGAL
to which week following tte
legal. If not, circle "NO.

YES______wks.

NO

economic hardship ............................

YES______wks.

NO

3.

unmarried mother

YES_____ wks.

NO

4.

r a p e ..................................... .

YES

wks.

NO

5.

i n c e s t ........... .........................

YES_____ wks.

NO

6.

risk to mother's psychological health (eg. severe
depression) .................................

YES

wks.

NO

7.

risk to mother’s physical health (eg. uncontrolled
diabetes) ...................................

YES

wks.

NO

8.

risk to mother's life (eg. eclampsia)

.........

YES______ wks.

NO

9.

prenatal diagnosis of:
a.

baby of the undesired sex . . . . . . . . . . . . .

YES______wks.

NO

b.

Downs syndrome (see quest. 1) ...................

Y E S _____ wks.

NO

c.

anencephaly (aee quest. 2)

YES______wks.

NO

d.

trisomy 13 (aee quest. 3 ) ............. .

YES

wks.

NO

e.

bilateral polycystic kidneys— a lethal condition
involving non-functioning kidneys . . . . . . . .

YES______wks.

NO

f.

thorasic spina bifida— physical defect involving
paraplegia and incontinence of urine and stool

YES

NO

1.

contraceptive failure ........................

2.

■

............................

. ...................

wks.

PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

449

FINALLY, A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR BACKGROUND:

(please be specific)

1.

OCCUPATION: ____________________ _________________________________________

2.

TITLE OF POSITION: ___________ ______________

3.

SPECIALTY: ____________________ _____________

4.

SEX:

5.

AGE: __________

(Please circle)

6 . DO YOU HAVE CHILDREN?

M

F

(Please circle)

YES

NO

7.

EDUCATIONAL DEGREE(S) AND SPECIALTY TRAINING (Please specify fields and dates.)

8.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED IN A NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT?
aonth)

(please count rotations by

never.....................................................
under 3 m o n t h s ........................
3 months- 1year .......................................... . . . . .
1-3 years ......................................... . . . . . . . . .
3-5 years.....................................................
5-10 years... ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10-15 years..........................................
over 15 years. . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

HAVE YOU WORKED IN A RELATED AREA (e.g. obstetrics, pediatrics)?
never.....................................
under 3 m o n t h s ......................
3 months-1 y e a r .....................................
1-3 years.......................................................
3-5 years.................................
5-10 years ........... . . . . . . . . . . . .
10-15 years...........................
over 15 years............................................

10.

IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION 9 as 2-8, PLEASE SPECIFY AREA

11.

HAVE YOU HAD ANY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CATASTROPHICALLY ILL NEWBORNS?
(Please circle)

NO

YES

(If so, please describe briefly)

PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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BACKGROUND QUESTIONS (Continued)

12.

RELIGION:

A.

Protestant

1
(denomination)

C a t h o l i c ...................................

Jewish:
Orthodox,

Conservative

2

• •• ............

3

or Reform

N o n e ...........................

4

Other

5
Please specify

B.

DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF (please circle):
deeply religious . . . .................................
moderately religious . . . . . ............... . . . . . .
largely indifferent to religion ..........................
basically opposed to religion. . . ' .......................

-13.

1

2
3
4
3

HAVE YOU RETURNED ANY OTHER QUESTIONNAIRES WHICH WERE PART OF THIS STUDY?
(please circle appropriate nos.)
distributed in theunit, Spring 1981
distributed to 1styear residents, July1981*^............
distributed in theunit, April 1 9 B 3 .....................
distributed at the"Which Babies ShallLive"conference,
April 1983 ..........................................
distributed at Arden House,April, 1983 ..................
N o ....................................................

15.

3
4

IN YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS, DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF (please circle):
radical left...........................................
liberal ..............................................
middle-of-the road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
conservative.........
radical r i g h t ...........

14.

1

2

1
2
3
4
5
6

ARE THERE ANY COMfCNTS THAT YOU WOULD- LIKE TO HAKE?
(If any of the questions were particularly difficult to answer, please indicate which ones
and why.)

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

£
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